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One of the best ways to recognize new, effective political forms is that you don’t 
like them. They are paradoxical. They are disgusting. It doesn’t belong to the dark 
side, but it points to something that is already there.
 — AKSELI VIRTANEN, FOUNDER OF ROBIN HOOD COOPERATIVE
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INTRODUCTION TOWARD A THEORY 
OF PARASITICAL RESISTANCE 
The tactics of appropriation have been co- opted. Illegal action has become ad-
vertisement. Protest has become cliché. Revolt has become passé. . . . Having 
accepted these failures to some degree, we can now attempt to define a parasitic 
tactical response. We need to invent a practice that allows invisible subversion. 
We need to feed and grow inside existing communication systems while con-
tributing nothing to their survival; we need to become parasites. — NATHAN M. 
MARTIN FOR THE CARBON DEFENSE LEAGUE, “PARASITIC MEDIA” (2002)
In 2006 the tactical media collective Ubermorgen gained access to Amazon’s digital library, capturing more than three thousand copyright- protected 
books sold on the site by manipulating its “Search Inside the Book” feature.1 
Unleashing a series of software applications known as “bots,” Ubermorgen 
sent five thousand to ten thousand requests per book and reassembled them 
into pdf s that were then distributed for free via peer- to- peer (p2p) networks. 
The bots tricked Amazon’s preview mechanism (designed to limit user 
previews in accordance with copyright protections) into furnishing com-
plete volumes of the books. Rather than hacking Amazon’s digital library, 
Ubermorgen acquired the files through what they described as a mode of 
“frontdoor access.”2 The group merely accepted Amazon’s invitation to pre-
view the books, albeit at a much higher rate than Amazon intended. The 
project, Amazon Noir: The Big Book Crime (figures I.1 and I.2), is one in-
stallment of what the self- described “big media hackers,” in collaboration 
with Alessandro Ludovico and Paolo Cirio, call their Hacking Monopolism 
Trilogy. The trilogy is a series of “conceptual hacks” with which they claim 
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to have exploited “unexpected holes in [the] well- oiled marketing and eco-
nomic system” of “three of the biggest online corporations (Amazon, Face-
book, and Google).”3 After Amazon threatened Ubermorgen with legal ac-
tion, the case was settled out of court with Amazon buying the Amazon Noir 
software for an undisclosed sum on the condition that Ubermorgen sign a 
nondisclosure agreement, effectively containing the disruption and restor-
ing the former system. What had been previously a fairly straightforwardly 
subversive artwork thus became financially implicated in Amazon’s black- 
boxing practices.
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But even by giving in, Ubermorgen tells us something in their shift to 
complicity. Crucially, Ubermorgen had not only located a loophole in Ama-
zon’s marketing strategy; by obliging Amazon to settle in secrecy to ensure 
that the software stayed out of the public domain, the tactical media group 
exposed the corporation’s investment in an appearance of openness. In the 
mid- 2000 s Amazon had begun pushing publishers to let them digitize their 
lists, a move that eventually helped the company secure a monopoly on the 
industry by making publishers dependent on Amazon for sales. Amazon 
Noir, and its co- option by Amazon, points to the hypocrisy by which big cor-
porations like Amazon benefit from restricting the free circulation of infor-
mation (strongarming publishers into exclusive agreements, dodging gov-
ernment regulation, criminalizing content sharing beyond their own site, 
forcing Ubermorgen into a nondisclosure agreement) while capitalizing on 
the ideal of shared access (its “Search Inside the Book” feature).4 “Search In-
side the Book” is a marketing tool that enables users to search through books 
while preventing access to the whole book. With Amazon Noir, as Nicholas 
Thoburn observes, Ubermorgen discloses “the inequity of the privatization 
of the nonscarce resource digital text, while taking advantage of the means 
by which the technological affordances of digital text are mobilized to ex-
cite consumer desire.”5 But not only does Amazon employ digital technol-
ogy to privatize access; Amazon does not redistribute the profits it makes 
to the writers and contributors whose work it digitizes and samples via the 
tool.6 The artwork — and resulting settlement — thus highlights the false pre-
tenses by which Amazon profits from imposing a strong legal and moral 
distinction between the “good openness” represented by the company’s 
free preview and the “bad openness” represented by Ubermorgen’s pirated 
open access.7 By insisting on its role as the good guy, Amazon disavows re-
sponsibility for how its dominant market position — the result of predatory 
business practices such as aggressive customer data mining and deep dis-
counts intended to drive out small businesses and secure the cooperation of 
publishers — intimidates potential challengers. This shields the company 
from having to face up to its own compromised status: its potential liabil-
ity for copyright infringement and antitrust violations.8 Amazon’s ability to 
claim the uncontested legal and moral high ground, to position itself as a 
champion of openness, is a function of its status as a monopoly — a position 
ironically secured by monopolizing and privatizing openness. As part of the 
settlement, Ubermorgen agreed not to discuss Amazon Noir publicly, and all 
media coverage of the artwork ceased. 
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The critical issue at hand is not whether Ubermorgen’s actions are right 
in the conventional legal or moral sense but why the same scrutiny is so 
rarely leveled at major players like Amazon. While a culture of nondisclo-
sure agreements portends an era of posttransparency, wherein corporate 
and state interests feel little compunction to hide their nontransparent gov-
ernance, Amazon Noir shows that powerful corporations like Amazon are 
nevertheless still invested in concealing their opacity and structural non-
accountability.9 They selectively engage the law so as to keep their coercive 
practices in a proverbial black box — in this case, by avoiding going to court, 
black- boxing Ubermorgen’s algorithm, and prohibiting any further press 
about the artwork.10 It is not that they no longer hide their protocols, but 
they no longer hide that they are hiding them. The rise of big tech platforms 
like Amazon has been closely linked to the fulfillment of a postwelfare logic 
of capitalism that many have called neoliberalism. Digital technology both 
accelerates and emblematizes this reorganization of contemporary life and 
its turn toward privatization and deregulation, as a handful of leviathan- 
like corporations increasingly monopolize all aspects of industry, leaving 
democratic principles and institutions crippled in their wake.11 Corporate 
monopolies’ nontransparency and nonreciprocity (e.g., obstructionist strate-
gies such as mandatory closed- door arbitration and settlements out of court) 
have become an open secret, even an expectation. As a result Amazon’s com-
modification of a highly calculated form of open access cannot be remedied 
by an act of simple unmasking. Precisely because the hypocrisy of the sys-
tem is already exposed, undermining it must necessarily take other forms.12
Ubermorgen’s intervention effectively held Amazon hostage to the com-
pany’s own purported openness (and legality) even as it performed a fun-
damental concession to the nontransparency of the system by agreeing to 
settle out of court. Put simply, the collective both called Amazon’s bluff and 
folded at the same time. In the act of settling, Ubermorgen managed to make 
Amazon the patron of the anticorporate artwork. But by making Amazon 
the patron of their work, the group also sold out. What are we to make of 
the dual effect of this action? Does Amazon Noir ultimately reject or rein-
force Amazon’s monopolization of information? Is the artwork resistant or 
is it complicit? And more to the point, are these designations mutually exclu-
sive? Does Ubermorgen’s settling with Amazon nullify the critical potential 
of the work? 
Like Amazon Noir, the performance- based artworks explored in this book 
manifest a logic of aesthetic resistance whose meaning and effects are far 
more indeterminate, far harder to pin down, than those which animated 
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much of avant- garde and oppositional art in the late twentieth century. These 
artworks take seriously the ambiguity that is already implied by the word 
resistance, as an act that necessarily presupposes the structural conditions 
against which it struggles, precisely because it cannot destroy or escape 
them outright. By turns irreverent, irksome, and disturbingly amoral, the 
artworks I discuss are not virtuous. They are not good or reassuring in the 
way we may typically think of political art. But these works nevertheless 
raise necessary and difficult questions about the meaning and value of re-
sistance, and the very possibility of critique, in a moment of ubiquitous ap-
propriation and financialization characterized by extreme consolidations of 
capital and ever more enmeshed and dependent relationships to power. Can 
something still be considered resistant if it is complicit with the structural 
conditions it challenges? Is resistance thinkable from a position that is not 
autonomous but embedded? 
This book responds to calls for politico- aesthetic strategies adequate to 
the waning sense of agency in a moment when the political tools on hand 
appear co- opted in advance. It begins from the premise that conventional 
notions of radical art and politics, gestures of transgression and refusal in-
herited from twentieth- century avant- garde aesthetics and revolutionary 
politics, traffic an idealism that does not fully account for the deep struc-
tural enmeshment of the contemporary subject. As corporate and state en-
tities have become more efficient at recuperating disruption back into the 
workings of capital — and as digital technologies have intensified surveil-
lance and accelerated appropriation — control and resistance have become 
nearly indistinguishable. Projects of artistic subversion and activist resis-
tance not only appear to be impotent gestures or anachronisms of a bygone 
era, but, even more perniciously, seem to throw gas on the fire of systems of 
extraction and exploitation.13 What are the meaning and value of a politics of 
disruption when artworks that are critical of corporations and government 
institutions can be said to help them — however inadvertently — close their 
loopholes? When hackers actually help states and corporations improve the 
security of their information systems?14 When anti- establishment art and 
modes of critique are adopted as profitable marketing strategies?15 What, 
we might ask, is the efficacy of resistance when it performs an immunitary 
function that renders the mechanisms it seeks to challenge all the more im-
pervious to it? Today, when disruption and critique are not what threaten the 
stability of the system but are essential to its functioning, would- be radical 
artists and critics find themselves implicated in, even feeding, the very power 
structures they seek to oppose.16 
6 INTRODUCTION
The Play in the System is not a book about specific digital platforms, prac-
tices, or technologies; neither is it a book that focuses on contemporary art-
ists and interventionists either working in a particular media or visual genre 
or representing a specific ethnicity or gender. It is a book about an idea, a 
system, the emergence of a new aesthetic and critical formation in response 
to the blunted force of frontal resistance in the face of ever more accommo-
dating and entrenched systems of power. The digital is not necessarily the 
medium or site of exhibition of these artworks; it is the informing condition 
of their emergence. The digital constitutes a favorable milieu for the consoli-
dation of power structures that predate it, for technologies, sold as empow-
ering, draw us ever more tightly into their ideological mechanisms through 
apparatuses of capture and economies of dependency. This study recon-
ceives resistance under what Gilles Deleuze famously termed the regime 
of control, where power has moved outside disciplinary spaces of enclosure 
and made openness its constitutive promise.17 Control, as compared to dis-
cipline, describes a formation of power that is more indirect, unbounded, 
and “flexible.” 
The book introduces and theorizes this tactic of complicit resistance as 
parasitism. Parasitical works use art as a means to wedge open — to redi-
rect or subtly re- incline — the mechanisms used to justify and legitimize the 
privatization of resources and access. Parasitism responds to a contempo-
rary political economy in which less powerful players are increasingly con-
strained and made dependent by the terms of their relationships to more 
powerful players. A new landscape of mass precarity has emerged in the 
wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and the rise of the digital platform 
economy, as wealth and influence have consolidated ever more narrowly in 
the hands of a powerful few. Neoliberal conditions in the Global North (this 
book focuses specifically on the United States and Europe) present a seem-
ing impasse for the once more reliable strategies of opposition and refusal 
associated with 1960s- , 1970s- , and 1980s- era anti- institutional, Marxist, and 
feminist art and critique as hegemonic power has immunized itself against 
these strategies by absorbing and monetizing once radical projects. As sec-
ond- and third- wave feminism, cultural studies, and institutional critique 
have been integrated into and canonized by prestigious higher education 
and art institutions, the sites of analysis from which structural power has 
been most effectively critiqued have themselves threatened to become he-
gemonic. At the same time, the economic precarity of a new generation of 
radical artists and activists has been made more and more dependent on 
corporate and institutional resources for their financial survival, weighing 
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down their political commitments with a sense of ambiguity. This techno-
cultural and economic shift has transformed contemporary interventionist 
and feminist aesthetics, and it is the parasitical works of artistic resistance 
that emerge from this climate change that this book explores.
To understand how some have forged resistance within these conditions, 
the book convenes an original archive of (mostly) lesser- known and emerg-
ing artists and interventionists working on the margins of the mainstream 
art world and the traditional scholarly canon, who have been compelled to 
operate within this inhospitable — or rather, all too hospitable — order. I ar-
gue that the uptake (and rejection) of parasitism within particular strands 
of art and activism signals a tactical repositioning, a means by which cer-
tain artists and interventionists have sought to highlight and operational-
ize their contingent and derivative status with respect to established radical 
critical and aesthetic traditions. The artworks in this book at once inherit 
from and sit in uneasy relation to aesthetic strategies and practices associ-
ated with the twentieth- century feminist avant- garde insofar as they contest 
power structures while also highlighting their own complicity with such 
structures. The conditions that constitute these artists’ host milieus vary 
from chapter to chapter. For interventionist artists working in the vein of 
institutional critique, it is the inexorability of digital and legal apparatuses 
of corporate and state power; for experimental women artists and writers, 
it is the dominating presence of an already established male avant- garde; 
and for a younger cohort of performance artists struggling to survive in the 
postcrisis economy, it is the outsized institutional shadow cast by an earlier 
feminist art canon. Many of these artists have found themselves precariously 
employed, increasingly reliant on the creative and academic gig economies 
of the neoliberal university and art market. Stringing together experimental 
festival appearances and adjunct teaching, performances in alternative art 
spaces, and exhibitions on social media while living off credit cards, most 
of the artists represented in this book reflect the burdens of a landscape of 
mounting debt, failing public infrastructure, and diminishing professional 
horizons. Here generation is thus understood less as a question of age than of 
sensibility and situation, for it is now defined by one’s perceived contingency 
within the new economy of precarity. 
The book is organized around the escalation and distortion of this tactic 
of resistance. It examines artworks across a number of genres and sites of 
practice that increasingly problematize the parasite- host binary over the arc 
of the book; as the political stakes of these works get messier, they increas-
ingly display the critical and ethical limits, some might argue the reductio ad 
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absurdum, of parasitism as a minoritarian tactic as it slides into autocritique. 
The book focuses on art because art has always been parasitical — always al-
ready compromised by virtue of being caught up in the economy of its con-
sumption and patronage. This introduction lays out an affirmative theory 
of parasitical resistance, while the chapters that follow are case studies and 
readings of how it works in practice. The first part of the book explores para-
sitism in the context of interventionist works of systemic and institutional 
critique, and the second part looks at works in the arena of feminist art and 
aesthetics. The difference in scale between the examples in the first and sec-
ond parts and the power differentials they represent are necessary to the 
book’s investigation of the various faces and strategies of dominant power 
and the nature of its investment in appearing open and accessible, for these 
power differentials shape the forms of resistance it affords. The feel- good 
conceptualism of Amazon Noir looks a bit like a Robin Hood story, with 
hackers robbing the powerful and redistributing the spoils to the people. But 
when later artworks examined here use the same parasitical tactics against 
individuals, without the same altruistic effects, it can be harder to see them 
as resistance to power. 
In 2009 a London- based Irish conceptual artist, Roisin Byrne, performed 
a very similar operation of parasitical resistance to Ubermorgen’s. Instead 
of a megacorporation, though, Byrne targeted the German conceptual artist 
Jochem Hendricks, ripping off one of his most famous works. Byrne, then 
an mfa  student at Goldsmiths, enticed Hendricks into an extended email 
correspondence after being, as she put it, “moved by an admiration for his 
work.”18 Posing as a fan, she turned Hendricks’s reputation as a gadfly back 
on him, imitating and raising the stakes of his own methods at his expense. 
Whereas Byrne is a relative unknown (despite appearing on the bbc 4 doc 
series Goldsmiths: But Is It Art? the same year), Hendricks is known for 
controversial works that challenge legal and moral boundaries. He has dis-
played the taxidermied corpses of fighting dogs (Pack, 2003 – 6) and paid 
undocumented workers to count millions of grains of sand (Grains of Sand, 
1999 – 2007), even going so far as to describe the latter work as a magnani-
mous move on his part.19 Hendricks characterizes his practice as a game 
without limits: “I start the game but whatever happens is fine, as long as 
people aren’t bored.”20 He explores what he can get away with in the name of 
art.21 Hendricks’s work tests avant- garde art’s capacity to function as a site 
of critical reflexivity and thus to be used as an alibi for actions that would 
otherwise be considered illegal or immoral. By staging art’s potential com-
plicity with exploitative economies of animal abuse and vulnerable labor, his 
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work provides a platform for reflection on practices of exploitation, while 
at the same time Hendricks himself profits from circulating these practices 
as art. 
When Hendricks came to Goldsmiths as a visiting lecturer, Byrne in-
tervened as the university was processing his payment, replacing the bank 
information on his invoice with her own, rerouting his payment to her ac-
count. (Byrne exhibits a copy of the invoice but provides few details about 
how she accomplished this.) She then used the funds to create a replica of 
Hendricks’s best- known work, Tax (2000). For Tax, Hendricks had pur-
chased gold bars in the exact amount that he owed to the government and 
claimed them as “artist’s materials” on his tax return. She called the piece 
Look What You Made Me Do. Arguably Byrne only played Hendricks’s own 
script back to him. But when she told him what she’d done, he insisted on 
differentiating her practice from his. In an email responding to Byrne, he 
wrote, “If you are able to convince me with a profound concept and content, 
we can talk.” Hendricks’s response suggests that he did not take Byrne’s work 
seriously, for he characterized the piece as a joke (“Of course I was laughing 
when I read your confession”) and asked Byrne to further justify the merits 
of the piece (“Meaning, content are the major points,” he pontificated).
Just as Ubermorgen demonstrated that Amazon’s dominant market posi-
tion enabled them to set the terms of access — to distinguish between their 
free preview (good openness) and Ubermorgen’s pirated open access (bad 
openness) — Byrne’s Look What You Made Me Do puts on display Hen-
dricks’s dominant position, his investment in his ability to act as gatekeeper, 
to determine what constitutes a legitimate artwork and what is merely a bad 
feminist prank or a lazy student imitation. In her artwork Byrne cleverly 
uses the copy (a symbol for what is considered secondary, degraded, femi-
nized) to highlight how differently the same conceptual art script signifies 
when the artist is female.22 The title of Byrne’s piece, Look What You Made 
Me Do, uses the language of a (usually male) abuser, suggesting provoked 
aggression and the inevitability of retaliation while inverting the gender dy-
namic; in so naming her replica of Tax (a piece that symbolizes Hendricks’s 
financial and social capital as a white European male), Byrne invokes sys-
tematic sexism as her alibi, in the same way that Hendricks himself uses 
power and exploitative social and economic structures as alibis. By parasit-
ing the parasite, she discloses the masculine privilege that underwrites his 
claim to legitimate subversion. In creating a replica of his most famous work, 
Byrne literalizes and hyperbolizes long- held notions of femininity as a bad 
copy of or vampiristic threat to masculinity. As an act of feminist revenge, 
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however, Byrne’s replica “enacts the literalism that would enable its own dis-
missal,” as Sara Ahmed has argued of Valerie Solanas.23 
But the project’s act of replication is only one facet of Look What You 
Made Me Do, which, though also comprising sculpture, photography, con-
ceptual art, and installation, is best understood as a work of performance 
art, insofar as Hendricks’s response to Byrne’s provocation is the centerpiece 
of the work. (Similarly, Ubermorgen touted Amazon Noir as a “performa-
tive media event,” and the project encompassed the reactions of the cor-
porate entity, mainstream media, and legal system to their provocation.)24 
The critical gesture of Ubermorgen’s and Byrne’s artworks is not the copies 
themselves but the unauthorized acts of appropriation they represent and the 
responses they elicit. When Byrne shows the piece in a gallery setting (as 
she did in 2009 at The Goma in Madrid), she also exhibits Hendricks’s art-
ist monograph and headshot, a photograph of Tax, and redacted copies of 
the invoice and their email correspondence — “trophies” of her intervention 
(figure I.3).25 Like Ubermorgen, whose logo and diagram for Amazon Noir re-
sembles nothing less than the black box of Amazon’s business practices, the 
work on display at The Goma is what Byrne is able to get away with taking.
FIGURE I.3 Installation view of Roisin Byrne, Look What You Made Me Do,  
The Goma, Madrid, 2009. Photo by Borja Díaz Mengotti.
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Hendricks’s Tax purports to be a critical reflection on what it means to 
take capital out of circulation (gold bars being the reserve for those who do 
not participate in the exchange of virtualized capital), yet Hendricks him-
self remains possessive of his own cultural currency. Both Tax and Grains 
of Sand are artworks precisely about how the meaning and value ascribed to 
actions depend on the bodies that perform them or contexts in which they 
are performed, yet when Hendricks finds himself the target — when he is 
given an opportunity to yield some of his capital (both literal and symbolic) 
to Byrne — he is unwilling to acknowledge the legitimacy of her conceptual 
project. He reserves for himself the role of authority, which is precisely the 
role that his work takes pride in subverting — a remarkably unreflexive re-
sponse. By retreating into the discourses of originality, Hendricks betrays 
the limits of his willingness to play the game, whose limits he once boasted 
were boundless. In his exchange with Byrne, Hendricks manifests his au-
thority as an established white male artist, both as a function of individual 
identity and as a structural position; he has a monopoly on the position of 
the subversive artist in the context of their relation, and so he has the power 
to set the terms of their encounter.26 Whereas Ubermorgen’s incursion into 
Amazon’s marketing tool fits within a recognizable anticapitalist narra-
tive, Byrne’s targeting of Hendricks provokes a more complicated response. 
While few are likely to identify with Amazon (which is faceless, impersonal, 
and dominant), more are likely to identify with Hendricks or at least find 
him sympathetic, thus complicating the effect of Byrne’s critique. Because 
her act of appropriation is so imitative and so off- putting, Byrne’s interven-
tion simultaneously calls out and recalcifies Hendricks’s positionality — an 
outcome she likely did not intend.
What critical and political value do such artistic projects have in our cur-
rent moment? Do they ultimately achieve anything? Certainly their implica-
tions as anticapitalist and feminist interventions are debatable. Their gains 
appear mostly symbolic. Their effects, typically kept off the official record, 
are largely unverifiable. By probing and testing the oppressive conditions 
they inhabit, these works risk inadvertently legitimizing and expanding such 
conditions by reinforcing what they set out to critique. Yet for all of their 
limitations, works like Amazon Noir and Look What You Made Me Do also 
tell us something important about the systems of power in which they op-
erate, for they manifest the ambivalence that necessarily contaminates any 
artistic or critical project of resistance today. They demonstrate a sense of 
being out of options. But more hopefully, they outline ways it may still be 
possible to express a kind of resistance from within this problematic.
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This book explores the following questions: What subversive possibilities 
might the complicit subject still hold? Can complicity be refashioned into a 
tool of resistance and redistribution? Both Ubermorgen and Byrne model 
ways of animating complicity as a tactic of furtive resistance. The fear of 
being complicit has helped maintain the idea that proximity to dominant 
power means allegiance to the social order. But the projects described here 
explore whether certain subjects can leverage their complicity (structural 
or circumstantial) with more powerful entities in order to open up unan-
ticipated lines of intervention, redistribution, and potentially solidarity with 
more marginalized subjects — subjects whose identities do not always allow 
complicity as an option.27 The artworks sketched in this introduction, like 
those that are analyzed in the rest of the book, exemplify the compromised 
performance of resistance that this book advances as parasitism. The term 
calls to mind insects, bacteria, viral agents. But this book is about something 
else: here parasitism captures the inescapability of dominance and the prob-
lem of structural dependency — perennial feminist concerns made newly ur-
gent by an inexorable and hypernetworked neoliberal present wherein the 
experience of subjectivity has assumed the general form of parasitism. The 
problem of the parasitical guest, made complicit by its dependent circum-
stances, reanimates classic preoccupations of feminist theory, namely the 
secondary, supplementary, precarious status of women and of sexual and 
racial minorities under patriarchy.28 To be a parasite is to be a guest in one’s 
own home.
The theory of parasitical resistance advanced in this book draws on a 
range of critical and aesthetic experiments with the parasite as an ambiva-
lent and nonemancipatory figure of institutional and systemic critique and 
intervention, ranging from the writings of the French philosopher Michel 
Serres to embedded art and design practice, from the digital incursions 
of tactical media to the tactics of free riding and “weapons of the weak.”29 
While these previous engagements with and invocations of parasitism are 
not the book’s focus, this body of work grounds and informs my conceptu-
alization of parasitism as a blueprint for a compromised ethics of feminist, 
queer, and/or subaltern appropriation, wherein the parasite undermines its 
host system only to the degree that it can get away with it. 
In its ideal form, the parasite advanced here is a figure neither of false 
consciousness nor of romanticized complicity but one imbued with the ca-
pacity for subliminal dissent: a form of alterity able to swim in hostile waters, 
if only temporarily. The parasite is an agent that can successfully install itself 
within the host system and can survive the host’s attempts to inoculate itself 
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against the parasite. As the parasitologist Claude Combes explains, parasite- 
host systems work differently from prey- predator systems. In prey- predator 
systems, after a mouse is eaten by a cat, its body and genetic information 
soon disappear. In parasite- host systems, the parasite enters into a persis-
tent state of intimate cohabitation in its host, and its genetic information is 
conserved side by side with that of the host; the parasite’s genetic material 
is not metabolized into the host but remains discrete within it (figure I.4).30 
The parasite- host system thus offers a temporal (enduring), spatial (imma-
nent), and relational (dependent) model in which embeddedness and rela-
tive contingency do not mean total subsumption or eventual assimilation; 
instead they signal the possibility of incrementally redirecting the host’s re-
sources from inside. In an all- pervasive contemporary social, political, and 
economic system, parasites demonstrate that enmeshment need not be anti-
thetical to disruptive action. The parasite’s incremental undermining offers 
a sorely needed alternative to the overdetermining binary of radical versus 
reformist action. Parasitism inverts the dynamic at work in what Rob Nixon 
has called “slow violence” and Lauren Berlant “slow death” (the gradual and 
often invisible toll of environmental crisis and neoliberal attrition of social 
welfare on the poor), operating instead a kind of slow resistance, which goes 
along with the falsely innocuous and inviting front of hegemonic entities in 
order to allow something else just as imperceptibly to emerge.31 
I am not suggesting that radical politics are obsolete, nor am I suggesting 
that frontal action is ineffective. Parasitical resistance on its own is neces-
sarily inadequate. Rather, in a moment when modes of direct opposition are 
subject to violent elimination and rapid co- option, this book explores how 
we might account for nonfrontal or oblique (nonconfrontational) expres-
sions of resistance that might otherwise go overlooked, whose mechanisms 
and implications are easily read and dismissed as mere capitulation. Parasit-
ism is foremost a politics of disidentification. My understanding of the para-
site’s antagonistic yet unavoidable relationship to its host system (its status as 
both different from and part of the host), and thus the critical potential of its 
performance of complicity, is fundamentally informed by José Esteban Mu-
ñoz’s theory of disidentification. For Muñoz, the disidentificatory subject of 
queer of color performance operates neither a straightforward identification 
nor a counteridentification with majoritarian culture but instead a “working 
on, with, and against . . . at a simultaneous moment.”32 Muñoz writes, “In-
stead of buckling under the pressures of dominant ideology (identification, 
assimilation) or attempting to break free of its inescapable sphere (counter-
identification, utopianism), this ‘working on and against’ is a strategy that 
FIGURE I.4 Illustration from Claude Combes’s The Art of Being a Parasite, 
2005.
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tries to transform a cultural logic from within, always laboring to enact per-
manent structural change while at the same time valuing the importance 
of local or everyday struggles of resistance.”33 Whereas queer performance 
theorists like Muñoz and Judith Butler have focused on how subjects outside 
the racial and sexual mainstream negotiate, appropriate, and rework domi-
nant culture as a strategy of survival, this study explores how minoritarian 
subjects with the racial or cultural capital to pass within and access pro-
tections within majority culture can manipulate the appearance that they 
acquiesce to power so as to undermine its functioning.34 In these accounts 
of disidentification performance is not simply a concealment but a mode by 
which processes of subjectivation are negotiated and contested in ways that 
are not immediately recognizable as such. Where the more radical subject of 
Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s undercommons, that “unassimilated un-
derground” of institutional life, is said “to be in but not of” the hegemonic 
space it occupies, the more ambivalent parasitical subject can be said to be 
both in and of the space of the host — or, more precisely, it is both of and not 
of.35 In this sense the parasite always walks the line between disidentifica-
tion and overidentification, a hyperbolic form of mimicry by which privi-
leged actors can parody authority.36 These accounts offer a means of foiling 
the systematic work of interpellation and leave open the possibility for re-
sistance from within. 
As corporate practices and digital technologies have consolidated the 
project of privatization, they have incorporated and commodified differ-
ence and dissent, transforming the social field into a system, a closed circuit, 
a rigged game. The Play in the System advances an account of resistance in 
the face of increasingly totalizing analyses of power in critical and media 
theory in recent decades. The book brings the critical paradigm of perfor-
mance to bear on the contemporary co- option of resistance. It is a work of 
cultural studies that stages a rare encounter among the fields of digital stud-
ies, performance studies, feminist and queer studies, political theory, and 
contemporary art history and criticism. Curating an archive of little- studied 
and emerging artists and interventionists not previously discussed in rela-
tion to one another, this study develops a logic of artistic resistance for a 
neoliberal networked era in which it is not a question of getting out but, fol-
lowing Foucault, it is instead “a question of how to work the trap that one is 
inevitably in.”37 The book discloses acts of parasitical resistance across sites 
of extreme consolidation and nonreciprocity: corporate monopolization, 
state power, toxic masculinity, and millennial precarity. Employing meth-
ods of discourse analysis and textual and visual close reading, it builds an 
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analytical framework for understanding the adoption of this new critical 
and aesthetic paradigm of resistance in the spheres of digital art activism, 
institutional critique, and feminist art and performance.
But before we can imagine or access such forms of resistance, we need to 
ensure we fully understand the problem itself: the host milieu in which the 
parasite must operate. When I theorize a particular instantiation of parasit-
ism as a minoritarian performance, I am thus also theorizing a particular 
mode of hospitality as a majoritarian performance. This dyadic structure is 
captured in the coerciveness of the host’s nongenerous giving and the resis-
tant effect of the parasite’s nonproprietary taking. I argue (1) that powerful 
entities, from corporate monopolies to privileged individuals, perform hos-
pitality, promoting and instrumentalizing precarity while masquerading as 
generous; and (2) that this performance of what I call coercive hospitality, 
while oppressive, contains within it a possible kernel of resistance. 
THE NEOLIBERAL HOST AND COERCIVE HOSPITALITY
Who or what precisely is a host? I reserve the term host for an entity whose 
ability to claim a universal status endows it with the power to authorize or 
withhold resources and access. Corporations and digital platforms are some 
of the most easily recognizable hosts given the seemingly inescapable na-
ture of their power. Indeed parasitism’s new visibility as a critical and aes-
thetic formation is inseparable from the sense of inexorability wrought by 
our technopolitical juncture, from the totalizing logics of the internet to the 
unprecedented scalar complexity of life in the Anthropocene. Today neolib-
eral citizens find themselves reliant on a system whose conditions they have 
little or no ability to negotiate. In this system hospitality is the new domi-
nant as experiences of uncertainty and dispossession, once consigned to the 
downtrodden few, move up the socioeconomic ranks.38 To live in and with 
neoliberalism over the past decades is to have witnessed: 1) the rise of a host 
economy, as the privatization of social life has given way to an extreme con-
solidation of power in the hands of a few; and 2) the recasting of the citizen as 
a parasite, as citizenship has undergone a violent redefinition as a condition 
of precarity. Precarity describes the state of being dependent on the generos-
ity of another: the Latin precarius refers to that which is “given as a favour” 
or “the idea of being given something — the right to occupy land, or to hold 
a particular position — ‘at the pleasure of ’ another person, who might simply 
choose to take it back at any time.”39 The generalizability of the parasite as 
a model of neoliberal subjectivity is thus indexical of the extent to which a 
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certain form of power has increasingly represented itself as hospitable. (This 
neoliberalized soft power of coercive hospitality, however, has not replaced 
but rather is coextensive with the hard power of militarized policing and 
neofascism.)40 Conceiving of neoliberalism as a host system through the 
classical paradigm of hospitality enables us to see it as a paternalistic logic 
that operates through the promise and withholding of protection and care 
to citizens, addressed as dependents.
By now the narrative of neoliberalism’s entrenchment in social and po-
litical life is well rehearsed: in the drive to maximize profitability, risk and 
economic burden are placed on the very individuals and institutions that 
prop the system up.41 Workers’ benefits are repackaged as entitlements for 
the undeserving, and charity is instrumentalized in the guise of corporate 
responsibility. Voters are no longer shareholders of the state, which now un-
apologetically seeks to please its private investors. Public administration 
gives way to corporate governance, and citizenship is recast as a debt to 
be paid. Commonwealth resources such as water and scientific knowledge, 
in which in principle all citizens hold an equal interest, are taken out from 
under them and privatized. As private interests have held tighter sway over 
public life, the possibilities for occupying public space have been constricted 
as the expanded dominion of private property has made the commons ever 
more inhospitable to citizens. 
These developments have not been experienced in the same way by all; 
a nuisance for some, they have meant a constant challenge to survival for 
others.42 Laws have criminalized basic human activities such as eating and 
sleeping precisely at the moment when the number of homeless people out-
strips the shelter beds available, making it effectively impossible for people 
to survive outside of the capitalist economy.43 The assault on the homeless 
exemplifies the constriction and criminalization of public life under neo-
liberalism: LA restaurants and markets have erected elaborate enclosures 
to “protect” their garbage from growing homeless populations; France has 
only recently outlawed practices requiring that employees throw bleach on 
discarded food, ostensibly discouraging dumpster divers “to avoid being im-
plicated in case someone gets sick”; and “anti- homeless spikes” and benches 
with armrests proliferate in urban centers from Montreal to Tokyo, making 
it difficult to sleep in public spaces.44 These “hostile architectures” evidence 
the narrowing of acceptable scripts for occupying public and commercial 
space.45 This has had the effect of inscribing contemporary social life within 
a logic of imposition: rent and taxation, credit and debt. It has reframed the 
terms of neoliberal citizenship as those of a patronage system. Expropriated 
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from the commons, citizens are then offered the commons back for rent — an 
illusory choice within a system of coercive hospitality.
As many have shown, the reprivatization of what already belongs to the 
people is the defining feature of the twenty- first- century economy. This shift 
makes visible the logic at the heart of the digital platform economy, wherein 
users must go through gatekeepers to retrieve their own data, pay a third 
party to interact with one another, and submit to ever- changing terms and 
conditions to access their own content. As one ibm executive summed it up 
in an internal memo titled “The Digital Disruption Has Already Happened,” 
the “World’s largest taxi company owns no taxis (Uber),” the world’s “largest 
accommodation provider owns no real estate (Airbnb),” the world’s “largest 
phone companies own no [telecommunications infrastructure] (Skype, We-
Chat),” and the “most popular media owner creates no content (Facebook).”46 
The new economy is a host economy. What we find today is a multiplica-
tion of intermediaries, a growing economy of hosts that create no original 
content and offer no services in the traditional sense; instead they sell ac-
cess to territory and infrastructure while capitalizing on the work of those 
who build and use it.47 By strategically positioning themselves as “platforms,” 
Tarleton Gillespie has argued, such companies monetize the content pro-
duced by others while minimizing liability.48 They wear the mantle of gen-
erosity while capitalizing on spectacles of their own magnanimity; they pose 
as free and open while concealing the rent or tax they take. 
Hospitality becomes coercive when the host alone is able to set the terms 
of its relationship with the guest and when those terms disavow the unequal 
and nonconsensual nature of the relationship.49 Coercive hospitality thus 
speaks to the capacity of certain entities and actors to exempt themselves 
from or buy themselves out of the very ethics of care and structures of ac-
countability that they profess to embody and to which they subject others. 
Crucially, however, coercive hospitality describes a specific disposition of 
power or mode of structural entitlement that exists both at the level of insti-
tutional and bureaucratic protocols and at the more mundane interpersonal 
level. The host is always at home, always entitled to space, always dictating 
the terms of access and belonging to others. The host’s “rightful place” is 
never up for discussion; his papers are never demanded.50 But like the para-
site, the host is a structural position rather than a specific identity or sub-
ject position (though certain identities or subjects occupy this position more 
readily than others).51 Who occupies the positions of host and parasite is ul-
timately less a matter of fact than of perspective and power; the normative 
language of social parasitism is, as Serres has shown, a deictic maneuver by 
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which certain subjects get called out and others don’t.52 The host and parasite 
are, moreover, neither ontological entities nor fixed identities. As this book 
will show, the same entity can occupy the position of host and parasite at 
different times — sometimes even at the same time. The performance of the 
host need not be cynical nor even fully conscious; performance is not mask 
play but a complex staging of power. Indeed, more often than not, the host 
does not recognize its structural position and the violence of its capacity to 
include and exclude. When called out by the parasite, it is often quite sincere 
in its surprise. Just as Hendricks feels miscast in the story Byrne tells about 
him and his work, Amazon executives are unlikely to characterize the cor-
poration’s monetization of openness as a dispossessive strategy. If anything, 
the host’s power rests precisely on this capacity not to recognize its struc-
tural authority over others.
Given the position’s scalar relativity, it follows that not all hosts are cre-
ated equal. The hosts I discuss range from powerful multinational corpo-
rations and states to individuals. Each chapter examines how privatization 
and privacy work hand in hand as immunitary strategies by which host en-
tities and actors cultivate unanswerability in different ways. Each examines 
a different mode or valence by which majoritarian actors have privatized 
the commons or commandeered their privilege, in turn opening up differ-
ent modes or valences of parasitical resistance. The respective hosts in these 
chapters prevent their own exposure to scrutiny, closing gaps and possible 
breaches, using technical, legal, moral, and intimate protocols to distance 
themselves from their parasites: the black box of big corporations’ exploit-
ative business practices (Ubermorgen’s Google Will Eat Itself and Robin 
Hood Cooperative, discussed in chapter 1); the red tape of bureaucratic in-
efficiency and the liberal- democratic state’s obfuscatory investment in its 
ethical righteousness (Núria Güell’s Stateless by Choice and Kenneth Pietro-
bono’s Void [The Opposite of Property]; chapter 2); the cease- and- desist letter 
and accusation of invasion of privacy that suggest the male cultural critic 
sees himself as outside of the cultural critique he offers (Chris Kraus’s I Love 
Dick; chapter 3); and the use of intellectual property to refuse to cede a place 
for younger performance artists at work in Marina Abramović’s protective-
ness over her legacy (Anya Liftig’s Anxiety of Influence and Ann Liv Young’s 
Sherry Is Present; chapter 4). 
If part I, “Redistribution: Institutional Interventions,” is tonally differ-
ent from part II, “Imposition: Intimate Interventions,” in its affective charge 
and level of intimate proximity, this is a function of the scale and nature 
of their hosts. Each chapter examines how a different hegemonic figure or 
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functionary — the “open” corporate platform, the “welcoming” security state, 
the “progressive” male cultural critic, the “receptive” iconic woman artist — 
projects itself as a moral authority, a figure of conscience; while they pre-
fer to regard themselves as outside of the power structures in which they 
operate, these figures and functionaries employ postures of benevolence 
and receptivity as alibis to cover the strategies that maintain their grip on 
power — hoarding their access to resources (wealth, private property, social 
capital, dynastic privilege) and restricting the access of others. When we 
name such entities hosts (without suggesting their equivalence or ascribing 
an ontology to them), what dynamics become visible? 
In part I the host targets are leviathan- like structures, labyrinthine cor-
porate and state institutions that exploit their massive scale through proto-
cols of unanswerability. Chapters 1 and 2 investigate the strategies by which 
the multinational corporation and neoliberal state ensure and normalize 
their structural nonaccountability. Chapter 1 examines how corporate plat-
forms enlist technological protocol as an alibi for their nonaccountability 
to their users and employees, and chapter 2 explores how the state tauto-
logically invokes the law to justify itself. In part II the structural targets (or 
hosts) are individuals, public figures chosen as metonyms for forms of struc-
tural power. In chapter 3 I examine Chris Kraus’s I Love Dick, in which the 
real- life cultural critic Dick Hebdige is made to stand trial as a symbol of 
heteropatriarchy (the ultimate Dick); similarly, in chapter 4, I examine how a 
younger generation of white female performance artists (including Ann Liv 
Young, Anya Liftig, and Lauren Barri Holstein) reckons with the recent in-
stitutionalization of feminist performance art by targeting the equally cele-
brated and loathed performance artist Marina Abramović as the personi-
fication of a winner- take- all postcrisis art market. Part I thus explores the 
quandary of individual action and political refusal under present conditions; 
it is primarily diagnostic, more interested in making the limits of radical in-
tervention visible than in transgressing them. In contrast, part II examines 
parasitical works that aggressively and queasily insist on intimacy with their 
hosts. When there would otherwise be no one to be held accountable, the 
artists nominate a single individual as representative of the hostile system in 
question in order to force a response, making it impossible for their hosts to 
ignore them or to remain indifferent. All these artworks thus address struc-
tural power, but the latter works stake their critiques in the personal rather 
than the institutional realm. 
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THE LOGIC OF THE PARASITE
Let us now examine the other side of this codependent dyad. Parasitism de-
scribes a relation whereby an organism depends on a host for its continued 
survival. There is no outside to the parasite’s relationship with the host: if the 
parasite kills its host, it goes down with it. Because the parasite is not separa-
ble from the host systems it attacks, it represents an ethically and politically 
complex model of nonoppositional resistance. The double- dealing parasite 
maintains itself by flattering and aggrandizing the host to its face while un-
dermining it behind its back. The affordances of the parasite, which cannot 
dictate but can only respond to the terms of its environment, are well suited 
to the inescapability of the contemporary condition. 
Despite common perceptions, parasitism was originally a social rather 
than a biological paradigm; scientists in the seventeenth century borrowed 
the term to describe forms of life that depend on others for survival, drain-
ing nutrients or gaining shelter at the expense of others.53 Long before it 
came to be associated with biology, parasitism referred to a performance of 
complicity with subversive potential in ancient religious practice. In its little- 
known earliest form, parasitism described a mode of social passing at the ta-
ble of the host, whereby a figure of lower birth is welcomed as a special guest 
of those in power in return for simulating affection and deference. A priest 
or temple assistant, the parasite earned his name (meaning “next to” the 
“food” [para sitos]) because he was permitted to dine with superior officers 
and enjoy meals at the host’s expense as a reward for his specialized knowl-
edge and religious consultation.54 (This derivation is echoed in the biological 
concept of commensalism, which denotes an association between organisms 
in which one benefits while the other is not harmed; it is from the Medieval 
Latin commensalis, meaning com- “sharing” + mensa “a table.”) The para-
sitical guest, aware of its precarious status at the table, its not- belonging, 
finds an opening for itself (and protection from reprisal) in the ritual form of 
obligation that lies at the heart of the ancient concept of hospitality as xenia 
(guest- friendship). These rituals of sharing forge an alliance of reciprocity 
between individuals from different social strata and yield benefits to both, 
such as shelter or favors.55 By accepting the host’s gifts, companions may be 
folded in as accomplices to (and occasional beneficiaries of) the host’s power, 
by virtue of their social proximity and performance of friendship. 
The parasite’s means for responding to its situation, while not fully de-
termined, are heavily constrained by its dependency on the host. The para-
site is individuated, yet it is inconceivable — literally impossible — outside 
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the ecosystem it inhabits. Parasitism, then, is best understood as a perfor-
mance of social acquiescence under coercion rather than as a mode of action 
predicated on individual subjectivity. What is so provocative and so diffi-
cult about parasitism as a paradigm of resistance is that it threatens to up-
end conventional critical rubrics for assessing political and ethical agency — 
notions of individual will and intentionality that presume an autonomous 
and rational subject. Lacking the full range of choice implied by such frame-
works, the parasite is imbued with the quasi- subjectivity of the performer 
who must sing for their supper.
Its early association with social mobility was retained in the parasite’s 
later use as a stock character in ancient Greek and Roman comedy — literally, 
a persona non grata, a position that could be occupied by donning its char-
acter mask.56 The figure of the parasite was for much of its ancient history 
a neutral figure, coming into circulation as a derogatory term when it left 
the stage to threaten the wider economies of the world. At stake in the ha-
tred of the parasite (a decidedly patriarchal fear of a kind of simulation 
that is unmistakably feminized) is its ability to trade in performance: it 
can use imitation as a tool to bend the protocols of the dominant order 
without being detected.57 For Plato, mimesis, or the ability to “play” by ma-
nipulating appearances — in the parasite’s case, to reflect back the desired 
image of the host — represents a troubling loophole by which one can in-
terfere with the natural hierarchy of things.58 Mimesis represents for him a 
counterfeit economy, an aesthetic loophole or dark art by which the artist 
can, through the trickery of artifice, upend the accepted truth of the social 
order and make it possible for slaves to be confused with kings. 
It is this provocative (if not fully subversive) potential that informs Serres’s 
characterization of the parasite as a duplicitous guest.59 In what is the best- 
known philosophical account of the parasite, Serres offers a master theory of 
the parasite as an interdisciplinary, transhistorical actor with the potential 
to short- circuit normative hierarchies and economies of exchange.60 In his 
most salient description, he uses the framework of immunology to describe 
the reaction the parasite elicits from its milieu, characterizing the parasite as 
a “thermal exciter” of its ecosystem. The parasite does not radically or obvi-
ously change the nature of the system; rather it introduces into the system a 
“minimal” and “differential” form of interference. The parasite smuggles in 
alterity under the guise of similarity. As Serres explains, by secreting a tis-
sue identical to the host, the biological parasite neutralizes the host system’s 
standard mechanisms for rejecting the potential threats posed by foreign 
bodies. By making the host think that it is cut from the same cloth, then in-
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crementally revealing itself, the parasite stuns the host’s usual defenses. By 
the time the host realizes that it has been hijacked, it is too late: “The para-
sited, abused, cheated body no longer reacts; it accepts it; it acts as if the visi-
tor were its own organ. It consents to maintain it; it bends to its demands.” 
The interloping parasite plays its environment; it “plays a game of mimicry”; 
it “plays at being the same.”61 
But this parasitical mimicry is not a straightforward aping. The parasite 
does not so much copy the host as adopt the script of its host system. It does 
not imitate the host but simulates assent to it, dissolving its own singular-
ity in the process. It disappears, as Serres puts it, “into the milieu that is the 
other.”62 The figure of the parasite, then, is abhorred not for its claimed in-
ability or refusal to contribute to its host economy but for the threat it repre-
sents: its ability to pass as (or give the appearance of being) nonthreatening 
to the host and thus its potential to undermine the host- guest hierarchy. The 
parasite represents a breach that threatens to expose the contradictions of 
the “hospitable” values of its host economy.
As a mode of artistic intervention, parasitism is thus productive on two 
levels: pragmatically and heuristically. Pragmatically, it offers ways to envi-
sion a different form of politics when direct activist modes are foreclosed. 
While it can seem that the house always wins, parasitism demonstrates that 
systems too can be made to adapt. If neoliberal power works by dressing up 
market strategy as generosity through the masquerade of public image, then 
the parasite accepts its given role in order to remain in the game. The cru-
cial dynamic is not opposition but (the appearance of) radical acceptance. 
Unlike their radical counterparts, parasitical works do not visibly challenge 
or openly contradict their host systems but adapt to operate on their terms. 
When leaving the system is not an option, playing along with one’s con-
straints becomes, paradoxically, a means of owning one’s lack of agency. 
Parasites affirm their hosts with manic intensity, jarring the hosts’ routine 
operations by following their hegemonic scripts to the letter. The parasite lo-
cates a point of contradiction in its host (such as Amazon’s and Hendricks’s 
wish to appear to be moral authorities and thus legitimate arbiters of access) 
and moderately recalibrates the host’s protocols of access, if only for a mo-
ment. Even as the host jostles to deflect this appearance of hypocrisy, the 
parasite often also provokes a response from the host akin to an immunolog-
ical reaction, a bodily defense that attempts to neutralize the foreign agent. 
We see this kind of immunological reaction in Amazon’s offer to settle and 
Hendricks’s patronizing rationale, both attempts to discredit and neutral-
ize their parasites. I argue that where bigger actors answer their parasites by 
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trying to delay or avoid having to respond, black- boxing in order to protect 
a semblance of openness, smaller actors answer by acting offended or by in-
voking the discourses of privacy and private property. But these reactions 
only draw more attention to the original contradiction of the host’s invest-
ment in appearing generous.
As a heuristic, parasitical works thus make several things explicit. First, 
they display the discursive mechanisms and administrative protocols by 
which the host tries to differentiate its own actions from those of its so- 
called parasites in order to rationalize its exceptional status — and that the 
host need not justify itself beyond a certain point. Second, they foreground 
the fact that what the host promotes as gratuitous acts of generosity are ac-
tually functional necessities, as hosts that claim to be autonomous and self- 
sufficient need their parasites. Third, they make visible the invisible stratifi-
cation that pervades the system of institutional access, despite its claims that 
everyone is equal on the level of human capital. Consequently the parasite 
makes clear that the host’s protocols, which purport to be fair and universal, 
are in fact conditional and mutable — if more for some than others. 
Like hosts, those who can be said to hold parasitical subject positions do 
not all occupy the same relationship to dominant power; as such, they are 
not equally accommodated. The discourse of parasitism is often invoked to 
describe the struggle for survival of the most vulnerable subjects for whom, 
under especially hostile conditions, as Muñoz observes, resistance cannot 
be too frank or too conspicuous for fear of retaliation.63 But parasitism is 
not only a function of the struggle to survive. The sense of parasitism fore-
grounded in this book emphasizes a more implicated, entangled, and am-
biguous relationship to dominant power. This less cut- and- dried sense of 
parasitism comprises those subjects who serve as dominant power’s chosen 
companions, its trophies of inclusion; these parasites are others or duplici-
tous hangers- on who can pass as belonging within spaces coded as white, as 
gender- conforming, as straight, as middle- class. They occupy social posi-
tions that afford them special access to those with power, yet they are denied 
autonomy by this arrangement; they remain precarious, for their inclusion 
is granted (or revoked) at the whim of the host. 
Rather than seeking to expose this hypocrisy, to show the real face of 
power (as if such a thing were possible), the parasite enacts a second- order 
exposure. It exposes not the thing itself but the exploitability of its perfor-
mance. Parasitical artists play this fiction of hospitality, which is an un-
guarded point of access to the host. The contemporary artists and inter-
ventionists explored in this book engage parasitism as a counterstrategy 
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for using more powerful entities’ pretense of benevolence — their desire to 
see themselves as inclusive of difference and dissent, however symbolic and 
perfunctory — as an opening by which certain minoritarian subjects can gain 
access. The phrase the play in the system invoked by my title refers to the 
working tolerance that exists within a system (required for its operation), 
which might be manipulated to alter the system’s functions and to open up 
spaces of redistribution and critique that wouldn’t otherwise be possible. It 
speaks to the possibility of accepting (and exploiting) the invitation that pro-
tocols of coercive hospitality make available to different ends from those in-
tended by the host. The defining feature of parasitical works is their ability to 
make the very entities and institutions they confront into the reluctant hosts 
and patrons of their disruptions. The parasitical artist does this through ex-
aggerated performances of dependency that compel the host either to accom-
modate them or to reveal the terms by which its hospitality is conditional. 
What I identify as resistance may not be fully conscious or even realized in 
the artworks I discuss. As we will see throughout the book, the parasite, al-
most as a matter of course, loses ground or gets co- opted in the process of 
launching an attack. What I call resistance is the differential between what 
the host is willing to give and what the parasite is able to get away with taking. 
It is the parasite’s ability to calibrate its actions to this interval of accommo-
dation, this limited room for maneuver, that is the play in the system. 
THE THRESHOLD OF ACCOMMODATION
“How does the parasite usually take hold? He tries to become invisible. We 
must speak of invisibility again,” Serres observes.64 Let us map more pre-
cisely how the parasite becomes invisible: how it evades reprisal in spaces of 
domination, how it makes its opposition seem negligible or even useful to 
the host. The parasite’s survival on the territory of the host is calibrated to 
what we might call the threshold of accommodation at which the host will 
allow it to endure without taking decisive action against it. Much as drivers 
who go only five to ten miles per hour over the speed limit (the threshold 
of accommodation within which they are unlikely to be ticketed), the para-
site takes advantage of the margin of subjective enforcement, knowing that 
(for reasons of limited resources or potential equipment error) small- scale 
transgressions are unlikely to draw scrutiny from authorities. (This analogy, 
however, falsely presumes that all drivers bear the same relation to the po-
lice state and to detectability, when African American drivers are the most 
likely to be stopped and, like Hispanics, are ticketed, searched, and arrested 
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at higher rates than white drivers. As antiblack police brutality has shown, 
non-white subjects are not met with the same leniency.)65 This margin of 
tolerance afforded to some also serves the state, which gives only as much 
accommodation as it needs to in order to maintain the allegiance of those 
it governs. In the interlude that follows this introduction, I examine more 
systematically the thresholds of accommodation by which the host differen-
tially enforces the access it grants to parasitical subjects.
The parasite’s ability to inhabit and exploit the interval opened by the 
degree of leniency granted by the system is most of all a function of the po-
tential loss posed to the host by what the parasite takes and the resources 
available to the host to surveil and discipline the parasite.66 The parasite’s 
performance of submission is on a continuum with that of the enslaved 
subject, the colonized subject, or the peasant — figures that, as Saidiya V. 
Hartman, Homi Bhabha, and James C. Scott have shown, respectively, feign 
acquiescence, even pleasure in submission, in order to survive.67 These schol-
ars elucidate the selective historical deployments of hospitality as a strategy 
of white supremacist, colonial, and imperial domination. However, in its 
Western, bourgeois manifestations, parasitism’s performance of submission 
might be closer to Joan Riviere’s 1929 psychoanalytic account of “womanli-
ness as masquerade,” in which she observed that highly intellectual women 
wear “the mask of femininity,” flattering and wooing men by feigning deli-
cacy and confusion.68 The rather more privileged and duplicitous parasite 
examined in this book can still presume a degree of safety if it is detected; 
unlike the enslaved subject, the colonized subject, and the peasant, it is not 
faced with the consequences of bodily harm or death. 
In such accounts of resistance and survival, the greater the risk posed by 
the performance, the more tightly the mask is worn. Hartman has observed 
that demonstrations requiring slaves to feign compliance and contentment 
for the slaveholder’s pleasure (“puttin’ on ole massa”) were difficult to un-
mask as performances; how does one tell the difference, Hartman asks, be-
tween “the simulation of compliance for covert aims” and plain compliance?
At the level of appearance, these contending performances often differed 
little. At the level of effect, however, they diverged radically. One perfor-
mance aimed to reproduce and secure the relations of domination and 
the other to manipulate appearances in order to challenge these relations 
and create a space for action not generally available. However, since acts 
of resistance exist within the context of relations of domination and are 
not external to them, they acquire their character from these relations, 
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and vice versa. At a dance, holiday fete, or corn shucking, the line between 
dominant and insurgent orchestrations of blackness could be effaced or 
fortified in the course of an evening, either because the enslaved utilized 
instrumental amusements for contrary purposes or because surveillance 
necessitated cautious forms of interaction and modes of expression.69
Similarly it is difficult to think through the parasite’s resistance as it plays 
its host because its performed acquiescence has ambiguous effects. In this 
description of the master- slave relation, Hartman affirms the indeterminacy 
opened up by power’s desire to be affirmed (what I have described as neolib-
eral authority’s wish to be perceived as open and accessible). This account 
of resistance applies also to the broader host- parasite relation, in which the 
conspicuousness of the enactment of submission is bound to its conditions of 
subjection and enforcement. The parasite’s potential as a figure of furtive re-
sistance also relies on the undecidability of its intentions. The parasite finds 
momentary refuge in the flash of indeterminacy, the blind spot created by its 
ambiguous relationship to the host (Is it or isn’t it sincere?).
Consider an example of how the parasite leverages a form of temporary 
illegibility or local know- how to negotiate the threshold of its host’s hospi-
tality. For his series paraSITE (1998 – ongoing), the Iraqi American artist Mi-
chael Rakowitz attaches plastic inflatable shelters to the heating and cooling 
vents outside buildings in Boston and New York City. Using the air leaving 
the buildings to inflate and heat the structures, he appropriates the spare en-
ergy they emit to provide shelter for the homeless (figure I.5). Likewise, for 
Parásitos Urbanos (2005 – 7), the Mexican artist Gilberto Esparza creates ro-
botic sculptures inspired by the surplus economy of Mexico City street ven-
dors, who redirect stray electricity from nearby electric poles to power their 
stands.70 Temporarily diverting the city’s spare resources, these works model 
the parasite as a figure that locates and siphons off untapped pockets of en-
ergy in its host system. They showcase the fact that the parasite’s reconfigu-
ration of access points to resources is often situational, illicit, and makeshift. 
Rakowitz has said that paraSITE was never intended as a replacement for 
social services but rather was “a symbolic strategy” designed to raise aware-
ness about homelessness.71 In the same way, the parasite can make its host 
system adapt (redirecting the wasted energy generated by industry into a 
rough and ready stopgap for the problem of homelessness) without question-
ing its foundations (making activist demands about the need for social ser-
vices). The parasite can make the system adapt precisely because it does not 
call into question its fundamental principles. In Rakowitz’s case, the parasite 
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does this practically by showing that this excess can be redistributed at no 
cost to the system and conceptually by calling out the greed and wasteful-
ness of a postwelfare system of private ownership, while appearing relatively 
harmless. Rakowitz’s and Esparza’s parasites demonstrate the capacity to lay 
low or the social capital to pass without setting off too many alarms. The art-
ists rely on the deniability provided by the projects’ status as artworks (rather 
than activism) to ensure that their installations are not destroyed and that 
they are not arrested. 
PLAYING ALONG: RETHINKING COMPLICITY  
FOR AN AGE OF EMBEDDEDNESS
The compromised position in which the artists and interventionists explored 
in this book find themselves recalls the feminist predicament famously cap-
tured by Audre Lorde as trying to dismantle the “master’s house” using the 
“master’s tools.” How can one fight the man while being paid by him, drink-
ing his Starbucks, and using his Apple products? As Lorde’s argument goes, 
those who stand “inside the circle” of social acceptability can never get rid of 
structures of domination so long as they need and benefit from them. Mean-
while, for those subjects from whose survival and well- being the system has 
continually divested — predominantly poor women, lesbians, and women of 
FIGURE I.5 Michael Rakowitz, paraSITE, 2000. Source: Michael Rakowitz.
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color, Lorde argues — radical oppositionality is not a privilege but the only 
imaginable recourse.72 How are we to understand the master’s house today, 
when complicity with exploitation is an increasingly pervasive and auto-
mated structural condition, when those on the bottom need what those on 
top control and provide? In the contemporary digital economy, the master’s 
house more closely resembles a platform; the liberal dream of every citizen 
owning their own home has been replaced by the neoliberal affordances of 
the rental economy represented by Airbnb. This transformation captures the 
neoliberal conversion of the welfare state into a host — a provider and facilita-
tor of access that retains the rhetoric of care (but only the rhetoric). There is 
a hollow paternalism at the heart of neoliberal policy and discourse, which 
replaces the social safety net with individual responsibility, demonstrating 
care by enjoining individuals to take care of themselves.73 The designation 
host attests to the difficulty of challenging forms of consolidated power that 
disavow their threat of physical violence (unlike the overt master, oppressor, 
despot) but whose capacity for violence nevertheless remains implicit in the 
formal and legal structures of ownership that still underwrite their authority. 
As neoliberalism’s automation of domination suggests, there is an unrec-
onciled tension in how scholars have approached resistance as a small- scale 
tactic. Sometimes such tactics, which are premised on acting within the 
space of power, are characterized as the tools of weak or less- resourced ac-
tors (such as in certain media theory representations of the exploited citizen- 
user under digital capitalism); at other times they are characterized as the 
tools of privileged or more resourced actors (such as in certain critiques by 
queer and feminist of color scholars, for whom resistance is too reactive and 
too accepting of the status quo and for whom only the politics of radical 
refusal and practices of collective care are adequate to the intolerable con-
ditions of life under racial capitalism).74 Rather than resolving this tension, 
parasitism offers a third term. It is neither the selective interventionism of 
those who can afford to intervene, to play the game and then retreat, nor is 
it the absolute refusal of the most marginalized. Parasitism is not — in its 
appearance, methods, or effects — a liberationist politics; it does not directly 
fight, destroy, or refuse the conditions of capitalist, imperialist, white su-
premacist oppression. But when it redistributes what it takes from these host 
systems, the parasite can find common cause with more radical projects. My 
argument thus runs not counter to Lorde’s but underneath it. It traces the 
contours of a submerged possibility whereby those inside the circle might 
simulate or exaggerate their complicity with the master as a tactic for un-
dermining the master’s house. Whereas Lorde emphasizes the impossibility 
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of using the master’s tools to completely dismantle the master’s house, The 
Play in the System explores the room within structures of domination for 
something less than total dismantling but still capable of wearing away at 
them. 
By passing as nonthreatening or even sympathetic, the artists I exam-
ine act as double agents or Trojan horses; they introduce forms of imma-
nent and lateral interference, transforming their complicity with hegemonic 
structures into a counterintuitive resource for undermining them in plain 
sight. They get away with this by leveraging the ambiguous status of art and 
performance, which are perceived as relatively harmless, merely symbolic. 
The parasite’s covert rebellion thus represents a tactical possibility afforded 
to those with the racial, sexual, and cultural capital to pass within spaces of 
white heterosexist masculine privilege. In all of the artworks I examine, the 
artists’ complicity with the host economies they attempt to subvert bleed 
over, making the viewers or readers of the work also complicit and demon-
strating that, while some are more compromised than others, no one is im-
mune from this entanglement. 
The chapters proceed from the more palatable and recognizable exam-
ples of this tactic to the more challenging. As the chapters progress, the art-
ists’ complicities with the structures they try to subvert reverberate more 
strongly. The political coordinates of the book shift, becoming both more 
pointedly self- critical and more feminist in orientation, as the parasite’s fire 
begins to ricochet back on it. This intensification reflects the escalating levels 
of investment and thresholds of accommodation of the parasites explored 
here and the increasingly personal targets of the parasites’ weaponization of 
complicity: complicity with the market in chapter 1, with state belonging in 
chapter 2, with heteropatriarchy in chapter 3, and with the legacy of white 
liberal feminism in chapter 4. Part I theorizes how the logic of coercive hos-
pitality subtends institutional protocols. Chapter 1, “User Be Used: Leverag-
ing the Coercive Hospitality of Corporate Platforms,” examines how plat-
form cooperativist projects play the scripts of coercive hospitality back on 
corporate platforms. Chapter 2, “An Opening in the Structure: Núria Güell 
and Kenneth Pietrobono’s Legal Loopholes,” examines legal incursions into 
state sovereignty and private property by the Spanish artist Núria Güell and 
the Chilean American artist Kenneth Pietrobono. These works investigate, 
at something of a remove, the system and the institutional structures that 
make up its economic, legal, and social operations; they read the fine print 
and work within the confines of the “9 to 5”; they ask big questions about 
how the system works and test its mechanisms — but mostly from a safe dis-
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tance. These incursions into corporate and state protocols have a certain 
conceptual cleanness to them: they settle out of court, they close the box, 
they do it all with an air of professional discretion. The relative sterility and 
formality of the opening chapters’ parasitical interventions are a function 
of the institutional nature of their corporate and state hosts and the kind of 
bureaucratic tactics they make allowable. 
In contrast, the artworks in part II deploy more visceral, relentless, and 
cringe- inducing tactics of parasitical resistance. Embracing parasitism as an 
emblematic site of feminist aesthetic practice, these works enact a far more 
aggressive confrontation with the host. They are messier, riskier, more auda-
cious: fewer containment measures are taken, and as a result, they at times 
suggest an enactment of the parasite that poses real risks to its survival. It 
is not that the structural problematic or artistic methods are different than 
those in the first part, but that the targets have moved closer to home — to 
include the parasite’s own romantic attachments and means of financial 
subsistence. Chapter 3, “Hangers- On: Chris Kraus’s Parasitical Feminism,” 
reads the literary motif of correspondence onto the host- parasite dyad by 
examining epistolary art projects by Chris Kraus (I Love Dick, 1997) and So-
phie Calle (Take Care of Yourself, 2007). These projects engage in practices of 
viral accumulation, producing hundreds of love letters that stalk, and even-
tually overwhelm, the male hosts of their projects. Chapter 4, “A Seat at the 
Table: Feminist Performance Art’s Institutional Absorption and Parasitical 
Legacies,” complicates the apparent oppositionality of this sexual warfare 
by examining an antagonism within feminist aesthetic practice itself. The 
chapter foregrounds disidentificatory performances by a younger, precar-
ious generation of would- be feminist performance artists, including Ann 
Liv Young, Anya Liftig, Amber Hawk Swanson, and Lauren Barri Holstein. 
These artists disidentify with an earlier generation of white liberal femi-
nism, the generation that spawned these artists themselves, by employing a 
tactics of alienated self- parody and aggressive homage. Finally, in the coda, 
“It’s Not You, It’s Me: Roisin Byrne and the Parasite’s Shifting Ethics and 
Politics,” I examine the mutual dependence of art and criticism, following 
a chain of events whereby Roisin Byrne, previously known for stealing and 
forging the works of well- established male artists, began to steal and forge 
my scholarship on her art practice. These latter chapters refuse the discre-
tion and propriety that characterized those earlier chapters, a refusal that 
is markedly feminist and that demands to know: Who gets to remain clean 
or to keep things hidden behind a screen? Who has the ability to stop the 
game? These chapters revisit the problem of the corporations’ black- boxing 
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of responsibility to show that propriety is also an alibi for privatization and 
that privacy is a feminist problematic.
The charge of complicity is often a disqualifying accusation marking the 
end, rather than the beginning, of a conversation about radical action (the 
inevitable rejoinder “You say you’re anticapitalist, but . . .”). When many 
argue it is precisely at this moment that complicity must be called out and 
eradicated and that opposition must be at its most pure because to work 
within the system is to grant it legitimacy, these artists embrace complicity 
as a strategic opportunity for resistance. To be made complicit, as the word’s 
etymology attests, is to be embraced, welcomed, folded in.75 Our relentlessly 
accommodating neoliberal moment, which leverages individuals’ structural 
dependence on large- scale informational and institutional powers, demands 
not a simple binary understanding of complicity (complicit/not complicit 
= bad/good) but a complex understanding, able to take the measure of a 
vastly asymmetrical and relational field of responsibility.76 The autonomous 
individual (implicitly raced and gendered as white and cis male), imbued 
with the capacity for consent or refusal on which traditional conceptions of 
radical action are based, has progressively been replaced by a fragmented 
quasi- subject embedded in a system of hegemonic power and exploitation.77 
The purity and idealism implied by the political and ethical frameworks of 
intention and agency based on the notion of the liberal subject (a category 
from which so many have been excluded) no longer align with the ever more 
diffuse and improvisational expressions of neoliberal power. The rise of the 
network as a dominant cultural form, Patrick Jagoda has argued, can lead 
to a sense of despair, since it posits that everything is interconnected and 
“makes scarcely imaginable the possibility of an alternative or an outside 
uninflected by networks.”78 Users and citizens are interpellated as subjects 
who have the ability to be ethical and moral — and are financially, legally, 
and juridically held accountable for being so — while at the same time we 
are profiled and managed algorithmically within big data regimes that are 
indifferent to our subjective will.79 For example, systems of data collection, 
as Finn Brunton and Helen Nissenbaum observe, are “still theoretically vol-
untary” but
the costs of refusal are high and getting higher: a life lived in ramifying 
social isolation . . . [with] only very particular forms of employment, liv-
ing far from centers of business and commerce, without access to many 
forms of credit, insurance, or other significant financial instruments, not 
to mention the minor inconveniences and disadvantages — long waits at 
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road toll cash lines, higher prices at grocery stores, inferior seating on air-
line flights — for which disclosure is the unspecified price. It isn’t possible 
for everyone to live on principle; as a practical matter, many of us must 
make compromises in asymmetrical relationships, without the control or 
consent for which we might wish.80 
But even as this book explores the possibilities opened up by short- circuiting 
the idea that complicity is the opposite of resistance — that in order to chal-
lenge domination, minor actors must be unimplicated — it should not be 
misunderstood as a celebration of complicity. To the contrary, the book 
traces how hegemonic entities routinely excuse themselves by accusing oth-
ers of complicity, by presenting the compromised actions of individuals as 
commensurate with their own, much more impactful and damaging actions. 
Discussions of the catastrophic implications of climate change, for instance, 
routinely interpellate all actors, regardless of their actual habits of consump-
tion, as equally responsible for the overdeveloped capitalist world’s depen-
dence on fossil fuels.81 The tactical complicity of the parasite thus follows 
work by Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Alexis Shotwell, Donna Haraway, and 
Jagoda, who have called for a new ethical ground of implication that relin-
quishes purity, an ethics of “justice without progress,” a politics of “staying 
with the trouble” and “learning to inhabit a compromised environment.”82 
“To be against purity,” Shotwell writes, “is to start from an understanding 
of our implication in this compromised world.”83 Rather than console our-
selves with the redemptive narrative offered by an imagined outside, this 
book examines what it could mean to inhabit embeddedness as the ground 
for a nonproprietary ethics.
These artworks offer no definitive answers, and likewise, my own study 
does not propose anything such as a solution — a deus ex machina, an es-
cape from the inescapable condition with which it tries to reckon.84 Rather, 
it advances parasitism as a necessary critical category for understanding the 
latent or unspoken political stakes of artistic projects of resistance not oth-
erwise recognizable as such. The book’s aim is neither to promote nor to de-
nounce parasitism — to deliver judgment on whether it is good or bad — but 
to critically assess its new visibility as a compromised praxis of resistance 
in the field of contemporary art and interventionism. The book both devel-
ops a theory of parasitical resistance and weighs the risks of this gambit. It 
reads the ethical purchase of these works within the frame of feminist and 
queer studies scholarship that theorizes agency under nonemancipatory and 
nonteleological conditions. As the promise of freedom or an emancipatory 
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outside has been shown to be an effective instrument of control, parasitical 
artworks eschew historical leftist benchmarks based on autonomy and op-
positionality. If this form of interventionism holds subversive potential, it is 
a subversive potential that is necessarily compromised from the start. 
PARASITICAL RESISTANCE AND ITS CHALLENGES TO CRITIQUE 
Even as it poses new possibilities for our moment, parasitical intervention 
blurs the line of what constitutes resistance. How can one evaluate — let alone 
hold accountable — a form of resistance possible only for those subjects al-
ready afforded leverage within the system? If everyone is now complicit by 
virtue of the scale of neoliberal capitalism’s coercive hospitality, is there any 
way to differentiate between degrees and forms of complicity? At times para-
sitism opens up clear forms of resistance; at other times it serves less as a 
strategy of subversion and solidarity than as a screen or alibi for active forms 
of bad faith and further exploitation. But the parasite is always a compro-
mised figure. What criteria, then, can be used to assess not only parasitism’s 
effectiveness as a mode of resistance but also its ethical implications? 
Parasitism represents an intensification of the turn to immanent critique 
in 1990s and 2000s tactical art, media, and activism as it has given rise to 
ever more ethically and politically ambiguous styles of resistance; in their 
embeddedness and enduringness, parasitical interventions differ from tac-
tical art and media’s more punctual incursions.85 Rather than causing a mo-
mentary disruption, the parasite nests within the host. Parasitism has no 
clear limits, no absolutely discernible beginning or end. Its constitutive am-
bivalence and complicity with the host cannot easily be resolved or wished 
away. This enduringness is the unique temporality of the parasite: its inevi-
table subsumption provides the ground for future planning. 
But, because of its abiding temporality and ambiguous character, conven-
tional critical methods and principles can initially appear to falter on their 
encounter with the parasite. The parasite’s embeddedness and enduringness 
pose clear challenges to criticism’s customary investment in externality and 
stability — objectivity, critical distance, and detachment — and its reliance on 
binaries (the word criticism deriving from the Greek krinein, meaning “to 
decide,” “to cut”). For traditional critical methods to activate the parasite’s 
potential, they must be able to ascertain its political intentions and effects. 
Therein lies the rub: in order to realize its political potential, as I have ar-
gued, the parasite can never appear to the host to be a fully coherent agent. 
Parasitism traffics in indeterminacy and is a paradigm that is necessarily 
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immanent and nonbinary. The parasite’s political potential thus lies in and 
depends on precisely what makes it so evasive to criticism.
But the parasite need not pose an insurmountable impasse for criticism. 
Rather it offers an opportunity to reassess criticism’s historical attachment 
to the autonomous subject — to clearly recognizable and stable political po-
sitions and to legal and moral value systems based on propriety and private 
property that code payment and protocols of authorization as inherently 
moral — as grounds for making ethical and political judgments. These tra-
ditional critical attachments do not account for how the ethics and politics 
of the parasite are necessarily conditioned by the host. While we may not 
easily be able to draw boundaries around the parasitical agent or work or 
determine with certainty the ethical and political intentions of the para-
sitical act, this does not mean that we cannot make claims about the ethi-
cal and political valences of a parasitical work of art. Parasitical resistance 
emerges in response to the pervasive sense that the epistemology of exposure 
is no longer an efficient engine of political change in a neoliberal information 
economy in which it has become painfully obvious that knowledge does not 
equal power. While the act of critical exposure is not the solution, it nonethe-
less remains an important political tool; however, it is one tool among oth-
ers. As a work of criticism, this book remains invested in the act of critical 
exposure, if not in the belief that knowing will necessarily facilitate concrete 
change, then as a tool for glimpsing the subversive charge of artworks that 
will not or cannot themselves avow their political efficacy or potential. Para-
sitism calls for methods for reading a performance of hegemonic power that 
cannot be unmasked by a discourse of truth. It demands political tools that 
are not absolute or predictable but relative and improvisational, pragmatic 
and situated, that are responsive to a dynamic ecology of relations in which 
there is no “once and for all” answer but highly contingent and conditional 
thresholds, loopholes, and openings that might yield more transparent, re-
distributive, and equitable relations among people, institutions, and systems. 
While the parasite must be careful not to show its hand, the critic can 
(and where possible, must) still read for its political and ethical intentions 
without falling back on a model of criticism based upon discerning a fully 
coherent intentional subject. (Some parasites have tells. Certain parasites, for 
instance, signal their criticality by employing irony; a wry or camp sensibil-
ity permeates many of these works.) In my analysis, intention — how did the 
artist feel toward their chosen target? — remains a significant factor in how 
I understand the politics of the work. It matters that Ubermorgen at least 
articulated a critical stance toward Amazon rather than admiring Amazon 
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and wanting to be bought out by it; it matters that Byrne signaled her work 
as a critical statement about gendered authorship and legitimacy, as opposed 
to being hostile toward Hendricks for other reasons.
But because the parasite’s intention is always at least partially effaced, and 
thereby cannot be ascertained with absolute certainty, the task of the critic 
is to adjudicate the parasite’s political and ethical efficacy primarily by other 
means. This means adopting a mode of reading that prioritizes effect over 
intention. Much as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick called for the recognition of the 
limits of the epistemology of exposure, introducing the reparative comple-
ment she calls “weak theory,” I propose two provisional criteria for assess-
ing the ethics and politics of parasitical works whose intentions cannot be 
fully known.86 These criteria map onto the two halves of the book: the work’s 
redistributive effects and its disruptive charge. The redistributive effects of 
parasitical works refer to their ability to recirculate what they take from 
the host beyond the parasite’s own interest and in solidarity with similarly 
or more precarious others — to work against privatization, to open hosts’ 
black boxes and disseminate the material, symbolic, or conceptual resources 
stashed therein. The disruptive charge is the work’s ability to impose on and 
make visceral the host’s hypocritical instrumentalization of openness so as 
to compel it to host the parasitical work, effectively turning the host’s words 
and actions against it. Whether the parasite is resistant ultimately depends 
on whether the effects of its redistribution or disruption positively outweighs 
the cost of its original act of complicity. 
While these criteria can be complementary with each other, they can also 
be directly opposed. In order to have a disruptive charge, a parasitical inter-
vention has to call attention to itself in some way; conversely (as we see in 
the cases of Ubermorgen’s Amazon Noir and Rakowitz’s paraSITE), evading 
attention and remaining invisible for as long as possible can be necessary for 
the artwork’s redistributive effects to be maximized. Moreover because the 
artists seek to support themselves through their art, they have a material in-
terest in their works being recognized that can impede the more furtive di-
mensions of parasitism. Insofar as these works facilitate their own exposure 
via protocols of exhibition and promotion, their visibility raises questions 
about how much more effective the project would have been (for others, not 
necessarily the artists themselves) had they kept it quiet for longer and en-
abled more people to benefit from them. And yet by not being visible enough, 
by not explicitly appealing to their host- patron’s public images, they might 
have been shut down earlier and even more decisively.
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Whether particular deployments of complicity will be put to redistribu-
tive or self- serving ends cannot be known in advance. The works examined 
in this book are not didactic, and they are rarely exemplary; they largely 
avoid being consigned to any single aesthetic category or critical or political 
position. My investment in these works, moreover, is neither one of fan nor 
apologist. It is not a matter of liking these works, many of which have been 
described by critics as unlikeable or unsavory, for they are largely uninter-
ested in formal concerns or aesthetic pleasure; rather it is a matter of con-
tending with their critical force. These works invest in art as, rather than a 
formal medium, a blunt tool for accomplishing a particular objective. While 
the book’s methods are feminist, the works themselves are not necessarily 
feminist or even progressive. While the parasite can be critically and politi-
cally useful, it is only a temporary vector, a moment of possibility: when it 
finishes its work, it is no longer a parasite. 
Moreover the parasite’s and critic’s investments are not necessarily aligned. 
During the course of writing the book, it became clear that my own invest-
ment in a feminist and anticapitalist mode of criticism was undermined by 
certain parasites’ self- serving opportunism or self- destructive drive. As the 
chapters develop, there are progressively more moments when the parasite’s 
personal interests and risky tactics exceed my critical containment mea-
sures and escape my grasp. As I was writing the book, several of the artists 
began to respond to, contest, and even plagiarize previously published chap-
ters’ characterizations of their practices as parasitical. Kraus challenged the 
charge in an earlier published version of chapter 3 that she was dependent 
on her then- husband’s press, Semiotext(e). Byrne, by adopting the terms of 
my analysis of her work, would compel me to reassess my initial optimism 
about her deployment of parasitism, as I explore in the coda. These works 
initiated a certain call and response between scholarly work and experimen-
tal practice, with the artists’ responses effectively breaking the fourth wall 
of the project’s conceptualization of parasitism. Their responses crystallized 
in artistic practice my efforts to theorize the parasitical relation from which 
there is no safe retreat. These moments forced me to recognize my impli-
cation in my attempts to immunize myself against the parasite’s work — to 
manage, to suppress, or to redirect certain parasites’ manifestly unethical 
or volatile charge. This is where the act of criticism shows its hand. The 
book thus explores the tension between the progressive critical possibili-
ties of the parasite and its artistic applications. In its metaconceptual fram-
ing, this book interrogates the dissolving boundaries between criticism and 
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practice in a digital era of instantaneous circulation and appropriation, in 
which critics are never only purely reactive but also participate in constitut-
ing the meaning of the work.
These works are not radical but parasitical. The parasite’s appearance of 
acquiescence is the condition of possibility for trafficking in something dif-
ferent when it wouldn’t otherwise be possible, perhaps even something radi-
cal. But the parasite remains a dangerous figure on which to base a politics. 
There are no guarantees against its mechanisms. Just as these artworks can 
subvert and siphon the power of their hosts, they can also fortify them. Far 
from a replacement for direct action, the parasite is a politics of last resort. 
And precisely because it flatters and mirrors the system, it cannot easily be 
identified, unlike oppositional art practices where the mask is eventually 
taken off. There is no revelatory epiphany, no happy ending — yet the parasite 
is neither a nihilistic nor merely cynical actor. It demands a different metrics: 
a wider lens, a determination to account for the coercive and asymmetrical 
structures that attend contemporary conceptions of choice and agency, a 
form of critique attentive to dynamics of scale and economy. But for all its 
limitations, the parasite cannot be judged in isolation because it always car-




Not all parasites are equally equipped for survival, just as not all subjects are charged with the same potential for resistance. Before proceeding 
further, it is necessary to address more systematically the privilege or capital 
that is presupposed by parasitical resistance in this book. Which parasiti-
cal subjects can play the system or afford to resist in spaces of domination? 
Why are some minoritarian subjects granted the accommodation necessary 
for acts of resistance and others are not? To answer these questions, we must 
first define more clearly the conditions of the host’s hospitality. 
Hospitality, as I advance it in this book, is a paternalistic logic of admin-
istration that distributes and controls access under the guise of care. The 
host presides over an economy of dependency — economia deriving from the 
Greek οικονοµία, designating the rules by which a household is managed. 
The host carves up and allocates resources at its pleasure within the sym-
bolic economy of the home, setting the terms of belonging for all who enter. 
The host’s regulation of access has the effect of making less powerful sub-
jects reliant on it for their survival. Digital platforms are key to understand-
ing the consolidation of this logic under neoliberal networked capitalism 
(what I call coercive hospitality), as there have become ever sharper distinc-
tions between those with capital and those shut out from it with the rise of 
leviathan- like monopolies and the concentration of individual capital in the 
winner- take- all postcrisis economy. In this contemporary political economy, 
the inviting rhetoric of openness, access, and sharing has been used as a 
strategy of domination, harnessed to secure and further the dominion of al-
ready powerful entities, while such entities efface the authority that confers 
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power upon them. This book starts from the example of digital corporate 
platforms’ wide- scale privatization of access and proceeds to trace how this 
infrastructural logic of privatization works across a range of other relation-
ships and milieus also founded on the principles of ownership (private capi-
tal, private property, personal privacy, patronage, and legacy). It explores 
how the host- parasite relation plays out in the dependent relations of the 
digital platform – user (chapter 1), state- immigrant (chapter 2), man- woman 
(chapter 3), and institution – contingent laborer (chapter 4). As these various 
iterations of dependent relations attest, there is a substantial gradient within 
the category of the parasite: the category includes those relatively privileged 
minoritarian subjects who can afford to test the host’s generosity and those 
who, by doing so, risk their very survival. 
It is crucial, then, to examine more closely the thresholds of accommo-
dation that determine the differential risk faced by minoritarian subjects 
who are not all equally equipped to gain access to and resist the host system. 
In this interlude I differentiate three logics that demarcate the provisional 
limits of the host system: the threshold of detection, threshold of tolerance, 
and threshold of care (table Interlude.1). Minoritarian subjects are not all 
precarious in the same way, either in degree or kind; these thresholds help 
elaborate the differential tactics and frequency of risk by which the condi-
tions of dependency are enforced, survived, and negotiated. The threshold 
of accommodation is not a strict line of demarcation but a margin below 
which something is not perceived. Like a line, a threshold has a discriminat-
ing function, but by virtue of its spatial logic it has slightly more allowance — 
it is something that can be played. It is by working these thresholds, by stay-
ing below the limen of detection (or, if detected, by dissimulating their pres-
ence or appealing to the host’s interests or sense of its own magnanimity), 
that parasites are accommodated by a system that claims neither to want 
nor need them. 
UNACCOMMODATED PARASITES: THE THRESHOLD OF DETECTION
The threshold of detection speaks to the disruptive or dissident possibilities 
of the parasite that has not yet been detected by the host. We find an illus-
tration of this in Ralph Ellison’s 1952 novel, Invisible Man, in which the un-
named black protagonist describes finding ways of leveraging “the advan-
tages of being invisible,” such as stealing electricity and living rent- free in the 
forgotten basement of a building rented only to whites.1 Within the threshold 
of detection, the parasite temporarily harnesses a mode of social invisibility 
TABLEINTERLUDE1 THREE THRESHOLDS OF ACCOMMODATION 
THRESHOLD OF DETECTION Not yet detected as a parasite; either alterity passes as 
similarity or has effect of social invisibility. 
*High-risk tactic
Repr es ent ative figur e 
The so-called stranger or foreigner unknown to the host.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  LIMEN OF DETECTION
*If detected and perceived as an outside threat,  
the parasite is subject to violent expulsion from host 
system. 
   
THRESHOLD OF TOLERANCE Parasite detected but perceived as so minor a threat as 
not to warrant the expenditure it would take for the 
host to expel it.
Parasite is barely accommodated. Calculus 
of accommodation is predominantly (but not 
exclusively) economic, and parasite is subject to 
regular scrutiny; parasite construed as outsider-guest.
Repr es ent ative figur es   
Those nonintimate dependents deemed necessary to 
host: servants, foreigners known to the host (those of a 
lower social order).
THRESHOLD OF CARE Parasite detected; difference is perceptible, and even 
potentially harmful, but parasite performs function of 
propping the host’s self-image as compassionate and 
caring. 
Calculus of accommodation is predominantly social, 
one of keeping up appearances; parasite construed as 
insider-guest.
Repr es ent ative figur es  
Intimates, dependents on the host: women, children, 
friends (those of the same social order). 
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(in this case, a mode that is a paradoxical consequence of the black body’s 
hypervisibility) as a tactical advantage. Ellison’s novel, Hortense J. Spillers 
argues, transfigures blackness from “a condition of physiognomy” into a 
symbolic strategy (“Under the ‘laws’ of this novel, the game of ‘blackness’ 
. . . came home, as it were, right between the ears, as the glittering weapon 
of an ‘invisible’ field of choice”).2 “I am one of the most irresponsible beings 
that ever lived,” claims the Invisible Man. “Irresponsibility is part of my in-
visibility. . . . But to whom can I be responsible and why should I be, when 
you refuse to see me? Responsibility rests upon recognition, and recogni-
tion is a form of agreement.”3 With the undercommons, Fred Moten and 
Stefano Harney update this black aesthetic practice of invisibility to theorize 
the hidden underground, “the downlow low- down maroon community,” of 
minoritarian collectivity and resource sharing through which marginalized 
subjects defy the systemic violence of institutional life.4 Ellison’s articula-
tion further resonates with Simone Browne’s account of how the inelucta-
ble glare of mass surveillance and biometric technologies operates on and 
through black bodies.5 It also speaks to minoritarian, black, queer, and/or 
trans politico- aesthetic projects of invisibility, undetectability, and counter- 
surveillance, such as Finn Brunton and Helen Nissenbaum have described 
as “obfuscation,” Shaka McGlotten as “black data,” Zach Blas as “informatic 
opacity,” and Toby Beauchamp as “going stealth.”6
Playing the threshold of detection is a particularly risky operation for 
black, brown, trans, queer, indigenous, and/or migrant subjects for whom 
the system’s sanctions are disproportionately higher: for those perceived 
as outside threats and who if detected are vulnerable to violent expulsion 
from the host system, for the threshold of detection presents that subject 
as a stranger.7 This representation of the parasite is deeply racialized and 
ethnicized.8 Typically such a parasite is perceived as having infiltrated the 
host system by crossing a border. For parasites that are called “terrorist” or 
“illegal alien,” this border is a national one, while the Invisible Man’s “in-
trusion” into a building rented only to whites conjures instead the crossing 
of a racial border. The parasite represented as a stranger is construed as a 
threat to the “purity” and coherence of the body politic, “a hostile invader 
of the host nation or group.” As a structure of speech, the epithet parasite, 
which connotes an excess or supplement, attempts to establish a strict parti-
tion demarcating inside from outside.9 This immunological trope is taken 
up in racist and xenophobic discourses to call for the securing of borders 
(the borders of the body, the family, the community, or the nation) by van-
quishing what is supposedly other to it. A trope of nationalist propaganda, 
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the language of parasitism exacerbates lines of fracture (job insecurity, anti- 
immigrant sentiment) to stoke social antagonisms for political gain. In its 
extreme expression in totalitarian propaganda, the discourse of parasitism 
represents certain groups as less than human (“vermin,” “pests”) and thus 
as susceptible to extermination — a rhetoric that, as Roberto Esposito has 
argued, was part of the Nazis’ “epidemiological repertoire,” which referred 
to Jews as “bacteria,” “viruses,” and “microbes” that must be eradicated for 
the health of the nation.10 
The ability to be perceivable as socially unmarked within the host system 
is thus less accessible to visible minoritarian subjects: dark- skinned racial 
and ethnic minorities, non- gender- conforming and visible religious minori-
ties, among others, who necessarily operate at a different threshold of vis-
ibility and identification in relation to power. But even those minoritarian 
subjects who hold “the dubious honor of being largely invisible or unread-
able” (light- skinned racial and ethnic minorities, gender- conforming homo-
sexuals, certain religious minorities, etc.) are rarely at home in spaces of pass-
ing.11 Indeed, for many racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities, the strategy of 
performing complicity, even when it is possible, holds little appeal. “With their 
commitments to conflict and antagonism as consciousness- raising and rev-
olutionary ideals,” Rachel C. Lee has shown, “postcolonial and race studies 
often regard as suspect an ethics that endorses hospitality (alternately, care-
taking) across conditions where parties refuse to or cannot recognize their 
reciprocity and interdependence.”12
ACCOMMODATED PARASITES: THE THRESHOLD OF TOLERANCE 
AND THE THRESHOLD OF CARE
Unlike the threshold of detection, which construes the parasite as a stranger, 
the threshold of tolerance and the threshold of care construe the parasite as a 
guest. Both of these thresholds speak to the conditions under which the host 
will knowingly accommodate certain parasites. These accounts explicitly 
highlight how the terms of accommodation are shaped by those of pater-
nalistic domination. In her feminist account of hospitality, Tracy McNulty 
explains:
Potis names the master of the home, the one who makes the law in the 
house — the casa. As master of the house, he is also master of all of the 
subordinates who make up the household (servants, slaves, and depen-
dent women), as well as the livestock or chattel that form his personal 
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property. The Greek despótes (lord, despot) and its Latin equivalent, do-
minus, represent the extension of domestic authority into the field of so-
cial and symbolic power; both terms designate the “head of the clan,” as 
well as the “lord” or “possessor” — the one who has power over and is able 
to dispose of his subjects.13
In this schema (one that is based on a heteropatriarchal slave economy), 
servants, slaves, and dependent women (not to mention cattle) are lumped 
together into a generalized minoritarian class of “dependents.” Compared 
to those subjects without freedom (“marked” with a ring around the neck), 
the wife, children, friends, and other loved ones of the head of the house-
hold enjoy a form of protection in ownership as “unmarked” subjects. But 
even their limited or provisional agency can at any moment be taken away 
at the behest of the master. They are both inside and out, equal and not. “As 
a model of social order, the patriarchal family depended upon duty, status, 
and protection rather than consent, equality, and civil freedom,” Saidiya 
Hartman affirms. “Subjection was not only naturalized but also consonant 
with the sentimental equality of reciprocity, inasmuch as the power of affec-
tion licensed the strength of weakness. Essentially, ‘the strength of weak-
ness’ prevailed due to the goodness of the father, ‘The armor of affection 
and benevolence.’ ”14 Within this plantation logic, dependents’ access to re-
sources for survival varies greatly according to the logic of their possession 
by the master of the house. The two categories of dependents — protected and 
unprotected — signal a divergence in the paternalistic logics of hospitality. 
Some dependents (nonintimates or foreigners) are barely accommodated or 
accommodated according to a calculus based on economic or other strategic 
factors (threshold of tolerance), while others — intimates such as dependent 
women, children, friends — are accommodated to the extent that they prop 
up the host’s need to be regarded as generous (threshold of care). 
Whereas Ellison’s Invisible Man attests to the cost of detection for some 
racialized subjects, the films Six Degrees of Separation (1993) and Get Out 
(2017) explore how some hosts occasionally accommodate racial difference 
(and the perceived dangers represented to both parties by such an alliance 
of strategic inclusion). In both of these films, a young black male protago-
nist gets in the door by fulfilling a white liberal fantasy of assimilated black-
ness. By incorporating the figure of the young black male into the white 
traditional family home, the white liberal host is able to rationalize their 
self- image as inclusive and progressive. Riding the line of the thresholds of 
tolerance and care, these examples speak to the selective, tokenistic inclusion 
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of certain racial and ethnic minorities — for example, the so- called model 
minority, endowed with a preferred status, and other exceptional subjects 
who are allotted a seat at the table while others are left outside the room.15
A POINT OF VULNERABILITY: THE THRESHOLD OF CARE
As these thresholds show, there are a number of stories that can be told about 
the parasite- host relation; I am telling only one of these. The parasitical per-
formances I explore in this book fall under the threshold of care. The artists 
I examine, almost all of whom have been threatened with legal action that 
was ultimately not pursued, dodge culpability by tapping into the plausible 
deniability that is afforded by the ambiguous legal, ethical, and moral status 
of digital technology, art, and performance.16 
But more crucially, parasites locate a point of vulnerability in the host’s 
(disavowed) need of its parasites: the host’s need to believe it is magnani-
mous, or to be perceived as magnanimous by those dependents it cares or 
professes to care about. Given the contingency of the host’s authority, the 
parasite can play on the host’s need to be reassured that it has the affection 
and approval of those it dominates: the master who wants to be a “good guy,” 
the boss who wants his jokes to be laughed at, the patron who expects his 
beneficiaries to kiss the proverbial ring. Following Michel Feher, who traces 
neoliberalism’s paternalistic and patriarchal logic back to chivalry and the 
gift economy built into the feudal relation, I argue that the parasite takes 
advantage of the host’s investment in maintaining the public appearance of 
equal footing; this is particularly true in an era when state and corporate lar-
gesse (strategic diversity, corporate responsibility, state diplomacy) are cali-
brated according to the optics of risk and brand reputation management.17 
The parasite effectively traps the host in the contradiction between the host’s 
public values and private actions. The parasite compels the host to accom-
modate it by harnessing the host’s desire not to appear hypocritical.
Some artists in the book play the threshold of care by seizing the advan-
tage afforded by their technical expertise or know- how (Ubermorgen, Robin 
Hood Cooperative) and others by leveraging the intimate access to power 
provided by citizenship (Güell) or social standing within the affluent queer 
community (Pietrobono). Still others (Kraus, Calle) weaponize the dubious 
privilege and chivalrous protection afforded to femininity, as Byrne does 
with Hendricks. By performing heterosexual white femininity as a means of 
lateral access, a kind of Trojan horse, these artists reanimate fierce histori-
cal debates about complicity in feminist and antiracist criticism. The com-
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plicit status of white femininity, long an integral and complex site for prop-
ping up the project of white supremacist patriarchy, is raised in particular 
by these works.18 White women’s “assumed delicacy and helplessness” has 
been a favorite alibi of white supremacy, serving as the historical justification 
for centuries of antiblack violence.19 Femininity benefits from the economic 
and social protection of patriarchal structures, much as, Frank B. Wilder-
son has shown, whiteness necessarily feeds on the spoils of white supremacy. 
“Whiteness is parasitic,” Wilderson writes, “because it monumentalizes its 
subjective capacity, its lush cartography, in direct proportion to the waste-
land of Black incapacity.”20 
However, these artists wield whiteness and/or femininity, positioned at 
the nexus of straightness and middle-class-ness, not as identities but as per-
formative tools and tactics of complicity that afford them access to and pro-
tections within the inner sanctums of power. Roisin Byrne, Núria Güell, 
Chris Kraus, and Sophie Calle embrace feminine archetypes of the clingy 
female admirer, the plus one, the vampiristic hanger- on. Under the thresh-
old of care, these parasitical intimates of the host operate a kind of coun-
terpassing. While passing is typically understood as moving from stranger 
to guest, they invert that dynamic, shifting from guest to stranger. In this 
move, those subjects who are most perceived as docile and nonthreaten-
ing, and who are most likely to be welcomed as guests, are instead (slowly) 
revealed to be strangers — parasites. This tactic of parasitism hinges in part 
on the gradual character of this estrangement and the strategic possibilities 
opened up by its delayed recognition. 
As a tactic of the more privileged, parasitism can represent a means of 
owning and subverting one’s complicity; it can represent an alternative to 
what can often amount to the platitudes and false innocence of allyship. By 
mobilizing whiteness and femininity not as fixed identities but as complicit 
modalities, these artists hold out the possibility for a strategic disidentifi-
cation with their own privilege — one that might be used to forge a kind of 
solidarity with those who, by virtue of their positions in relation to the host, 
must mobilize their parasitism differently. 
While my discussions of the artworks depart from the thresholds of ac-
commodation I set up here, this framework remains an essential analytic 
for conceptualizing the social politics of interventionism that in discussions 
of tactical art and media too often relies on the notion of a universal subject 
of capitalism, ignoring or leaving undeveloped the gendered, raced, sexual-
ized dimensions of the subject and the system under discussion. One of the 
book’s organizing questions — What does one’s position allow one to get away 
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with and what forms of resistance can that latitude facilitate? — examines 
how the parasite’s accommodation is conditioned by the racial, gender, and 
class privilege that subtends the very possibility of parasitical resistance, for 
these axes of visibility and identification determine the amount of play that 
is possible in systems of white heteropatriarchal neoliberal control. 
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ONE USER BE USED
Lev er a g ing t h e Coer c iv e Hos pit a l it y  
of  Cor por a t e  Pl a t f or ms
Let us begin with what is for many today the most recognizable — if also the most invisible — example of the privatization of openness: the big 
tech platform. The platform economy is paradigmatic of the logic of con-
solidated power and one- way accountability that this book examines. Big 
tech platforms capture the underlying architecture of coercive hospitality, 
wherein corporate technologies sold as enabling access and sharing con-
tain hidden costs borne by the user. Such technologies have helped an ever- 
narrowing number of monopolies accrue power and influence by concealing 
their authority. Megacorporations like Google and Amazon have presented 
themselves as hospitable services — as mere hosts and intermediaries, mere 
“platforms” — to gain sway over the market, extracting user data and amass-
ing capital, even as they are increasingly unanswerable to users, workers, and 
governments. The term platform suggests a progressive and fair arrange-
ment that promises to support those who rely on it. Mobilizing the rheto-
ric of democracy in order to privatize public goods and services, these mo-
nopolies use the appearance of openness to facilitate closedness — fueling 
inequality, killing off competition, and limiting opportunities for workers 
and local communities. 
This chapter examines how global corporations have also gotten in on 
the act, as companies like Walmart and McDonald’s have borrowed this 
playbook. More specifically, the chapter investigates how these companies 
have sought to adopt for themselves the image of digital technology as neu-
tral and egalitarian in order to obscure their ever more predatorial busi-
ness practices, as they have invented new methods for making the poor pay 
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(literally) for their own immiseration. By embracing the rhetoric and affect 
of the digital, by presenting themselves as virtual (rather than a physical 
presence) and their actions as automated (rather than strategic calculations), 
these corporations have made it harder for workers and consumers to chal-
lenge them or to build a lasting grassroots response to their impacts.1 When 
threatened with exposure for manipulating the appearance of hospitality 
to exploitative ends, these corporations adopt the appearance of network 
protocol (the neutral authority of the faceless administrator) to sidestep ac-
countability for their actions. 
Corporate monopolies’ wish to appear caring, charitable, and accessible 
need not be a subjective desire but may be an economic calculation; the ques-
tion is not the cause of their performance of hospitality but its effects and 
the ends to which it is used. Can this pretense of openness be turned against 
them? To answer this question, I look to a series of artistic and social col-
lectivist experiments that test the possibility of using the market’s supposed 
openness to bend the arc of privatization instead toward recommunalization 
and redistribution. These experiments include Robin Hood Cooperative’s 
“Parasite” algorithm (which mirrors the investment patterns of the most 
successful traders on Wall Street) and Ubermorgen’s Google Will Eat Itself 
(2005 – 8), made in collaboration with Alessandro Ludovico and Paolo Cirio. 
Whether they aim at divesting from finance or platform capitalism using the 
stock market or attempting to take down Google using its own advertising 
revenue (or, in another, similar effort, to buy Kickstarter using Kickstarter), 
these parasitical works model how performances of exaggerated complicity 
might open up new political scripts. Ubermorgen and Robin Hood Coop-
erative employ imitative tactics in order to siphon resources from the data 
economy and redirect them toward social groups or causes that seek to “re-
build the commons.” By literally investing in the very structures that they 
seek to dismantle, these works model the parasite as a political actor with 
the potential to harness platform capitalism to different ends, if with largely 
ambiguous results and symbolic returns.
AN OPEN PLATFORM
The platform is but a recent variant of digital capitalism’s long- standing in-
vestment in the rhetoric of openness. The digital’s much- touted virtue of 
openness — its collapse of hierarchy, explosion of secrecy, democratization 
of knowledge — is central to how the medium has been defined from its in-
ception. Sold as “the great equalizer” enabling circulation and free access to 
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information for all, the early internet — the network — heralded a brave new 
world of viral circulation, even as it was used to overstate both the equalizing 
effects of circulation and the reciprocity of exchange, as if speed alone could 
lubricate democracy or level socioeconomic disparity. With the privatiza-
tion of the internet in the mid- 1990s (placing the once public project in the 
hands of corporations), the rhetoric of openness and access, as Wendy Hui 
Kyong Chun has shown, served to grease the wheels of capital in the name of 
democracy.2 This rhetoric advanced a false equivalency between individual 
users and corporate actors, addressing all “users” — states, corporations, and 
individuals alike — as commensurate nodes within the network. 
Yet, as Andrew L. Russell argues, the digital’s constitutive “openness” is 
in fact deeply ideological, for it redefines access for commercial ends: “For 
individuals, ‘open’ is shorthand for transparent, welcoming, participatory, 
and entrepreneurial; for society at large, ‘open’ signifies a vast increase in 
the flow of goods and information through a global, market- oriented sys-
tem of exchange. In the most general sense, it conveys independence from 
the threats of arbitrary power and centralized control.”3 And yet this form 
of power and control is precisely what this rhetoric is used to install. “When 
a new app is said to be democratizing something — whether robotic per-
sonal assistants or sepia- toned selfies,” argues Nathan Schneider, “it means 
allowing more people to access that something. Just access, along with a big, 
fat terms of service. Gone are those old associations of town meetings and 
voting booths; gone are co- ownership, co- governance, and accountability.”4 
The celebrated openness of the digital, Astra Taylor points out, rather than 
serving as a leveling force, amplifies already existing disparities. “Online, 
just as off- line, attention and influence largely accrue to those who already 
have plenty of both,” she writes. Big media have thus given way “not [to] 
a revolution but a rearrangement” in which “giants like Amazon, Apple, 
Google, and Facebook remain the gatekeepers” and “the new order looks 
suspiciously like the old one.”5 What is perhaps new is the mask of egalitari-
anism. Taylor observes that this rhetorical ploy is often wielded in ways that 
sidestep “discussions of ownership and equity”: “While openness has many 
virtues, it is also undeniably ambiguous. Is open a means or an end? What 
is open and to whom? Mark Zuckerberg said he designed Facebook because 
he wanted to make the world more ‘open and connected,’ but his company 
does everything it can to keep users within its confines and exclusively re-
tains the data they emit.”6 
More recently big media corporations’ adoption of the strategic position 
of the platform has demonstrated their use of openness as a tool of skill-
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ful misdirection. As Tarleton Gillespie has shown, the term is a “discursive 
resting point” employed by corporations to subtly but meaningfully reca-
librate their responsibility to others. According to Gillespie, these entities 
selectively perform their agency: they present themselves as a valuable ser-
vice in some moments and as a mere platform in others. When companies 
position themselves as platforms — as simply accommodating the activity of 
others — they are able to monetize content without having to be liable for it.7 
Nick Srnicek elaborates: “While often presenting themselves as empty spaces 
for others to interact on, they in fact embody a politics. The rules of the prod-
uct and service development, as well as marketplace interactions, are set by 
the platform owner. Uber, despite presenting itself as an empty vessel for 
market forces, shapes the appearance of the market. . . . In their position as 
an intermediary, platforms gain not only access to more data but also control 
and governance over the rules of the game.”8 We can see this active position-
ing when Google and Facebook executives speak, for example, about their 
role in policy and legislative matters as being those of mere hosts, conduits, 
or carriers of content, as opposed to publishers. They present themselves 
as neither promoting nor championing the content they disseminate, and 
therefore as not liable for offensive, dangerous, or hateful material that might 
appear on their platform.9 
What distinguishes the platform model from the traditional, transac-
tional business model is the posture by which, despite the visible presence of 
site- based advertising (not to mention other invisible forms of marketing), 
these corporations insist on their role as hosts rather than users in their 
own right. (While companies like Facebook, Google, Airbnb, and Uber are 
the most commonly cited examples of platforms, Walmart and others in-
creasingly also position themselves as platforms, pioneering supply- chain 
management practices that do not buy products but effectively contract with 
suppliers to rent shelf space, paying their contractors only for the items that 
sell.)10 Such platforms position themselves as hosts, providing infrastructure 
and facilitating interaction, while at the same time nontransparently mon-
etizing the data they acquire through these services. 
One might call the platform economy a parasitical outgrowth of the 
postcrisis era. It has been suggested that the 2008 global financial crisis 
was “a key enabling condition” for the rise of the platform economy.11 The 
neoliberal advancement of deregulation, privatization, the unraveling of the 
public sector, a low interest rate climate for venture capital, and high levels 
of unemployment (leaving behind a precarious class of workers with few 
protections), as Srnicek and Gary Hall have shown, helped companies like 
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Airbnb and Uber become unavoidable almost overnight.12 Operating on a 
postwelfare model of capitalism, these companies repackage hospitality as 
rent. They turn acts of generosity like ridesharing and couch- surfing into 
commodities. Writes Hall:
In the case of Uber and Airbnb . . . these assets take the form of seats in 
vehicles and rooms in properties that are otherwise occupied on an infre-
quent and temporary basis. In other words, they are idle resources it has 
up to now been difficult for capital to commodify and whose value from 
an entrepreneurial point of view has therefore been wasted. . . . Even if 
this form of economy is presented as a revival of community spirit, it ac-
tually has very little to do with sharing this access to goods, activities, and 
services and everything to do with selling this access. (Many people insist 
on referring to it not as the sharing economy but as the renting economy 
for just this reason.)13
While Airbnb and Uber sell hospitality as rent, Facebook and Google 
purport to provide it for free. They overstate the individual user’s agency by 
downplaying the platform’s authority to set the terms and conditions of use: 
the companies sell themselves as free services and insist that online sub-
jects are their equals, counterparts able to use and be used equally, all while 
quietly transforming the content and information produced by such usage 
into data sold for enormous profit. Facebook boasts, “It’s free and always 
will be”; Google, as Siva Vaidhyanathan points out, accepts no money for 
the algorithmic labor it performs to give the appearance of simplicity to the 
messy work of sorting and ranking search results.14 The pervasive rhetoric 
of the online “user” does similar work for the seductive fiction that digital 
technologies are hospitable by quietly flattening and neutralizing ethical and 
political distinctions and placing practices of consumption and participa-
tion alongside those of exploitation. The narrative of user empowerment is 
at best incomplete. These rhetorical sleights of hand intentionally muddy 
the question of who is in control — of who is a host and who is a guest — and 
the precarity of the latter position (the terms of use serve not the user but the 
corporation). 
Yet increasingly, digital corporate platforms are an invitation that cannot 
be refused. More and more our relationships with corporate and state enti-
ties are predetermined by contracts that shift legal and ethical responsibility 
onto individual users, consumers, and citizens. To participate online is to 
find oneself tacitly or automatically conscripted into a larger matrix of con-
trol.15 As Vaidhyanathan argues of Google’s “choice architecture,” the choice 
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to “opt out” can mean very little when, simply “by accepting the invitation to 
participate, the user finds him or herself implicitly engaged in a contract that 
is subject to ongoing modification without warning and whose terms can 
only ever be accepted or declined.”16 There is, to borrow a phrase from The-
odor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, “no mechanism of reply” — at least not 
if the answer is no.17 Without the capacity to respond, to negotiate, users find 
themselves subject to the will of a system of social control and power. Even 
those users in the Global North for whom internet access is a given are all 
too aware, Vaidhyanathan notes, that it is not a privilege that can be forgone, 
for it would mean being shut out from a valued, even indispensable service.
Such is the coercive hospitality of platform capitalism, whereby the very 
terms of participation (as use) are premised on accepting an invitation that 
can be declined only at significant cost, if at all. The rhetoric of the user, 
wherein to be a digital citizen is to participate as a user in a community of 
users, compels a reappraisal of the ideological work of use. The nomination 
user (unlike guest) suggests active agency; it overstates the individual’s voli-
tion within online space and understates the dominance of platforms. “In 
order to operate . . . the Internet turns every spectator into a spectacle,” ar-
gues Chun. “Users are used as they use.”18 
PERFORMING PROTOCOL
The language of the r fc  was warm and welcoming. — KATE HAFNER AND MATTHEW 
LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE
Even before corporate platforms like Amazon and Google existed, hospital-
ity was the founding logic of the networking protocol on which the internet 
is built. The idiom of host domains, servers, clients, and feeds is not arbitrary; 
it lifts into view the ideological armature of new media. In 1967 a small group 
of Advanced Research Projects Agency (a r pa) researchers gathered in Ann 
Arbor to discuss plans for a system of resource- sharing that would not rely 
on a centralized computer and thus be less vulnerable to attack. It was at 
this meeting that Larry Roberts put forward the idea of a national network 
of “host computers” connected to each other over dial- up telephone lines.19 
Networking functions, Roberts proposed, could be handled by “hosts” that 
would act as both research computers and communications routers. Later, 
Wes Clark would suggest an ingenious modification: insert smaller com-
puters between the host computers to map a subnetwork of interconnected 
nodes. These separate computers, dubbed “Interface Message Processors” 
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or imps, would act as packet- switching nodes (what we call routers today), 
serving as messengers between the host computers.20 This “Host- imp” to-
pology would serve as an early blueprint for the infrastructure of Advanced 
Research Projects Agency Network (ARPAnet) protocols (figure 1.1).21 As the 
semantic and logistical bedrock of early network protocol, then, hospitality 
is the implicit structure that makes the very idea of the internet thinkable.22 
As such, it constitutes the proto- language of protocol and the paradigm of 
political economy in which the system insistently and unreflexively traffics. 
The language host appears self- evident, attributed by default, ideologically 
null. And yet how deeply strange, and ultimately symptomatic, it is that a 
medium premised on exchange — on the sending and receiving of messages — 
would be imagined as a network made up only of hosts. 
Protocol, writes Alexander Galloway, is the “set of recommendations 
and rules that outlines the computational standards or procedures by which 
technologies function.” Protocol’s ambition is to be a good host: “It must ac-
cept everything, no matter what source, sender, or destination.”23 In his book 
Ethical Programs: Hospitality and the Rhetorics of Software, James J. Brown 
Jr. notes the ethical dilemma of networks’ invitation to open yourself up to 
a form of one- way access, when you never “really [get] to decide in any thor-
oughgoing way who or what enters your ‘home’ (your apartment, your lap-
top, your iPhone, your thermostat).”24 A term associated with performances 
of social etiquette, protocol is “a method of correct behavior under a given 
chain of command.”25 Like protocols that govern social or political practices, 
networking protocols establish the common rules of ceremony or formal-
FIGURE 1.1 Early ARPAnet sketch, “The Subnet and Hosts.”  
Source: James Pelkey.
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ity that enable systems to function effectively.26 Galloway explains this, but 
also insists on the limits of the analogy, for “instead of governing social or 
political practices as did their diplomatic predecessors, computer protocols 
govern how specific technologies are agreed to, adopted, implemented, and 
ultimately used by people around the world. What was once a question of 
consideration and sense is now a question of logic and physics.”27 
While the protocols of hospitality built into the ARPAnet may have little 
to do with the kind of hospitality performed by today’s corporate platforms, 
the relationship between hospitality and digital protocol is nevertheless in-
structive. Here we might probe Galloway’s sharp distinction between the 
sociopolitical and the technological for what it can tell us about the perfor-
mance of protocol. When Galloway argues that protocols “encapsulate in-
formation inside a technically defined wrapper, while remaining relatively 
indifferent to the content of information contained within,” he appears to 
leave the fiction of hospitality intact; he does not address the way that tech-
nological protocols create and inform social protocols.28 So why does this 
matter? Representing protocol as nonideological and ideal receptivity ob-
fuscates the system’s interestedness. When protocol is posed as logical, it 
enables hosts to dodge acknowledging the rules or agreed- upon conventions 
that most benefit those who make them. In other words, protocol is what 
systems use to perform logicality as a means of disavowing their agency. We 
must be wary of the façade of hospitality that alibis networks’ adherence to 
protocols, which instrumentally impose and regulate a distinction between 
the so- called hosts and guests of the system. 
Informatic protocol pervades the texture of daily life, even in offline 
interactions; everyday interactions with corporations more and more as-
sume the air of navigating a website. The rare exchange with a human em-
ployee follows a predetermined script, taking on a protocological affectation. 
Agency — even for the corporation’s appointed representatives — only ever 
seems to exist elsewhere. This kind of technological standardization, on-
line and offline, is a widely accepted mode of corporate performance within 
a digital service economy that, Noam Chomsky asserts, works to “transfer 
costs to the people”:
So, for example, suppose you find a mistake in your checking account 
and you call the bank to try and fix it. Well, you know what happens. You 
call them up, and you get a recorded message saying “We love you, here’s 
a menu.” Maybe the menu has what you’re looking for, maybe it doesn’t. 
If you happen to find the right option, you listen to some music, and ev-
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ery once and a while a voice comes in and says “Please stand by, we really 
appreciate your business,” and so on. Finally, after some period of time, 
you may get a human being, who you can ask a short question to. That’s 
what economists call “efficiency.” By economic measures, that system re-
duces labor costs to the bank; of course, it imposes costs on you, and those 
costs are multiplied by the number of users, which can be enormous — but 
that’s not counted as a cost in economic calculation. And if you look over 
the way the society works, you find this everywhere.29 
But technological standardization is not merely a source of frustration for 
those living under hypernetworked late capitalism; it is how network proto-
col (both a vehicle of dissemination and a mode of address) expands the field 
of exploitation under neoliberalism. 
THE CORPORATE RUSE OF HOSPITALITY
Megacorporations mimic the supposed neutrality of administrative proto-
col by posing as mere platforms, and it is through this mimicry that they 
have reframed their own practices of exploitation as expressions of generos-
ity. Consider the following example. In November 2013 a news story broke 
about a Walmart in northeastern Ohio that had decided to hold a holiday 
canned- food drive for its underpaid employees. “Please Donate Food Items 
Here, So Associates in Need Can Enjoy Thanksgiving Dinner,” read the sign 
accompanying plastic bins at the Canton- area superstore.30 (“Associate,” the 
name that Walmart gives employees who don’t receive benefits, is used in 
place of “employee,” much as retail employees are now trained to refer to 
customers as “guests”; these are terms that enable the corporation to keep its 
hierarchy intact while simultaneously disavowing it.) Rather than Walmart 
itself engaging in one- off bonus holiday giving (already a vastly inadequate, 
short- term panacea), the company asked its low- wage employees to provide 
bonuses for its other low- wage employees.
Defended by a company spokesperson as “evidence that employees care 
about each other,” the request was nonetheless made in the name of Walmart — 
 a move that positions the company as a surrogate supplicant for its employ-
ees.31 Walmart both asks its employees to take responsibility for themselves 
(and for each other) and, perversely, takes credit for the generosity of care 
that those in need are asked to give themselves. The event capitalized on 
American cultural traditions of gift giving and charitable donations around 
the holidays (“Secret Santa” and Salvation Army gift drives) to project an 
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aura of generosity and good tidings. But what Walmart’s performance of 
benevolence masked was an extraordinary act of taking — first, in the with-
holding of wages and benefits that made the supplication necessary at all; 
second, in the good public relations the company gained by hosting the 
event; and third, in the additional profits to be made in the likely event em-
ployees shopped at Walmart for the goods they gave each other. Thus its per-
formance of generosity was an all- out profit- making scheme to increase sales 
by co- opting the gift exchanges that it prompted in the first place. Rather 
than a unique case, this example follows a wider trend in corporate respon-
sibility toward charitable giving that is hosted by the corporation but entirely 
paid for by the customer, such as “Donate your change” programs and apps 
promoted by various banks, grocery stores, and food delivery platforms.
From Walmart’s actions we can discern three identifiable moments in 
this ruse of hospitality. First, the corporation commits an initial act of ex-
ploitation (e.g., Walmart’s low wages). Second, the corporation invokes pro-
tocol as an alibi for displacing and disavowing ownership of that act of ex-
ploitation (e.g., Walmart poses as a mere intermediary of hospitality rather 
than a causal agent and interested party). This has the effect of cleaning the 
corporation’s hands, of keeping the dirty laundry in- house. Third, the cor-
poration, now sufficiently removed from the original exploitation, attempts 
to turn its initial act of exploitation into a new source of revenue by present-
ing itself anew as the solution to this exploitation (e.g., Walmart attempts to 
siphon off good PR by asking its employees to provide for each other). 
While the first and second of these moves are familiar, the third — in 
which an entity attempts to profit from the misfortune they themselves have 
created — carries a certain neoliberal novelty. The seeming generosity of the 
corporation is revealed as a ruse; the corporation channels the neutral or 
technological character of protocol to present itself as a hospitable platform, 
disavowing the nonreciprocity that it coercively establishes as its very terms 
of use — terms to which you must agree or be denied access. 
Around the same time Walmart kicked off the canned- food drive for 
its underpaid employees, McDonald’s updated its McResource Line, a web-
site that provided the company’s 1.8 million employees with financial and 
health- related advice. In one article on the site, titled “Digging Out of Holi-
day Debt,” the world’s largest fast- food chain suggested that workers, who 
make on average $7.75 an hour, sell “unwanted possessions on eBay or Craigs-
list” to “bring in some quick cash.” The company also encouraged employees 
to break food apart when they ate, explaining that “breaking food into pieces 
often results in eating less and still feeling full.” Elsewhere the website of-
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fered workers (or, as McDonald’s refers to them, “team members”) assistance 
in applying for food stamps.32 Still another page advised, “Quit complaining: 
Stress hormone levels rise by 15% after ten minutes of complaining.” 
The McResource campaign is not McDonald’s only venture of this kind: 
that same year, the company launched two related initiatives in partnership 
with Visa. First, the company created a website to teach its minimum- wage 
employees how to create a budget. The sample monthly budget was roundly 
criticized: it presumed that the worker had two jobs (based on the national 
minimum wage figure of $7.25 per hour); it budgeted only $20 per month for 
health insurance (Forbes puts the national average for an individual at $215 
per month); and it excluded many necessary expenses, including child care, 
groceries, clothing, and gas.33 The budget, ostensibly intended to help under-
paid employees manage their finances, inadvertently bolstered the fair wage 
movement’s cause by demonstrating the practical impossibility of living on 
a minimum wage.34 
The budget web page was hosted by Visa’s corporate responsibility plat-
form Practical Money Skills (practicalmoneyskills.com). Visa describes 
this program as the product of the company’s belief “that greater financial 
knowledge can empower people to better manage their money and improve 
their quality of life.”35 The sentiment disavows Visa’s profit model, which is 
based on interest paid; in other words, its business model depends on indi-
viduals who are unable to pay their bills outright each month and must in-
stead rely on credit to cover the shortfall. With motivational platitudes like 
“Every day and every dollar make a difference” and a downloadable “budget 
journal” that directs employees to track their spending for a month and con-
template their goals (“Knowing where your money goes and how to budget 
it is the key to your financial freedom”), the site offers up a spectacular show 
of bad faith.36 Employees are addressed as empowered financial agents by 
resources telling them that the only things between them and financial free-
dom are discipline, introspection, and planning — individual action, coded 
as a moral duty. David Graeber points out that in theory the debt relation 
presupposes reciprocity, but Visa’s financial model is invested in maintain-
ing nonreciprocity.37
McDonald’s used the Practical Money Skills website to introduce Visa- 
branded payroll cards to pay its employees. “Who needs a paper paycheck? 
Paper paychecks are becoming outdated and for good reason,” the website 
stated. It cited the inconveniences of check cashing (with no mention of di-
rect deposit, an option said to be reserved for managers and assistant man-
agers) and positioned pay cards as “a faster and safer alternative.”38 The part-
62 CHAPTER ONE
nership between the two companies was met with mounting concern, as 
critics observed that the PayChekPLUS! Elite Visa Payroll Card, issued by 
Comerica Bank, charged minimum- wage workers fees to access their own 
wages.39 
These campaigns received significant backlash after the publication of 
news stories on the progressive news sites Slate and Think Progress and in 
the business news outlets Forbes and Bloomberg. These stories were widely 
circulated on Facebook and Twitter and were further ridiculed when they 
were picked up by The Daily Show and The Colbert Report. (What work 
remains for the satirist, we might ask, when faced with something so un-
subtle? Moreover, as neoliberal corporate practices have taken on the guise 
of their former parodies — e.g., the satirical shenanigans of the Yes Men’s 
impersonations of ExxonMobil and Dow Chemical — it is hard to imagine a 
satirical response that would be adequate.) One could argue these instances 
of public ridicule narrate coercive hospitality’s failure. But for every such 
program that attracts public criticism, there are others that are less often 
noticed and much more successful. Though I would be more inclined to ar-
gue that these moments of public criticism (episodes of corporate misbehav-
ior often treated by these shows like a string of anomalies) demonstrate not 
coercive hospitality’s occasional failure but a “he said – she said” discourse 
and counterdiscourse that is the relentless circularity and binaristic nature 
of political critique today. Ultimately it is not because people are necessar-
ily fooled by the flagrant duplicity of corporate- speak that these corporate 
techniques are not still effective in raking in ever higher profits (though 
many may either believe the sincerity of the corporation’s claims to care or 
give them little thought).
After the negative attention, the budget and Practical Money Skills sites 
were taken down, and both pages now redirect to the same error page.40 
In October 2013 the labor advocacy group Low Pay Is Not ok released a 
taped phone call from a longtime Chicago- based McDonald’s employee to 
the McResource Line. She asked for assistance meeting her financial obliga-
tions, only to be referred to federal and state agencies (i.e., food stamps, food 
banks, Medicaid).41 The recording prompted further public outcry, which led 
McDonald’s to finally shutter the McResource website as well.42 The com-
pany issued the following statement explaining the decision: “We have of-
fered the McResource program to help our valued McDonald’s employees 
with work and life guidance created by independent third party experts. 
A combination of factors has led us to re- evaluate, and we’ve directed the 
vendor to take down the website. Between links to irrelevant or outdated 
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information, along with outside groups taking elements out of context, this 
created unwarranted scrutiny and inappropriate commentary. None of this 
helps our McDonald’s team members. We’ll continue to provide service to 
them through an internal telephone help line, which is how the majority of 
employees access the McResource services.”43
Just as online content providers self- identify as platforms in order to side-
step their own culpability, McDonald’s uses its statement to shift responsi-
bility for its ill- conceived campaign onto “independent third party experts” 
and “outside groups.” In renouncing its ownership of the site, the company 
positions independent pr  consultants, activists, and critics as the problem, 
admonishing the “unwarranted scrutiny and inappropriate commentary” of 
critics who point out the incongruity between the company’s advice and the 
choices that it makes. It portrays itself as furnishing a responsible solution 
to the problem (“we’ve directed the vendor to take down the website”).44 All 
the while McDonald’s maintains business practices that keep their employ-
ees in a cycle of poverty, ignoring widespread employee protests to raise the 
minimum wage and to gain the right to unionize. 
Food drives and advice websites are textbook cases of corporate pater-
nalism, with Walmart, McDonald’s, and Visa in the position of the respon-
sible patriarch and the employee as the child- dependent (a position that has 
many of the same racial and gender valences attending the discourse of the 
“welfare queen”). This is how to be responsible, to save your allowance, to 
eat right. The programs curtail the freedoms and imaginable futures of low- 
wage employees while claiming to act in their best interests. The implica-
tion is clear: If you are in debt, it is your fault. They infantilize and patronize 
employees for their inability to thrive under the conditions that the compa-
nies themselves create — indeed they charge the employees a fee for failing 
to do so. 
What might the digital afterlives of these pr  fails tell us about the selec-
tive accountability of the corporation? How does the manipulability of the 
digital archive — or what David Weinberger has called the “weird” historical 
status of web documents — keep companies from having to face accountabil-
ity?45 How do corporations masquerade as neutral or purely logical by hid-
ing behind the public’s limited understanding of how networking protocol 
works? After the “Digging Out from Holiday Debt” page was taken down, 
the web page initially redirected to a company- branded error message that 
read, “Hmmm. We couldn’t locate the content you were looking for. It’s pos-
sible that it doesn’t exist anymore, or has simply been moved to another lo-
cation” (figure 1.2). The page now redirects to a standard “Not Found” Error 
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404 message and is not recoverable via the Internet Archive Wayback Ma-
chine.46 The Wayback Machine software was developed by the Internet Ar-
chive to “crawl and download all publicly viewable websites and take ‘snap-
shots’ of them, in order to record the websites at different intervals over their 
life spans.”47 In fact, in light of the relative unreliability of the Wayback Ma-
chine, these webpages would not be recoverable at all if not for hyperlinks 
to their original ur l s in online progressive and business news stories about 
the campaigns, tenuous and crucial public archives documenting corporate 
actions that would otherwise be erased.48 Lisa Gitelman observes that the 
transfer status code “Error 404” typically occurs when “a user selects an out-
dated hyperlink or mistypes a ur l , indicating the address of a Web server 
but not a viable page.” In this case it seems that the formerly functional 
McResource web page has been made unavailable not because of a lack of 
server support or an incorrect ur l ; instead it is a web page that McDonald’s 
intentionally refaced to resemble an error page. The company attempts to 
capitalize on the ambiguous causality, the nonaccountability associated with 
Error 404, which is employed to invoke the sheer incomprehensibility of the 
technological sublime. “Error 404 does not specify who committed or what 
caused the error to occur,” writes Gitelman. “It implies a dizzying potential 
for mistakes — more than four hundred different kinds — but stops short of 
laying any blame.” Gitelman continues:
FIGURE 1.2 McDonald’s McResource Line “Digging Out from Holiday Debt” 
error message. 
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It answers a particular request with a denial that affirms the constancy 
and ubiquity of the Web administration, which is at once authoritative 
and impersonal — a system of protocols, really, that is seldom acknowl-
edged but always present. Corresponding error messages, like the prefa-
tory announcements on early phonograph records, hail users individually 
but are not by or from anyone in particular. Even when a Web master or 
systems operator replaces the generic error message with a server- specific 
version, she does so as a ventriloquist, speaking with the impersonal, au-
thoritative voice of Web administration itself — a voice that reventrilo-
quizes the impersonal authority that has so long hailed and conscripted 
its subjects to the mediated public: “post no bills”; “all circuits are busy”; 
“stay tuned for more.”49
With the “Digging Out of Holiday Debt” error message, McDonald’s 
seizes upon the alibi of a technological protocol, which is performed here as a 
cute irregularity (not unlike Facebook’s own error message of a thumb with 
a bandage on it [figure 1.3] or a series of Amazon error messages with im-
ages of a “company dog,” launched as part of an internal pr  effort to promote 
Amazon as “an awesome place to work” [figure 1.4]).50 McDonald’s personi-
fies this irregularity in the image of white, white- collar masculinity, a goofy, 
confused sitcom dad, here summoned to represent the “impersonal author-
ity” of the web master — a choice that discloses the racial, class, and gender 
politics of digital memory, social forgiveness, and corporate accountability. 
Cuteness, Sianne Ngai argues, is “an aesthetic of powerlessness,” which is 
linked to the juvenile, feminine, and nonthreatening.51 In these error mes-
sages the cute is marshaled to present the nontransparent operations of the 
corporation as inoffensive, even pleasurable. The harmless dopiness of Mc-
Donald’s white dad, the charming woundedness of Facebook’s boo boo, and 
the sweet helplessness of Waffles the Amazon puppy are leveraged to elicit 
a sentimental attitude toward the corporation, which momentarily poses as 
vulnerable. “Digging Out of Holiday Debt” thus lays bare who is exposed to 
risk and who isn’t. The host’s and the parasite’s asymmetrical relationships 
to risk reveal a hypocrisy at work in the nonaccountability of the host; in-
sulated from actual risk, the host withdraws from the social relation, disap-
pearing back into the machine when asked to settle its accounts.
FIGURE 1.3 Facebook error message.
FIGURE 1.4 “Dogs of Amazon” error message. 
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THE VIRTUOUS CORPORATION
Corporate social responsibility is a strategy for attracting investors and rais-
ing a brand’s value by selling civic engagement as part of a company’s busi-
ness model. The rise of the narrative of corporations as “good guys” is, as 
Laurie Ouellette has shown, a consequence of the transformation of con-
temporary governance under neoliberalism: “an assemblage of reforms en-
compassing public sector downsizing, the encouragement of public- private 
partnerships, the outsourcing of many government services to commercial 
firms, and the dismantling of welfare programs.” Corporate responsibility 
uses the interstices that are left open by such reforms as strategic opportu-
nities for profitable marketing campaigns and public- private partnerships.52 
The architects of neoliberalism such as Milton Friedman believed that “the 
social responsibility of business is to increase profits,” a form of unabashed 
capitalism that makes little show of caring about the greater good; however, 
the performance of ethical capitalism represented by new notions of corpo-
rate social responsibility suggests an important shift in the public discourse 
of neoliberalism.53 While corporations still seek to maximize profits, they 
recognize that in order to achieve maximum profitability “they must now 
act virtuously.”54 The modern corporation borrows the discourse of the wel-
fare state at precisely the moment in which the state and the corporation are 
engaging in mutual surrogation: the state increasingly takes on the model of 
the firm, while the corporation increasingly professes responsibility for car-
ing for the public. The corporation thus dismantles the very civic interests 
that it purports to maintain, and the continuity of civil society is now a farce 
in which the state is also complicit.55 But as these campaigns show, corpora-
tions are not taking the place of the welfare state. Walmart and McDonald’s 
offer no material assistance to those who need it. They simply cloak them-
selves in the moral authority of the welfare state while obscuring their own 
reliance on government aid in various, far less visible forms. It is the mega-
corporations that are the real “welfare queens.” With their low- wage employ-
ees receiving billions annually in assistance from U.S. taxpayers (and their 
fabulously wealthy ce o s and founders receiving billions in tax breaks from 
the same citizens), Walmart and McDonald’s are in fact subsidized by their 
tax- paying employees, whom they refuse to pay a living wage.56 
These scenarios demonstrate the tightening of a previously more pro-
tracted feedback loop of corporate responsibility. They manifest the acceler-
ated speed of appropriation today — the collapsed duration between Walmart 
and McDonald’s refusal to remunerate their employees and their appropria-
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tion of their poverty as empty spectacles of charity. Corporate responsibility 
is a strategy for attracting investors; by making it into mere theater, these 
companies perform generosity as a marketing tool that, rather than amelio-
rating poverty, instrumentally sustains and reproduces it. Not only do they 
not pay their employees a living wage but they also repackage and sell this 
denial of care as care in the secondary economy of public image – branding 
campaigns, where the denial of care masquerades as corporate responsibil-
ity. They sow poverty and disempowerment and harvest them as new finan-
cial markets, while they perversely take credit for the generosity of the care 
that those most in need must in fact give themselves. 
One of the most visible leftist strategies of the past decade for fighting 
such corporate aggressions has been to reverse the neoconservative rhetoric 
of parasitism. Activist retorts ask the public to look more closely at which 
individuals and organizations truly feed off the work of others while con-
tributing little or nothing in exchange. The Occupy movement and other 
anti- austerity organizers, for example, have mobilized the language of para-
sitism to mirror back the parasitical character of the system itself. By im-
posing themselves on city centers — spaces emblematic of the collusion of 
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corporate and state interests — protestors denounce the absurdity of a world 
system that exploits its workers while calling them parasites. With the battle 
cry “We are the 99%!” Occupy captured a certain standoff at the heart of the 
discourse of parasitism, with each side of the barricade decrying the other 
as the real user in the system. This back and forth exposes a curious revers-
ibility that lies at the heart of the host- parasite relation; the interchangeabil-
ity of the two positions (hostis etymologically refers to both the guest and 
host)57 has been highlighted in a number of popular memes (figures 1.5 and 
1.6), which depend upon the classic Marxist reversal that positions capital, 
not labor, as the “true parasite” of the system.58 
Much as I argued of satirical shows like The Daily Show and The Col-
bert Report in their responses to the actions of McDonald’s and Visa, these 
memes earnestly invest in the epistemology of exposure at the very moment 
when the social media platforms by which they travel have been shown to 
function as echo chambers;59 memes therefore do not circulate between ide-
ological camps but instead preach to the converted. And such viral memes’ 
circulation as critique depends upon and reinforces the power of social me-
dia platforms, which monetize circulation while being indifferent to content, 
making the meme authors complicit with the very systems they attack.
Dependency — which has long been “pathologized, feminized, and ra-
cialized” by the U.S. welfare state —is framed as “the condition of an in-
dividual, rather than a social position.”60 However, such memes seek to ex-
pose the hypocrisy of a system in which precarious subjects are reviled for 
their dependence by the very entities that create their poverty. The working 
poor have been defined in terms of this dependence on a rigged system; 
FIGURE 1.6 “Makers vs. 
Takers” meme. 
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they are seen as social parasites, a term revived by neoconservatives in post – 
financial crisis popular and political discourse, as state and corporate re-
sponsibility and risk are systematically offloaded onto individuals. From rep-
resentations of “welfare queens” to the language of “Takers vs. Makers” and 
the “dependent 47%,” the discourse of social parasitism disproportionately 
targets women and minorities whose contributions to society — including 
domestic work and dependent care — are kept off the official record.61 For 
example, the notion of the so- called welfare queen has historically been cir-
culated as a “coded reference to black indolence and criminality designed 
to appeal to working- class whites.”62 This rhetoric is part of a long history 
of discrediting women and minorities in order to block their attempts at 
downward redistribution and punishing vulnerable populations for their 
efforts to survive.63 
Within this framework vulnerable subjects are twice condemned: Wal-
mart’s and McDonald’s campaigns deploy technological automation as a 
screen to allow them to refuse accountability for the violence they perpe-
trate or enable, instead making their victims accountable for the harm done 
to them.64 There are many examples of this. The city of Cleveland attempted 
to sue Tamir Rice’s family for the $500 ems ride after the unarmed twelve- 
year- old was shot by police; Columbia University sought to bill protesting 
students who carried mattresses around campus in support of Emma Sulko-
wicz after the university failed to expel her alleged rapist; and Flint, Michi-
gan attempted to make its citizens pay for toxic drinking water.65 In these 
scenarios the powerful entity asks its victims to pay for their own exploita-
tion, as when repressive governments charge “bullet fees” to the families of 
those they execute. In its most obvious form, prisons and jails charge incar-
cerated individuals for their room and board; if they are too poor to pay the 
fees upon their release, they are now required to sign contracts promising to 
pay them in installments or return to jail. Through the criminalization of 
poverty, under neoliberalism, state and private institutions have turned their 
nonaccountability to the most vulnerable into a stream for revenue genera-
tion. Jackie Wang writes:
For me, these methods of extraction mark a turning point in what some 
have called the neoliberal era. . . . Nearly half a century of economic poli-
cies that have eroded the power of labor and enabled a high degree of cap-
ital mobility has not only resulted in a fiscal race to the bottom that has 
gutted the tax base in this country, but has also transformed the nature 
of governance itself. If — to borrow Wolfgang Streeck’s taxonomy — the 
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tax state (i.e., the postwar Keynesian welfare state) has evolved into the 
debt state (which authorizes austerity) then what we are witnessing now 
is the emergence of the predatory state, which functions to modulate the 
dysfunctional aspects of neoliberalism and in particular the realization 
problem in the financial sector. . . . In short the outcome of neoliberal 
policies and federal fiscal retrenchment has been not only privatization 
and austerity, but predatory and parasitical governance on the state and 
local levels and indebtedness as a generalized social condition.66
“Over the past few decades,” Lester Spence affirms, “cities have turned to 
policing to fulfill two functions: to surveil and discipline black populations 
hardest hit by economic shifts and to collect revenue in the form of fines.”67 
In this logic, argues Jasbir Puar, subjects are precarious because they are 
precarious — an intentional tautology: “Surveillance and securitization econ-
omies work through a sort of monetization of ontology — certain bodies are 
intrinsically risky investments via a circular logic of precarity whereby these 
bodies are set up as unable to take on risk in the very system that produces 
them as risky.”68 Puar notes that this can be seen in the fact that it was over-
whelmingly African American and Latino populations who were subject to 
foreclosure when the financial bubble burst.
These techniques of nonaccountability, under which the poorest and 
most vulnerable to systemic racism pay for their own oppression, shroud 
exploitation in the supposedly apolitical protocols of low- level administra-
tion: opaque bureaucratic protocol and employees “just doing their jobs.” 
Powerful corporations take advantage of the perception of a hard line be-
tween the sociopolitical and the technological (a perception that protocol 
functions to maintain) in an attempt to hide the fact that these systems are 
neither neutral nor consistent but rather dynamic and improvisational. The 
double exploitation that I have described in this section is the logic by which 
companies such as Facebook, Google, Walmart, and McDonald’s present 
themselves as mere hosts, while also acting as voracious parasites. 
USER UNFRIENDLY
So how can artists and users intervene in such a conjuncture?69 In the re-
mainder of the chapter I highlight a series of art and political experiments, 
largely conceptual in nature, that model how we might exploit the coercive 
hospitality of the system, to use the user. These projects follow what Trebor 
Scholz has called “platform cooperativism”; they introduce the possibility of 
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leveraging digital tools and platforms in the service of enhancing and grow-
ing not capitalism but new channels for sharing or redistributing resources.70 
Insofar as they use megacorporations’ own techniques in their attempts to 
wrest ownership back from private corporations and put it into the hands of 
users, they undermine the corporations in such a way as to force them to eat 
themselves, recalling the image of the ouroboros (the ancient symbol of the 
serpent eating its own tail). 
The first of these is an ongoing project by the Robin Hood Cooperative.71 
Founded in 2012, the Finnish group characterizes itself as an alternative 
hedge fund that “bends powers of finance to the production and protection 
of the commons.”72 Sometimes they frame their work as art (as “economic 
performance art”); at other times they describe their work as a business, 
and still others as activism. Robin Hood Asset Management Cooperative 
(r h a mc) invests in the New York Stock Exchange, guided by an algorithm 
called “The Parasite.” Akseli Virtanen, one of the group’s founders and a 
self- described radical political economist and finance theorist, calls the al-
gorithm a “cooperative, counterinvestment of the precariat.” Rather than 
stealing or hacking the corporation’s black box (like Ubermorgen’s Amazon 
Noir), or indeed fixing it, the algorithm mimics it.73 The algorithm works by 
tracking and mimicking the investment patterns of “the best players on the 
market” (investors with more than $100 million in the U.S. market). “When 
we see that a swarm starts to emerge . . . like they all start to buy Nokia, we 
just follow the crowd,” Virtanen explains. “We buy too. We let them do all 
the work and just follow. And last year buying Nokia was a very good move 
for us. This is, to put it very simply, what we do: We just imitate. It’s a space 
of pure mimesis.” He continues, “Robin Hood looks like a perfectly normal 
financial operation. But we turn it around, tinker with it and so it is a bit 
strange. . . . In a sense we reengineer finance, cash and risk flows, flows of 
dependencies and potentialities, we work with its materiality, with the diver-
gent capacities lying latent but definitely built into its matter. And we have 
the power and imagination to do this. Financial technologies are very mold-
able, plastic, synthetic — just waiting for an artist’s touch to start producing 
something else than debt relationships.”74
The group claims to redistribute a portion of the total profits earned to 
causes that “expand the commons and the public domain,” but it does not 
explain on their current website (which is in the process of being relaunched: 
“2.0 coming soon!”) how they do this redistribution, precisely what channels 
they use, and what projects or actors receive it.75 According to an account by 
someone close to the group, however, members pay a $60 minimum fee to 
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join and can invest as much as they like into the fund.76 They can determine 
how much to keep and how much to return into the common pool, which is 
rechanneled toward projects that group members elect based on their prom-
ise “to produce and protect the common.” It tests the possibilities of revers-
ing the dynamic that puts to work democratic principles of openness and 
sharing for proprietary models by putting to work proprietary models for 
democratic principles of openness and sharing.
The project’s claim is that financial markets that capitalize on structural 
exploitation and the precarity it creates can be leveraged by appropriating 
some of this capital and reinvesting it in projects that support redistribution. 
Tiziana Terranova observes that this strategy — of playing the stock market 
in order to reinvest in the commons — is subject to the Marxist and leftist cri-
tique that it is “ultimately reinforcing the logic of financialization rather than 
supporting an alternative.”77 (This critique, she notes, is likely only to inten-
sify with the group’s relaunched version, which will use blockchain technolo-
gies and includes plans to grow its capital investment.) Pekko Koskinen, a 
member of the Robin Hood Cooperative, echoes this sentiment: “People of-
ten want clear boundaries between good and evil, professional and amateur, 
Right and Left, but Robin Hood breaks those binaries. We’re creating a Tro-
jan horse to warp the rules of the market.”78 Regardless, r ha mc suggests an 
ingenuous weaponization of the tools of private capital (digital automation, 
financialization) for redistributive ends (to support precarious groups or 
progressive projects). It proposes a mechanism for appropriating the infor-
mation and tools of the rich (what the group calls the wealthy’s “most impor-
tant means of production — their knowledge, their relations, their position”) 
to distribute proceeds to underresourced groups. Still, while the funds may 
generate excitement over the creation of an “alternative economy” that is self- 
generating, it is impossible to dissociate the funds from the original “host 
economy” from which they are first appropriated. r ha mc’s scheme depends 
on committing an initial act of complicity, an original sin, to gain financial 
capital that can then be redirected in a second, virtuous act of redistribu-
tion. But it remains to be seen if the project only serves to install a new class 
of patrons. The parasitical tactics of the Robin Hood Cooperative stand in 
stark contrast to grassroots cooperatives like the Detroit Community Tech-
nology Project and Cooperation Jackson, which have sought to rebuild the 
commons from the ground up by insisting on communities’ right to self- 
determination over the technological infrastructures that shape their lives.79
We can think of Robin Hood Cooperative’s work alongside another work 
by Ubermorgen, the self- styled “big media hackers” with whom I opened 
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the book. In 2005 the Swiss Austrian American artistic duo and real- life 
couple Hans Bernhard and Lizvlx, working with the Italian net artists Ales-
sandro Ludovico and Paolo Cirio, began a web- based collaboration called 
Google Will Eat Itself. In this project the group tries to take down Google 
using the mechanisms built into its own advertising scheme. Calling the 
project an “auto- cannibalistic system,” the collaborators ran approximately 
fifty hidden websites packed with Google ads that regularly generate clicks 
using an army of online bots. “This isn’t that hard to do if you have the 
technical skills,” Bernhard explains. “Google’s system is not perfect.” The 
trick, he adds, is to keep each bot below Google’s click fraud threshold. At 
the end of each month, Google pays the group for these clicks, which they 
then move to a Swiss bank account. Having accrued 819 shares of Google 
stock valued at over $405,000 by the conclusion of the project, they estimate 
that, at that rate, they would fully own Google in roughly 202 million years. 
A 2005 press release titled “Hack the Google Self- Referentialism” explains 
the project: “The greatest enemy of such a giant is not another giant. It’s the 
parasite. If enough parasites would suck small amount[s] of money in this 
self- referentialism embodiment, they will empty this artificial mountain of 
data and its inner risk of digital totalitarianism.”80 (In an intriguing paral-
lel, McDonald’s offered its employees the chance to invest in company stock 
as part of their Practical Money Skills campaign, their responsible finan-
cial planning website. McDonald’s characterized the opportunity to “build 
ownership in McDonald’s” by purchasing McDirect Shares as a “benefit” for 
employees, heralded by the website as “just more ways that McDonald’s is 
showing its commitment to your future.”81 Employees are thus called upon 
to invest, literally, in their own demise.)
Google Will Eat Itself (2005 – 8) uses on Google itself the methods by which 
it has made an estimated $36.5 billion in advertising revenue in one year 
alone: by using algorithms to analyze and sell what users search and send 
over Gmail and then using the data to sell targeted ad space.82 Yet Google has 
hardly eaten itself. Over the course of the project, the amount of time until 
the artists would own Google didn’t decrease but rather increased by 345,117 
years. With Alphabet Inc.’s stock price valued at $1,082.80 a share at the time 
of this writing in 2019, the project, rather than exposing the effectiveness of 
a tactical micropolitics, calculates the limitations of its own parasitical re-
sponse. In its leveraging of small- scale use of capitalist platforms on the mas-
sive scale of financial and data economies, Google Will Eat Itself anticipates 
two comparable artworks: Nikolas Bentel’s Data Arbitrage (2015), a bot that 
purports to sell users’ social media data to brokers and then use the funds 
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to buy fake accounts, which it in turn sells; and Irena Haiduk’s Frauen-
bank (2017), an art installation that enables museum visitors who identify 
as women to acquire membership to a woman- only financial cooperative. 
In March 2012 a project similar to Robin Hood Asset Management Co-
operative and Google Will Eat Itself appeared on Kickstarter, a website that 
facilitates capital investments in various projects and collects a small fee 
(5 percent) on the money pledged, whether or not the project is fully funded. 
Kickstarter is often used to crowdsource the funding of art projects, an an-
swer to the privatization of arts funding in a largely postnational funding 
era. The Los Angeles – based comedian Eric Moneypenny advertised his plan 
to buy Kickstarter by raising money on Kickstarter, which at the time was 
valued at $18.6 million. The ad was soon removed with an “Error 404” mes-
sage appearing instead: “Oh my goodness. We apologize but something’s 
gone wrong — an old link, a bad link, or some little glitch” (figure 1.7).
This response was much like eBay’s response to Keith Obadike’s 2001 dig-
ital performance Blackness for Sale, in which the artist attempted to sell his 
“blackness” on the site (promising the buyer a “certificate of authenticity”) — 
a sale that was deemed “inappropriate” by the site. Similarly Moneypenny’s 
prank compelled the system, which is ostensibly transparent, open, without 
limitation, to expose its limits. Although these artists and media activists 
follow the same protocols that media corporations (Google, Amazon, Kick-
starter) use, they are nevertheless treated as parasites. Their projects compel 
the network to address them as such, treating as exceptions — as “bad links” 
or “little glitches” — the protocols that the corporation itself has imposed. As 
forms of systemic mimicry, these interventions are part of the ouroboros; 
they participate in a ceaseless feedback loop of appropriation; they lever-
age the parasitical substrate of digital media in order to take advantage of 
the host system’s infrastructural vulnerabilities. But more significantly, they 




compel conglomerates, which are purportedly designed to be user friendly, 
to expose that they cannot easily be used in return; they highlight the asym-
metry of the relationship.
As targets of parasitical resistance, the monopolies explored in this chap-
ter are relatively obvious hosts compared to other systems I examine in this 
book. The scale of global corporations’ dominance and influence makes 
them relatively easy to identify and criticize as hosts. How, then, can we un-
derstand the outsized status of hosts like McDonald’s and Walmart in rela-
tion to the examples I discuss in the following chapters, which make hosts 
of the liberal- democratic state and of private individuals? Are these all on 
a continuum (some more extreme and readily identifiable than others), or 
does the logic of the host itself operate differently?
TWO AN OPENING IN THE STRUCTURE
Núr ia Güel l a nd Kennet h Piet r obono’s  
Leg a l  Loopholes
Chapter 1 examined the extent to which the coercive openness of platform capitalism, as a mechanism by which monopolies consolidate their he-
gemony, might instead be siphoned as a tool of redistribution. In this chap-
ter I focus on artworks that explore how the rights granted by private prop-
erty and citizenship might be leveraged toward economies of recirculation, 
rather than accumulation. I turn to imaginative attempts by two artists to 
subvert the coercive hospitality of the Western neoliberal- democratic state. 
Known for art practices that highlight the hypocrisies of state ideology, the 
anticapitalist activist- artists Núria Güell and Kenneth Pietrobono pursue 
interventions that attempt to resist the nation- state and its juridical powers 
by divesting from paradigms of legal sovereignty that they find unjust. In 
Stateless by Choice: On the Prison of the Possible (Apátrida por voluntad pro-
pia) (2015 – 16), Güell struggles to identify the proper bureaucratic channels to 
renounce her Spanish nationality and become stateless; in the proposed but 
unrealized work Void (The Opposite of Property), Pietrobono tries to classify 
a piece of private property as unowned. Güell defiantly seeks a way out of 
the complicity with state violence implied by citizenship by birth, grappling 
with nationality inherited by descent or “right of blood” (jus sanguinis); Pi-
etrobono, a U.S. citizen who grew up in a family with mixed legal status and 
who is a product of an assimilationist immigrant narrative, delves deeper 
into the myth of American uplift via private property — nationality as earned 
by “right of the soil” (jus soli). 
These artworks thus explore a parasitical relationship not to corporate 
structures but to the larger structure of the state, which in its alignment with 
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corporate power under neoliberalism has adopted the strategic performance 
of coercive hospitality. Hiring lawyers, drafting legal documents, and navi-
gating government bureaucracy, Güell and Pietrobono earnestly attempt to 
locate within the purview of the law a way of subverting its coercive struc-
ture. When their attempts at frontal opposition fail, they instead undertake 
to document the rhetorical and bureaucratic protocols of nontransparency 
by which the state curtails the freedoms that it purports to guarantee. When 
they find that a way out is not possible, Güell and Pietrobono seek to repu-
diate this coercive framework by sneaking through the loopholes created by 
their relative privilege and inclusion in order to undermine the state from 
the inside. Like Robin Hood Cooperative, these artist- activists invest in al-
ternative economies of power, represented by the commons. Rather than 
imagining that because the parasite is attached to the host it necessarily re-
produces the logic of the host, Güell and Pietrobono perform the parasite 
as an unpredictable agent with the potential to incite transformation, even 
redistribution, in ways the host cannot anticipate.
THE RIGHTEOUS HOSPITALITY  
OF THE NEOLIBERAL SECURITY STATE
The undocumented immigrant is a structuring absence in the work of both 
Güell and Pietrobono. Before examining more deeply their practices and the 
place of the undocumented immigrant in their respective oeuvres, I want to 
briefly sketch how the U.S. state’s construction of the undocumented im-
migrant as a hostile invader of and dependent threat to the nation- state has 
been used to increase corporate and state profit in practices of border se-
curitization. The nativist rhetoric that portrays the immigrant as a para-
site on the host body of the nation- state is especially pervasive, as Jonathan 
Xavier Inda has argued of the Mexican immigrant in particular.1 The racist 
and xenophobic slur illegal alien is meant to invoke the image of Hispanic 
criminality, just as the epithet welfare queen is a “coded reference to black 
indolence and criminality designed to appeal to working- class whites.”2 This 
slur, however, ignores the fact that the U.S. national economy depends on 
undocumented labor. How does the state’s performance of border securiti-
zation hide itself under the aegis of protecting citizens from those entities 
deemed “outside threats”?3 How does it perform protocol so as to present 
its operations as fair and rational, to project an idealization of the liberal- 
democratic state as ethically righteous in ways that elide its financial inter-
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estedness? Consider two examples of the emerging neoliberal economies of 
U.S. border security, as seen from both sides of the border. 
Take the promotional video Welcome: Portraits of America, which is 
shown in the arrivals hall at international airports in the United States and 
at U.S. embassies and consulates. The video, which plays on a loop while in-
ternational travelers wait to be questioned, fingerprinted, and searched, has 
been described by the Department of State as part of an effort to provide “a 
warm welcome” in the aftermath of the Patriot Act; it was commissioned 
under the Bush administration as part of the Rice- Chernoff Initiative, a gov-
ernment partnership with Walt Disney Parks and Resorts, which reportedly 
gifted the seven- minute video to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
and the Department of State in order to aid with post- 9/11 public diplomacy.4 
The video offers highly scripted depictions of racial, ethnic, religious, and re-
gional diversity and tolerance (figure 2.1). Its montage of cowboys and Mus-
lims, interracial couples, a farmer driving a tractor, and a girl celebrating 
a quinceañera makes for an ironic welcome mat in an era of securitization 
that has in the wake of 9/11 disproportionately targeted racial, ethnic, and 
religious minorities for scrutiny. The video uses American visual rhetoric 
of rugged individualism, racial uplift, and the self- made man as a kind of 
background music that is played while biometric technologies like digital 
fingerprinting, iris scanning, and facial recognition — “sold as necessary to 
protect us from a dangerous world” — are employed to “spin the bodies of 
prisoners, welfare recipients, and [in this case] travelers into valuable data.”5 
In this moment when, as Wendy Hui Kyong Chun has asserted, “freedom is 
conflated with security,” the idealization of democracy and the realization 
of state control are shown to be isomorphic with one another.6 In Disney’s 
representation of “America the free,” democratic tolerance and free- market 
capitalism are shown to be coextensive.
The monetization of the U.S. War on Terror and the project of “securing 
the homeland” is also reflected in entrepreneurial ventures of the Trans-
portation Security Administration (t sa ), an agency of the Department of 
Homeland Security. These ventures include the regular selling or auctioning 
of confiscated and lost t sa  items (e.g., knives, snow globes, jewelry) on web-
sites like eBay and GovDeals.com.7 The t sa  also runs multimillion- dollar 
marketing campaigns seeking to popularize its expedited security screen-
ing program, PreCheck, which exchanges faster security lines for an $85 
subscription fee for five years.8 There is also the biometric security program 
c lea r  (a technology specially certified by the Department of Homeland 
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Security) that allows travelers to bypass security checkpoints by using fin-
gerprint and/or iris identification for a subscription fee of $179 per year. And 
the t sa  has approved a pilot program with the Florida- based firm Security-
Point Media to sell corporate advertising space at the bottom of its security 
bins (for companies like Microsoft, Zappos, and Charles Schwab that are 
eager to target business travelers).9 t sa  thus offloads federal costs to private 
companies, which upgrade the airport checkpoint equipment at no cost to 
the federal government.10 The U.S. government’s supposedly neutral stake in 
antiterrorism border security is in fact webbed with hidden private interests.
The shift to antiterrorism protocols as new economies for private capital 
extends beyond the U.S. border. Every year thousands of Mexican immi-
grants are deported from the United States for minor infractions, such as 
running a red light or getting a speeding ticket; they are sent across the bor-
FIGURE 2.1 Welcome: Portraits of America promotional video stills.
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der and then handed pamphlets recruiting them for one of the many glob-
ally outsourced call centers based in Tijuana and other border cities.11 These 
call centers are almost entirely staffed by deportees, who are employed to 
converse with customers of U.S. companies such as FedEx and DirecTV — 
 typically with a starting salary of around $150 per week.12 Call centers have 
increasingly been outsourced to Mexico; the sharp rise in deportations un-
der the Obama administration (figure 2.2) — which corresponded to a dra-
matic increase in the funding allocated to U.S. border patrol during this 
same period — helped ensure a steady flow of native Mexicans who speak 
English fluently with an American accent.13 This example further shows how 
the project of U.S. border security and control works in tandem with the 
project of multinational capital. Border securitization is used to supply a 
low- wage surplus labor economy. Violations of immigration law are used to 
isolate and capture new pools of skilled, highly vulnerable labor. Much as 
Walmart and McDonald’s deploy social responsibility as mere theater (see 
chapter 1), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security repackages the neo-
colonial outposts opened up by immigration law for companies like FedEx 
as “auspicious employment opportunities” for recent deportees. 
These scenes of border capitalism evidence how the “two faces” of state 
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tility is inextricable from its performance of hospitality; as the etymology 
of hostis (meaning both “guest” and “host”) suggests, hospitality conceals 
within it its opposite. These scenes demonstrate just how easily the state 
that presents itself as hospitable is capable of hostility. The two faces of sov-
ereign power are captured in the Department of Homeland Security’s stated 
mission: “to secure America’s borders while welcoming legitimate visitors 
to the United States.”14 The Welcome: Portraits of America video’s seemingly 
benign spectacle of hospitality might be likened to what the Swedish anthro-
pologist Magnus Fiskesjö has shown in his analysis of the U.S. presidential 
turkey pardon to be a ritual enactment of sovereign power; it masquerades 
as lighthearted but is in fact a public performance of clemency that shores 
up the state’s power to command matters of life and death.15 Similarly, the 
video’s staging of a warm welcome functions as a tool of sovereign power, for 
it welcomes as guests those visitors it deems legitimate and excludes those it 
deems illegitimate.
Undocumented immigration, as these examples demonstrate, is thus not 
outside but central to the workings of a capitalist sovereign power, for it pre-
sents as rational and natural the protocols by which it distinguishes between 
guests and strangers, between those who are met with the welcoming face of 
the state and those who are met with its repressive face. Looking to the work 
of Núria Güell and Kenneth Pietrobono as models, how might individuals 
divest from the coercive hospitality of a neoliberal security state that belies 
a networked economy of exploitation and exclusion? 
ATTEMPTED ESCAPES
I now turn to two artworks that represent earnest and frontal attempts by 
Güell and Pietrobono to address their complicity with state ideology — for 
Güell, an ideology that is represented by citizenship by birth, and for Pietro-
bono, by the immigrants’ myth of the American dream (the notion that, with 
enough hard work and determination, every citizen has an equal chance of 
achieving prosperity and private property). Born in Girona, Spain, in 1981, 
Güell spent several years in Cuba, where she says she was “born as an artist,” 
eventually training with the performance artist Tania Bruguera at her Be-
havior Art School (Cátedra Arte de Conducta).16 Güell’s work explores what 
she calls “hegemonic morality” (morales hegemonica), by which she means 
the narrative that the state perpetuates about itself as morally justified. Her 
work is interested in the social contract by which citizens must abide despite 
never having signed it. In 2015 the artist began Stateless by Choice, in which 
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she petitioned the Spanish government to allow her to renounce her nation-
ality and assume the status of a stateless person, in solidarity with stateless 
migrants. In her official declaration of her desire to renounce her citizenship 
(which initially reads like a breakup letter), Güell enumerates her reasons 
for making the request. “I do not feel identified within the structure of the 
nation- state, with the nationalist processes or concept of fatherhood,” she 
begins. The letter, addressed to the government subdelegate of Girona, lays 
out Güell’s critique of the idea of the nation- state: It is an arbitrary invention. 
It is historically outmoded. It is a xenophobic and racist colonial construct. 
“I have never signed a contract accepting the State as my legal sphere and 
the fatherland as a superior value to pay homage to,” she writes, articulating 
the problem that has long preoccupied philosophers of the social contract. 
“And it aggrieves me when political leaders take on the office of spokesper-
son for a supposed collective will in which they include me through my na-
tional identity.”
Stateless by Choice explores the disjuncture between Güell’s anarchist 
political identification (that of an outsider) and her structural privilege as a 
Spanish citizen (that of an insider). Güell tries in her art practice to use her 
citizenship to undermine the idea of citizenship itself — an objective that, 
if achieved, would by her logic “redistribute” (extend to people who are in-
voluntarily stateless) the affordances enabled by her European citizenship. 
(Though abdicating can mean something quite different from redistribut-
ing, as gestures of solidarity, such as heterosexual couples who boycotted 
marriage “until everyone could do it” — a symbolic act met with fairly di-
verse responses within the l g bt q  community — have demonstrated. Unless 
Güell is able to pass on her unused citizenship to someone else, this is not 
strictly speaking redistribution.) Nevertheless, troubled by how her Spanish 
citizenship foists upon her colonial and imperialist ideologies she rejects, 
the artist attempts to use the operations of the law to challenge Spanish law. 
“Nationality is conceived as the quality that infuses in a person the fact of 
belonging to a national community organized as a state,” she explains of her 
motivation. “This project is born from my dis- identification with the nation- 
state structure and my rejection of nationality as an imposed identity con-
struction.” The work circulates via Güell’s personal website and its exhibi-
tion in the form of performance documentation: annotated legal documents, 
provided in both Spanish and English, and testimonial photography and 
video of the artist’s efforts to process her renunciation application at various 
government institutions (figures 2.3 and 2.4). For the work’s 2016 exhibition 
at Barcelona’s a dn  Galeria, the artist displayed an enlarged photograph of 
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FIGURES 2.3 AND 2.4 Núria Güell, Stateless by Choice: On the Prison of the Possible, 
2015 – 16. Source: Núria Güell.
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her at the Spanish embassy alongside her framed legal correspondence with 
the state and played the video documenting her attempts on a continuous 
loop on a small television in the corner of the gallery.17 The images are not 
aestheticized; they are rather humdrum scenes of state bureaucracy — an 
exterior shot of the artist entering the Spanish embassy in Dublin, a glass 
building reflecting the Spanish flag flying amid blue skies, an interior shot 
of an embassy clerk behind what appears to be bulletproof glass, offset by 
a flag and a portrait of the head of state. “We are here just to make you na-
tional, not to get out,” a confused government clerk explains in an English- 
subtitled video still.
When her request is denied without “meaningful explanation,” Güell 
hires an attorney to help her investigate the legal parameters of abdicating 
Spanish citizenship.18 She learns that citizenship can only be taken away, not 
renounced: it is possible to lose Spanish citizenship only as a penalty from 
the state. In effect, the state can decide not to host you, but you cannot de-
cide not to be hosted. “I don’t want to lose it [citizenship] as a punishment,” 
she specifies in a note to her attorney; “it is an issue of respecting the will 
of the person in [their] rejection of nationality.”19 Güell later commissions 
a second report to find out if she can divest herself of her nationality on 
the grounds of exercising her legal right of self- determination. This right is 
based on Article 1 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which holds that “all human beings are born free.” In the eyes of the 
law, Güell wonders, is she free to be free?20 Does her right of nationality give 
her the ability to reject her nationality? The legal report finds that the right 
to self- determination is conceived only as a collective right to create another 
state or nation. Güell eventually receives an official answer to her petition: 
“A year and a half later, the Ministry of Justice has notified me that my peti-
tion is unviable. The current Spanish legal framework does not contemplate 
the existence of people without a nationality of their own free will. That is, 
every human being must compulsorily belong to a state. To sum up, although 
the state does not allow human beings to give it up, it reserves the right to 
expulsion.”21
By establishing the impossibility of renouncing this legal entitlement on 
moral grounds, exposing the illegitimacy of citizens’ implied consent and 
the uses to which it is put by the nation- state, Güell highlights the nation- 
state’s coercive hospitality. (“Where is the will of the subject???” she writes 
in the margins of the legal report she commissions.) She concludes that the 
right of nationality is essentially a nonright because it “only allows you to re-
produce the same structure.” Nationality, Güell concludes in her writings for 
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Stateless by Choice, is a way of containing certain subjects within the order 
of the liberal- democratic state while denying others admittance. A citizen’s 
inability to withdraw individually from the structures by which the nation- 
state perpetuates itself is encapsulated by the subtitle that Güell ultimately 
gives the project, On the Prison of the Possible. Stateless by Choice challenges 
the Spanish government’s moral and legal right to claim its state power as 
lawful; because the individual citizens over which that power is exercised are 
permitted neither to reject nor to decline their nationality, they cannot with-
draw the consent by which state power claims to be justified. The state seems, 
in this case, to turn the people, in aggregate, against the people, in their in-
dividuation. Moreover the state’s claim that it has the support of the people, 
as an abstraction, is curiously nonverifiable and tautological. Nationality 
is a form of imposed belonging into which natives are conscripted at birth 
(by dint of what the Spanish Civil Code terms “autonomic acquisition”) — 
belonging that others are systematically denied.22 Eventually Güell is notified 
that her petition is unviable, the issue settled in advance by a law to which 
she never consented.
In 2015 the Queens- based artist Kenneth Pietrobono responded to a call for 
proposals for a public artwork commemorating those affected by hi v/a id s, 
to be placed in front of city hall in Provincetown, Massachusetts. Pietrobo-
no’s proposal, which was submitted with the working title Void (The Oppo-
site of Property), aspired to create an artwork that could elude the category of 
private property: he proposed to mark off a plot of land as unowned. In his 
proposal he asked what might constitute “the opposite of property” — not lost 
property, disowned property, or property that is unowned, but unproperty. 
He proposed to section off a segment of the property, set up a blind trust, and 
have the city de- succession the land to the blind trust, much like the siphon 
represented by Robin Hood Cooperative’s Parasite algorithm. In contrast to 
the platform cooperativist experiments of chapter 1 that explore the possibil-
ity of forging a path to self- ownership, Pietrobono is more interested in le-
veraging the logic of private property toward a nonproprietary model. While 
the legal framework behind the idea appears never to have been fully sub-
stantiated, his concept was for the city to pay a lease every year on the land, 
with funds going to hi v/a id s research. Pietrobono’s interest was in hack-
ing property — as Güell sought to hack nationality — as a tool for redistrib-
uting the power inscribed in legal access. The artist explains his intention: 
“Because the law can’t see outside of itself, the interest in the unowned . . . 
was always a deeper interest in some practice that would show an ‘outside’ to 
something that is all encompassing.”23 Like Stateless by Choice, Pietrobono’s 
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proposed work was an experiment to see if the law can be undermined on 
an individual level, using its own terms against it: “I was really just trying to 
think, what if I could make a crack in actual legal frameworks?” Pietrobono 
said of the piece. “How can I really intervene?” 
Pietrobono would later learn from a lawyer that the project was not vi-
able within the current U.S. legal framework, in which ownership is com-
pulsory.24 “The truth is it is an impossibility and you have to set up some 
kind of sovereign to keep the land unowned [because] it has to be owned. 
It has to have a steward.” The hi v/a id s memorial that the city ultimately 
chose, which was inaugurated in 2018, is the antithesis of Pietrobono’s pro-
posal: a traditional sculptural form symbolizing collective ownership and 
marking closure. Designed by the sculptor Lauren Ewing, the memorial is 
a seventeen- ton Brazilian quartzite square monument shaped like a cross- 
section of an ocean floor, in the style of a traditional gravestone, inscribed 
with the word remembering. In choosing the ocean as her inspiration, Ew-
ing explained, she wanted to design “something that belongs to everyone” — 
precisely the opposite of Pietrobono’s attempt to design something that be-
longs to no one. Ewing’s sculpture is a monument to community proprietor-
ship and consolidation instead of a gesture of collective dispossession and 
redistribution.
It is in these works’ failure to move outside of the structures of the nation- 
state and private property that they succeed in becoming effective heuris-
tics. They demonstrate, most basically, what most surmise but few know 
for sure: that one cannot not be a citizen and something cannot be unowned. 
They open up spaces for examining what state ideologies make thinkable 
and not thinkable by creating spaces for imagining the unimaginable, for 
not wanting what citizens, to invoke Gayatri Spivak, “cannot not want”: citi-
zenship and private property.25 Everywhere is the possibility of wanting and 
not having; nowhere is the possibility of not wanting or not having. These 
works further demonstrate that, like corporations (Amazon’s nondisclosure 
agreement with Ubermorgen and McDonald’s Error 404 message), states 
have the power to defer their responses or avoid accountability; instead they 
operate their power through administrators, who function as intermediar-
ies. The black box of the powerful multinational corporation finds its ana-
log in the red tape of state and local governmental bureaucracy, for red tape 
manifests a government’s unwillingness to open its own black box, to avow 
its own inner workings and legal limits.26 In public management and or-
ganization studies, there are long- standing debates about whether red tape 
is a sign of the “malevolence or incompetence” of bureaucracy.27 Whatever 
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its intention, the red tape is piling up exponentially; as Frank Pasquale ar-
gues, institutional secrecy and complexity are increasing, and this in turn 
increases the asymmetry in power between institutions and individuals: 
“Even our political and legal systems, the spaces of our common life that are 
supposed to be the most open and transparent, are becoming colonized by 
the logic of secrecy. . . . But while powerful businesses, financial institutions, 
and government agencies hide their actions behind nondisclosure agree-
ments, ‘proprietary methods,’ and gag rules, our own lives are increasingly 
open books [subject to] surveillance cameras, data brokers, sensor networks, 
and ‘supercookies.’ ”28 
Centralizing the medium and performance of the contract, these art-
works follow a certain contractual logic to its furthest conclusions. What is 
presented as a contract (an agreement to which both parties consent) is in-
creasingly an agreement to which there is no affirmative assent, and there-
fore no possibility of dissent. And yet this asymmetrical contract between 
parasite and host does encode some odd form of mutual agreement, or at 
least mutual dependence, for the host needs and depends on its parasites 
while at the same time it seeks to control them. These artworks insist on 
getting in writing things that the state presumably will not articulate; they 
cut through its red tape, which delays or defers definite answers in order to 
not say no, preserving the illusion of agency in citizenship; they pressure 
state institutions to back up their claims to ethical legitimacy (claims that 
are based on principles of consent, freedom, and equality) and document 
the state’s unwillingness to do so. Nationality and property do not have op-
posites, for liberal constitutional regimes do not recognize uncitizenship 
(native statelessness) or unproperty. In the eyes of the law, there must be a 
positive or affirmative value; the structures of the law do not allow for ne-
gation but only accretion, and sovereignty will not retract but only expand.
LAWFUL PARASITES 
In other works Güell and Pietrobono turn to parasitical methods that seek to 
use their complicity with the state against its mechanisms. If, as I’ve argued 
in this book, institutional authority’s investment in an appearance of open-
ness represents a condition of possibility for resistance in the neoliberal pres-
ent, how might the state’s minimal and highly choreographed appearance of 
receptivity be operationalized against its exclusionary and repressive func-
tions? In order to theorize the narrow window of possibility that inheres in 
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the structural logic of sovereignty, I turn to the etymology of loophole. The 
term is commonly used to describe a certain room for maneuver in a given 
rulebook — a little play in the system. It typically refers to a gap, opening, or 
out created in the way a law, code, or contract is written. Black’s Law Diction-
ary defines a loophole as an “ambiguity, omission, or exception . . . that pro-
vides a way to avoid a rule without violating its literal requirements.”29 It is an 
oversight, whether through error or inexactitude, on the part of the enforcer 
that enables those subject to it to evade their obligations. How this evasion is 
read depends on who is viewed as the sympathetic party. In some cases it is 
perceived as a miscarriage of justice, as when wealthy corporations exploit 
available loopholes to avoid paying their taxes. In others it is celebrated as 
a rare moment of escape from domination without reprisal, when the little 
guy catches a break. 
Güell’s and Pietrobono’s parasitism rests heavily on their creative manip-
ulations of the law to renegotiate the terms of their hosts. Making spectacles 
of the law’s affordances, the artists foreground and play with the symbolic 
meaning of the hole (in loophole). So as not to appear to be obviously or ex-
plicitly defiant, they rely on making the terms by which the system’s power op-
erates as literal as possible — by asking to get the letter of the law in writing — 
so that they can sidestep the law’s intention without violating its literal inter-
pretation. My interest is not in actual or available legal loopholes but in the 
idea of the loophole — the potential elasticity, the play within the structure 
of sovereignty, enabled by the liberal- democratic state’s purported invest-
ment in free circulation. To what extent can the liberal- democratic state’s 
supposed openness to forms of alterity deemed legitimate be used to disrupt 
state ideology within its own terms? Here I follow Judith Butler, who argues 
that hope for negotiations with power can emerge from an improvisational 
engagement within dominance’s very terms. “If subversion is possible,” she 
writes, “it will be a subversion that emerges from within the terms of the law, 
through the possibilities that emerge when the law turns against itself and 
spawns unexpected permutations of itself.”30 In its contemporary usage, the 
term loophole refers to a narrow window of escape or point of vulnerability, 
a meaning that can be traced to the late sixteenth century, when the word 
referred to a feature of medieval castle architecture. Loophole derives from a 
now- obsolete sense of loop, meaning “window” or “small opening.” A medi-
eval loophole, or “arrowslit,” was a narrow slit in the castle wall, not unlike 
a keyhole in appearance, through which small arms (bow and arrow and, 
later, crossbow and musket) could be fired. The loophole’s thin vertical ap-
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erture was cut at an angle so as to enable the archer to have a wide field of 
fire. (The French for arrowslit, meurtrière, means literally “murdering win-
dow.”) In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the decorative feature was 
often built in the shape of a cross, making the loophole the weaponization of 
a pious form (figure 2.5). The architectural form of the loophole captures the 
extreme asymmetry of access and thus the overwhelming advantage of the 
entity behind the castle wall over the outsider who must be extremely precise 
with his shot. As narrow windows of escape from accountability, loopholes 
are things that the powerful structure in themselves to give themselves an 
out, but I am interested in how these same loopholes can also be used to give 
an outside attacker an in. 
The loophole is an immunological technology. Its function is to preserve 
the difference between inside and outside. Conceptually and literally it de-
scribes a narrow space in the edifice of sovereignty that allows it to secure 
its interests and protect itself from the outside world. The sovereign state’s 
architectural form was designed to appear closed, and the liberal state’s ar-
chitectural form was designed to appear open, but both are immunological 
models insofar as they function only in relation to the outside. They must 
therefore allow the minimum amount of openness necessary for exchange 
to be possible while regulating what comes in. This sense of loophole speaks 
to the reversibility of the play in the system that I describe in this book. 
While the loophole gives a significant advantage to those inside, its aperture 
nevertheless still represents a site of vulnerability to external forces.
Like the previous works by Güell and Pietrobono, the works examined in 
the next section attempt to locate loopholes — spaces of tolerance integral to 
the law — in the rights of citizenship and private property by lodging them-
selves in the law’s gray areas.31 The artists exploit their positions as relative 
insiders to the legal and ideological structures they work against in order to 
locate loopholes that allow them to siphon off resources from within. The 
following works explore whether the state’s investment in appearing open 
and tolerant to those deemed legitimate by its threshold of accommodation 
might open up new and unexpected channels for critical reflection and so-
cial redistribution. Can those guests provided with the rights and protec-
tions afforded by legal citizenship and private property turn the law against 
itself in order to channel these rights and protections toward others? Or 
does attempting to do so only draw more scrutiny to vulnerable individu-
als, placing them in further peril, and only serve to fortify structures already 
in place?
FIGURE 2.5 Interior perspective of loophole at Corfe Castle, Dorset, England. 
Source: John Bointon, under Creative Commons License Attribution 2.0 Generic 
(c c  by 2.0). 
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HUMANITARIAN AID (AYUDA HUMANITARIA)
In 2008 Güell held a contest to find a husband. She distributed a flyer in the 
streets of Havana announcing her intention to marry a Cuban who wished 
to emigrate to Spain. She invited interested men to compete by writing “the 
world’s most beautiful love letter” (Chica espanola se ofrece como esposa al 
cubano que le escriba la carta de amor mas bonita del mundo). She offered to 
pay for all expenses associated with the wedding, the couple’s travel to Spain, 
and her husband’s application for Spanish citizenship. Once he achieved the 
status of citizen, they would divorce, and any proceeds related to the sale 
of the artwork would be split down the middle. In exchange, she asked two 
things: that he keep a diary of his experiences in Spain until they divorced 
and that he attend art openings with the artist. The artist hired a jury of lo-
cal sex workers to judge the entries. The winning submission, entitled “The 
Letter for My Rose,” is written from the point of view of a yearning gardener 
to his rose (figure 2.6). Its English translation reads:
Your gardener is writing to you having worked all his life plucking roses, 
all beautiful and of different types, but there is a great mystery in them 
that I don’t know but would like to discover. Because every time I get near 
to one of my roses it greets me with angry thorns, pricking my fingers, 
and then you notice how ungrateful some of these roses are with you. You 
are in charge of making these beautiful flowers look ravishing and shin-
ing as they should always do. But this time I am tired of my garden and 
the beauty of my flowers and have decided to explore other flowers that 
do not grow in my country, but in a beautiful place everybody knows by 
the name of: Barcelona. I do not know the flower yet and do not know “if 
it bears thorns.” Perhaps this is the flower that will let me walk around 
her places and let me take care of her petals? Which flower will it be . . . 
the one I have dreamed of having some day with no spots or thorns. Be-
cause, if you are my flower, allow me to be your gardener for t he  r es t  
of my l if e . 
Your gardener 
20/10/0832
Among other documentation of the artwork is a wedding video (posted 
to YouTube) that includes footage the artist and her husband produced as 
“proof of love” for Spanish authorities (figures 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9).33 Opening 
on a stock image of champagne glasses and red roses and set to Louis Arm-
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FIGURES 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 
AND 2.9 Núria Güell, 
Ayuda Humanitaria 
(Humanitarian Aid), 
2008 – 13. Source:  
Núria Güell.
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strong’s “What a Wonderful World,” the video features the cliché trappings 
of romantic love. It includes candid photographs of the couple — her kissing 
his back, them goofing off on the beach, them intimately embracing. She sits 
while waiting to have her makeup done. During the 2009 ceremony, both 
Güell and her groom look nervous, she in a dress and he in a white tuxedo 
jacket, cameras flashing around them. “It is my consideration to attest that 
they have the legal capacity for this act,” the justice of the peace says before 
reciting the Cuban civil marriage code.
In this work, Güell seems to say to the Spanish state that had denied her 
the right to renounce her citizenship, “Oh, you want to add, not subtract? I’ll 
show you adding.” Unable to escape her complicity with the state, she wea-
ponizes it. The artist appropriates love as an authorized means (authorized 
by the state’s conferral of citizenship after marriage) through which to traffic 
in difference. Love is a siphon, a “plus one” that is a minus, subtracting (in 
the act of addition) the negative value of the unwelcome guest in the eyes of 
the xenophobic state. For Güell, marriage — an institution intended to add 
wealth to the nation — is a loophole, an activist tool that can also be used 
against the state’s exclusionary apparatuses. By simply doing what is within 
her rights as a citizen, she redistributes her privilege. Her artist’s statement 
plainly avows her parasitical methods. “The main resources that she uses in 
her work are to flirt with the established powers, complicity with different al-
lies and the uses of privileges that artistic institutions she works with have, as 
well as those socially granted to her for being Spanish and European,” reads 
the English translation on her website.34 
Güell demonstrates the completeness of what she describes as her dis-
identification with the state by marrying without love, betraying the tacit 
agreement that relationships recognized by the state with citizenship be 
sincerely based on love. In her staging of the letters she solicits from men, 
she makes their ability to feign sincere attachment her only requirement 
for marriage; the men must be able to simulate love, which she knows to 
be false but which the state cannot disprove. And who better to judge this 
performance of simulated affection than a sex worker? The sex worker em-
blematizes Güell’s weapon of choice: a woman’s terrifying ability to simu-
late affection. Indeed the act of simulating emotion is always a threat to the 
state; historically the prostitute and the actor are equally reviled because 
they use their bodies and their simulated emotions in exchange for money. 
As Jonas A. Barish notes in his classic book on the hatred of theatricality, 
under Roman law, actors, like prostitutes, were forbidden to vote, to hold 
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public office, to occupy the very seats of the theater in which they them-
selves performed, and even to leave the profession, to cross the threshold 
into civil respectability.35 
We might ask about the extent to which Güell’s gesture in Humanitarian 
Aid is truly redistributive. Her very performance of it as art, her documen-
tation and exhibition of the process, put her spouse (the parasite’s parasite, 
as it were) at risk, while posing substantially less risk to her. Güell’s project 
has to put a person more precarious than herself at risk in order to make and 
benefit artistically from her project — a fact that is not acknowledged in what 
is presented as a magnanimous performance of generosity on her part — at 
least until later in the work. The ethical stakes of the work grow much knot-
tier after the couple settles in Spain. In 2012, three years into their marriage, 
an audio testimonial (in Spanish) about Ayuda Humanitaria by Güell’s hus-
band, Yordanis, was uploaded to Soundcloud.36 (The same recording was 
also posted to the Immigrant Movement International project, a website run 
by Güell’s mentor Tania Bruguera, strongly supporting its authenticity — and 
Güell’s active participation in its dissemination.) In the recording he ex-
plains that he has lived in Spain for almost a year and still cannot find work:
I cannot find a job so I rely on my dearest wife. This situation forces me to 
do several things with no right to claim like taking care of the cleaning of 
the house, cooking, doing the laundry, washing the dishes, ironing, walk-
ing the dogs, feeding them, shopping in Mercadona. But I don’t think this 
is so bad, because she is in her right because she works and brings the 
money. I cannot be against her or against what she asks me to do because 
otherwise, where would I go? I don’t have a job and now it is really hard 
to find one. I don’t have anyone or anywhere to go here in Spain. 
The marriage, intended to be a means of reallocating privilege, is shown 
to depend on a larger economic structure for Güell’s husband to have the 
autonomy necessary to enjoy its benefits. The testimonial concludes oddly, 
with a change of register akin to an “ask the audience” reality tv  segment. He 
closes by asking if he has become a hostage to the socially engaged artwork:
I have to do what she asks me: People might say that I am laying at her 
feet and eating from her hand. Am I right in what I’m saying? Am I cor-
rect? Or am I wrong? Do you think she is abusing me? Yes or no? I hope 
your answer is correct, please help me with this. I send warm greetings to 
the person who is listening to me. Once more I say goodbye and thanks 
for listening.
96 CHAPTER TWO
One problem with Güell’s project is that its very status as an artistic project 
undermines its stated intentions, which, it would seem, would be best served 
by keeping the constructed nature of the venture a secret. Pietrobono, by 
contrast (in a project with considerably lower stakes than Güell’s), enlists 
outside participants who have (it appears) more power and security than he; 
it is Pietrobono, not his hosts, who assumes the risks of the performance. 
Although he, as an artist, may benefit from the performance, these poten-
tial benefits do not contradict the point of his project in the way that Güell’s 
might be said to do.
EASEMENT (VERMONT 1)
After learning that his proposed project Void (The Opposite of Property) was 
not viable, Pietrobono began work on what would become Easement (Ver-
mont 1), a piece that represents a compromised version of his original aim: to 
upend ownership by transforming it into rent paid to charity. In 2016 Pietro-
bono approached a couple in rural West Townsend, Vermont, about making 
a work on their property. The artist asked property owners Christopher Keefe 
and Mike McGrath to grant him an easement, the legal term for the right to 
use another’s property for a specific purpose. Easements are typically granted 
to utility companies to run power lines or broadband cables or to private in-
dividuals whose access to their land requires passing through a neighbor’s 
yard; they are maintained in property law for the purposes of supporting 
private property rights and commercial enterprise. Broadly, what interests 
Pietrobono about private property is its ability to confer security and agency 
to the owner. Easements confound this, for they confer a nonpossessory right 
of use. With the easement, Pietrobono sought to locate what he calls “fissures 
in the structure” of ownership by redirecting the benefits of ownership from 
within the legal structure of private property itself. “I wanted to exert at least 
one challenge on that idea that ownership is absolute,” the artist explains.37 
At first he toyed with concepts that included using the easement to calculate 
a percentage of a private property or to use the overall property tax to extract 
a kind of livelihood from the property, but the fine print soon showed these 
concepts to be unworkable under Vermont property law.38 
When Pietrobono initially made a similar proposition to Keefe and Mc-
Grath as he had to the city of Provincetown, “to create some kind of financial 
siphon that would attach to the property value,” the owners demurred. “It be-
came very clear from conversations that an easement was as far as they were 
willing to go,” he said. “They were happy to have me work on the land . . . 
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but legally, they did not want to fuck with their deed.” While Pietrobono 
envisioned Easement as contributing to alternative imaginings of social re-
lationships to those configurations represented by capitalist property and 
wealth structures, the owners and the legal frameworks within which he 
had to work were less radical. The landowners appeared to find a benefit, 
the artist speculated, in “expressing a kind of ‘solidarity’ without having to 
do much to what they hold in the first place.” “My main sense,” he says, re-
flecting back on the process, “is that for them ‘going further’ with Easement 
was simply a door to too many uncertainties . . . and beyond what they were 
willing to expose themselves to directly.”39
The original concept for Void and Easement of using private property 
to create a legal or financial siphon was influenced by the work of the 
American conceptual artist Cameron Rowland. Rowland’s work investigates 
the persistence of the U.S. slave economy and its institutional legacies in 
contemporary neoliberal capitalism, from exploitative prison labor to the 
system of asset forfeiture. Pietrobono’s interest in identifying a “laundering 
mechanism” recalls a project Rowland undertook in 2016 called Disgorge-
ment. For that work, which also takes the form of a contractual agreement, 
having established that the insurance company Aetna held slave insurance 
policies for slave owners, Rowland set up what he calls the Reparations Pur-
pose Trust after purchasing approximately $10,000 worth of Aetna shares, 
in partnership with the work’s exhibiting gallery, Artists Space. The gallery 
and artist hold the shares in trust until the U.S. government makes financial 
reparations for slavery, at which time the shares will be liquidated toward the 
payment of reparations. The artwork both pressures debates around repara-
tions and, given the possibility that the shares will accrue value during this 
indefinite period, underscores its own potential complicity with the eco-
nomic afterlife of chattel slavery. 
The landowners agree to an easement providing Pietrobono with official 
access to a designated section of the property, if “only after a personal rela-
tionship was established.”40 Once the legal paperwork was in place, drafted 
with the help of a local attorney, Pietrobono began a two- day durational 
performance on the land. He selected a small corner of the property and, 
with the couple’s blessing, set about digging a three- by- eight- foot hole in the 
July heat (figure 2.10). The artist wore a T- shirt printed with the words “On 
the Backs of Others.” When he finished, he returned the soil to the hole and 
placed a neat border of rocks around the exhumed land. Pietrobono thus 
voids the product of his own labor, closing it off as symbolic. The effect is 
that of a freshly dug grave (figure 2.11).
FIGURES 2.10 AND 2.11 Kenneth Pietrobono, Easement (Vermont 1), 2016.  
Source: Kenneth Pietrobono.
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Easement assumes multiple forms across multiple media, and each dif-
ferently inflects the dimensions of the labor and the materiality of the work. 
First, there is Pietrobono’s physically demanding durational performance, 
the live event of the work’s materialization. Second, there is the resulting 
land installation, which serves as material index and remainder of the live 
performance. Third, there is the work’s secondary (likely more enduring) 
exhibition on the artist’s website via digital photographs, documentation, 
and written marginalia. (These materials include curated photographs of the 
artist bending and sweating with a raised pickaxe, copies of the legal con-
tract, and an in- progress critical statement about the work.) Finally, there is 
the easement itself: the abstract legal manifestation of the social relationship 
brokered between the artist and the property owners. It is this final form that 
is privileged by the work’s title. 
Easement’s ability to subvert the power structure inherent in private 
property both depends on and problematizes the essential contradiction of 
ownership (what Derrida terms the “aporia of hospitality”): to remain a host, 
one must not be too welcoming.41 To be a host, one has to give, but if one 
gives too much, one can no longer be a host. “The terms of ownership create 
a contradiction, an impossibility of hospitality,” Irina Aristarkhova glosses 
Derrida’s insight.42 The work effectively puts on display the terms and limits 
of the hospitality offered by Pietrobono’s hosts. So while Pietrobono does 
not manage to convert the owners’ property value into a siphon, he does 
temporarily neutralize the terms of ownership via Easement’s status as art. 
“Their ownership of my artwork is contingent on them giving up one of the 
aspects of the ownership of their land,” Pietrobono points out. Significantly 
the work makes the owners patrons of an artwork that is critical of their 
structural positions as hosts on their own turf. Ultimately, Pietrobono rea-
sons, more than the easement itself, from his perspective, the true medium 
of the work became his relationship with the property owners, “because it 
was the one material that actually is available to be voided, erased, allowed 
to end, allowed to dissolve and not be enclosed by one party or the other.”43 
The condition for the owners’ possession of the artwork, in other words, is 
in their nonpossession of it. 
Pietrobono’s other performances of social and institutional critique have 
also begun to garner wider attention.44 His body of work, the performance 
theorist Josh Takano Chambers- Letson observes, “can be understood as a 
mediation of the contradictory nature of state power as it is represented, 
spatialized, and landscaped within the US.”45 The “On the Backs of Others” 
T- shirt he wore during the Easement performance (the front of the shirt 
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reads “From Utility to Commodity and Back”) references another of the 
artist’s ongoing works, Terms and Conditions, begun in 2012. For Terms 
and Conditions, Pietrobono initially committed to wearing thirty T- shirts 
printed with phrases such as “Human Capital,” “Privilege,” and “Games We 
Can’t All Win” over a period of thirty days (figure 2.12). The project appro-
priates the customizable T- shirt, a ubiquitous symbol for the hypercommod-
ification and branding of certain bodies, to expose the capitalist unconscious 
that underwrites everyday exchanges. The shirts are a vehicle for exploring 
how the queer Chilean American artist’s body functions in public space, and 
the unwritten rules, the “terms and conditions,” that underwrite the social 
economies in which he circulates. Pietrobono says, “For me personally, the 
shirts are an attempt to stand back and assess an illogical system, my place 
in it, the ways it works against me, and the ways it directs me beyond my 
control.” He explains, “In a way, its [sic] a big game of Marco Polo, calling out 
to these dynamics which are mostly unseen.”46 Photos taken for the project 
show Pietrobono wearing the T- shirts while shopping at Macy’s in Herald 
Square (“Disposable Income”), buying a hotdog from a New York City street 
cart (“Coincidence of wants”), contemplating views of Ellis Island and the 
FIGURE 2.12 Kenneth Pietrobono, Terms and Conditions, 2012 – ongoing.  
Source: Kenneth Pietrobono.
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Statue of Liberty (“Legitimate expectations”), and loitering in Zuccotti Park, 
home of Occupy Wall Street, after it was cleared (“Protect me from disap-
pointment”). With the artist’s trademark bookish deadpan, the shirts slo-
ganize the rigged game of racialized capital.47 
A similar deadpan address marks Pietrobono’s National Rose Garden 
project (2009 – ongoing), which in much the same way exposes the disjunc-
ture between how U.S. imperialism represents itself and how it is experi-
enced by those subject to it. The project includes a series of digital photo-
graphs of roses with names such as “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” and “USA Patriot 
Act” (figure 2.13). It also encompasses a series of hand- numbered National 
Rose Garden special commemorative plates, made of porcelain and featuring 
phrases like “Super pac s,” which he made available for purchase. National 
Rose Garden offers a send- up of the false sentimentality of U.S. empire. Both 
projects’ ironic sensibilities are not so much the artist’s as those of the sys-
tem itself — the open secret that it is founded on unequal access to resources. 
Like Terms and Conditions and the National Rose Garden series, which 
inscribe in real or symbolic space the forms of systemic exclusion and impe-
rialism that remain implicit, Easement makes apparent the hidden and ex-










propriated labor that underwrites private property. The piece’s labor is given 
an additional valence by Pietrobono’s T- shirt, “On the Backs of Others,” and 
by the performance’s location and social context. The artist worked closely 
with the curator Cindy Smith to devise the piece in response to an invita-
tion to participate in the Stream Festival, a community- funded summer art 
festival hosted on the creek that runs along Keefe and McGrath’s property.48 
Inaugurated in 2014, the annual festival is a nod to Allan Kaprow’s 1975 per-
formance piece Echo- logy, which took place in a New Jersey stream. When 
Pietrobono received the invitation to participate, he was struck by the pecu-
liarity of an art festival being hosted on private property. He decided to use 
the festival as an opportunity to explore the historical relationship between 
private property and citizenship in the United States.
Although Pietrobono did not choose the festival’s location in the rural 
valley of Vermont’s southern hill towns, Easement is better for its fortu-
itous local symbolism. This is an area in which the land has itself proven 
resistant to appropriation. A promising agricultural economy in the early 
nineteenth century, the area later fell into economic decline because the 
dense, craggy terrain made the land difficult to develop. In the project Pi-
etrobono strains to chip away at the rocky, difficult soil, provoking reflec-
tion on how dispossessed laborers must struggle to create an opening onto 
the rights of ownership. The shirt’s inscription, “On the Backs of Others,” 
references the history of US slavery. It also disrupts the historical forget-
ting that underpins the notion that hard labor is necessarily an expression 
of agency or a path to self- determination, reminding viewers that such la-
bor is still routinely outsourced to undocumented immigrants, migrant la-
borers, and the working poor — subjects who have historically been denied 
not only citizenship but also humanity. The phrase recalls those laborers 
for whom an extreme physical toll did not, and does not, yield the digni-
ties of state- recognized personhood and the freedoms of self- possession. 
Re enacting this disavowed labor, the artist puts forward his body as a sur-
rogate, standing in for those for whom labor has represented not the key to 
self- possession but an instrument of dispossession. With Easement, Pietro-
bono asks what justifies continuing to treat property as patrimony today. 
The artist set out to challenge received ideas about the supposedly natural 
correspondence between property and labor, formalized in John Locke’s la-
bor theory of property. Locke’s theory was used to justify the Homestead 
Principle, which holds that one may gain ownership of an “unowned” natu-
ral resource by exerting labor, which is an act of “original appropriation.” 
“In my mind I was thinking about all of this security that property gives 
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you and all of this stability and agency. Even the root of property is the Latin 
word proprius, which means the deepest sense of oneself. The closest legal 
expression of personhood is ownership. Even your possession of yourself . . . 
owning property as the highest form or expression of independence. ‘I am 
an independent agent. I own this land. This land is mine!’ . . . [But] labor isn’t 
isolated. There is rarely one agent.”
With Easement, Pietrobono attempts to reverse- engineer the ideological 
mechanism of private property. Where Locke asks “How do I own some-
thing that is unowned?,” Pietrobono asks “How do I try to unown some-
thing that is already owned?” The answer to both questions is “labor.” The 
work seeks to show the falsity of the promise of self- determination through 
ownership, which has historically been used to determine citizenship in the 
Americas. (This is the Lockean logic behind the expropriation of land from 
Native Americans, who were seen as not cultivating private ownership or 
self- determination through labor.)
Why dig a grave for no one, with no purpose? What is the grave, with all 
of its significatory excess, meant to represent? Is it meant to enact Pietro-
bono’s own (familial) claim to the rights of citizenship? To mark those (real 
and social) deaths that have been the consequence of principles of land-
ownership? Pietrobono affirms that the answers to these questions, and his 
preoccupation with themes of citizenship, labor, and access, are rooted in 
his own family history and in the history of oppressed groups in the United 
States. He describes Easement as an investigation into the possibility of find-
ing an opening or backdoor onto the rights and privileges bequeathed by 
private property. He himself comes from a family who spent roughly twenty 
years as noncitizens: he was born in Florida in 1982, not long after his fam-
ily emigrated from Chile to the United States, but his family did not acquire 
documented status until 1996. “I recall the import of this being the arbitrary 
condition that the mere location of my birth gave me a completely differ-
ent position within the law than my family,” Pietrobono explains. The art-
ist confesses his preoccupation with what it means to claim citizenship as 
a second- generation immigrant with “no blood in the land” (“because so 
much has been justified by that logic: so- and- so has blood here”): “[When 
I was thinking about what to do for the festival] I was thinking, how does 
someone like me, a child of immigrants, not a lot of money to speak of, hack 
into that? How do I get some level of protection and stability and growth that 
landowners get? Which then [led] to the whole thinking about the racialized 
history of land ownership and who had place under the law to lay claim on 
land.” Easement, Pietrobono explains, was motivated by the question of how 
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the rights of landownership are conditioned by and complicit with struc-
tures of violence and exclusion (“over native populations, on extracted la-
bor, on displaced labor, on women”). “I was thinking a lot about the violence 
required to create property — to protect it, to regulate it, to safeguard it.”49
Freedom, ownership, and subjection are intertwined in the liberal con-
text. As Saidiya V. Hartman has noted, freedom contains within itself a par-
adoxical double bind, grimly described by Marx as the “double freedom” 
wrought by primitive accumulation: the freedom to exchange one’s labor, 
while being free of material resources. For Marx, this double bind is encap-
sulated in the moment when the subject is free to circulate as a worker and 
sell his labor but is not free to own himself, to reap the benefits of his labor. 
For Marx, primitive accumulation refers to “the expropriation of the imme-
diate producers, i.e., the dissolution of private property based on the labour 
of its owner.” Here Marx describes the alienation of the worker not only from 
his labor but also from the land. Uprooted, the worker must now circulate 
to find work. Marx writes, “Private property . . . is . . . personally earned, . . . 
based, as it were, on the fusing together of the isolated, independent working 
individual with the conditions of his labour”; under capitalism, private prop-
erty (the fruits of one’s labor) “is supplanted by capitalist private property, 
which rests on the exploitation of alien[ated], but formally free labour.”50 
Hartman sees this irony as resonating most cruelly in the “freeing” of the 
former slave’s labor, which she argues is the freedom to have one’s labor 
power exploited: “Within the liberal ‘Eden of the innate rights of man,’ own-
ing easily gave way to being owned, sovereignty to fungibility, and abstract 
equality to subordination and exploitation.” Hartman continues, “If sover-
eignty served ‘to efface the domination intrinsic to power’ and rights ‘en-
abled and facilitated relations of domination,’ as Michel Foucault argues, 
then what we are left to consider is the subjugation that rights instigate and 
the domination they efface.”51 What Hartman wants to show is what Pietro-
bono wants to show: that what is legally owned conceals the untold expro-
priation and violence that the discourse of legality obfuscates.
The relation of violence to the policing of property rights is explored in 
a critical text written by Pietrobono, “The Opposite of Property,” that ac-
companies his documentation of Easement on his website. He situates Ease-
ment’s investigation into the role played by private property in the high- 
profile deaths at the heart of the Black Lives Matter movement. He points to 
the way that private property’s “management and enforcement set the stage” 
for the use of lethal force against black bodies: Florida’s Stand- Your- Ground 
law that alibied George Zimmerman, who murdered Trayvon Martin on the 
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basis of a claim that some people have the right to be in particular places 
and others do not; the charge of “illegal vending” used by the police to jus-
tify their initial reason for approaching Eric Garner, who was allegedly sell-
ing loose cigarettes and taking “rightful” profits out of the pockets of store 
owners; and the fatal denial of Philando Castile’s legal right to possession of 
(i.e., recognized right to ownership of) a gun, a right that in practice seems 
reserved only for white people.52 In all of these cases, the right to protect pri-
vate property trumped the right to life. Pietrobono says that his aim with 
Easement was “to mark the land so that the property owners couldn’t have it 
without considering this kind of negative space, the socialized aspect that ac-
tually allows this property to exist.” The grave he digs is the grave for all those 
black and brown bodies denied the right to self- possession and protection. 
Rather than stating outright that he intended to dig a grave, the artist let the 
work’s political intentions remain implicit in his exchanges with the owners: 
“It was always, ‘I will exert an intervention in the land in the shape of a 8 foot 
by 3 foot rectangle.’ ” Pietrobono left the very raw symbolic stakes of the proj-
ect implicit in these conversations, presumably so as not to offend his hosts, 
whose goodwill he needed to complete the work. Although they were initially 
perplexed by the formality (and legality) of his request to use their land, the 
owners eventually complied: “It took a while for them to even understand 
why I would want [the easement] because in their mind [they were like] we 
know you now so you can just come here whenever you want. You don’t need 
an easement to come here. I had a hard time articulating why, for me, it was 
important it was a legal relationship.” By insisting on a legal agreement, Pi-
etrobono created not just an informal guest relation but a formal, legal rela-
tion. The legal easement gives the queer sociality that makes his intervention 
possible the official status necessary for it to circulate as a formal art object.
A year after making Easement, Pietrobono visited Maria Eichhorn’s Building 
as Unowned Property (2017) at Documenta 14 in Athens. In this work Eich-
horn, like Pietrobono, attempted to identify a legal path to designate a prop-
erty as unowned. The artist bought Stavropoulou 15, a two- story building that 
had fallen into disrepair, for €140,000 , using funds from Zurich’s Migros Mu-
seum. The dilapidated neoclassical- revival is located near Amerikis Square, 
a culturally diverse, working- class neighborhood. Eichhorn claims to have 
bought the building to protect it from gentrification and real estate specula-
tion. For now it remains a shuttered building with a lock on the door and a 
peeling façade. “It was painful to see the piece but interesting,” Pietrobono 
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said of Eichhorn’s house. “I think that is the difficulty of this kind of art. You 
are trying to produce a commons while participating in this highly ‘winner 
take all’ individuated authorial world and it is one of the inherent contradic-
tions of being an artist and wanting to produce socially in any way.” In other 
words, how does the artist use the tools available but to different ends?
Building as Unowned Property raises the irony of contemporary art tour-
ism: Is it better than the real estate tourism it replaces? Is Eichhorn better 
than other prospectors? The ethical questions raised by Eichhorn’s act of re- 
propriety recalls a project by Güell, another wry critique of humanitarian-
ism called Good Intentions (2016) that she developed with her frequent col-
laborator Levi Orta; it is a proposal for public donations to save looted Syrian 
antiquities by purchasing them from the black market. Much as Robin Hood 
Cooperative’s Parasite algorithm leaves open the question of whether pro-
ducing a commons is a matter of being a better patron, Eichhorn’s work 
poses the question of whether it is a matter of being a better owner, a good 
host? Does setting a property apart in order to protect it from more rapa-
cious owners make it a commons? As Pietrobono sees it, Eichhorn claims 
that by taking something out of circulation, she circumvents the logic of 
ownership — but she then capitalizes on her good intentions by circulating 
the piece as an art commodity, an emblem of her cultural capital. Here we 
find an instance of where the work of redistribution and of symbolic disrup-
tion butt up against each other — when the potentially redistributive act is 
recaptured and absorbed back in the art economy. For him, the solution to 
the problem of private property is not repossessing or owning with good in-
tentions (as a symbolic gesture that remains mostly within the art world); it 
is redistributing and communalizing that property. 
THE PARASITE DELINQUENT
Both Pietrobono (a founding member of New York City’s Occupy Museums) 
and Güell see their work as responding to the relationship between con-
temporary art and capital (both social and economic) after the 2008 global 
financial crisis.53 Güell sees banks as paradigmatic of hegemonic power’s 
nonreciprocity. With her piece Displaced Legal Application #1: Fractional Re-
serve (Aplicación Legal Desplazada #1: Reserva Fraccionaria) (2010 – 11), she 
organized a series of events to teach the public how to turn the law against 
the banks, as (she argues) the banks have used the law against the people. She 
named the work after the fractional- reserve banking system, “the mecha-
nism through which banks create money out of nothing.” Under this system 
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the bank does not own the money it lends; it loans out other investors’ and 
depositors’ money. They effectively create money by “monetizing” the iou s 
of businesses and individuals.54 (When the reverse happens, however, Güell 
observes, it is considered a crime, such as when writing a check without hav-
ing the funds to back it up.) Güell’s artwork — a performance- based, socially 
engaged experience in the vein of participatory art — comprised a confer-
ence and a manual, downloadable for free on her website, called “How to 
Expropriate Money from the Banks.” The manual featured strategies, legal 
information, and commentary from her collaborators, who included the an-
archist activists Lucio Urtubia and Enric Duran.55 While Güell situates her 
actions as artworks, neither Urtubia nor Duran do so. Called modern- day 
Robin Hoods, Urtubia and Duran are well known in anarchist circles for 
successfully expropriating (“robbing”) funds from big banks and redirecting 
the money to revolutionary and social justice causes. Both Urtubia and Du-
ran model a redistributive ethics of parasitism, and their work exemplifies 
how complicity can function as a tool of power: it can force individuals to 
internalize the moralism of the state or it can give the powerless a loophole, 
the access needed to gum up the inner workings of the system.
Luc io  Ur t ubia  
Urtubia was the original hacker. A lifelong bricklayer born in autonomous 
northern Spain in the 1930s, in 1977 he famously forged $20 million worth of 
Citibank traveler’s checks — an act that is considered his masterwork. At the 
time, Citibank (then known as National City Bank) was the largest bank in 
the world. The famous anarchist used the money to aid guerrilla movements 
such as the Tupamaros in Latin America, the Black Panthers in the United 
States, and the antifascist struggle in Spain. The forgery cost the bank much 
more than the $20 million in counterfeit checks, for it prompted a crisis 
in confidence in the checks themselves, which were spread across Europe. 
The bank had no choice but to suspend the use of traveler’s checks, putting 
thousands of tourists in limbo and causing its stock to fall. Urtubia was fi-
nally arrested in 1980, when he was stopped with a suitcase full of the falsi-
fied checks. Despite the large scale of the forgery, however, he served only 
six months in jail after he struck an extrajudicial agreement with Citibank. 
The bank, which had continued to receive and pay out false traveler’s checks, 
agreed to drop the charges in exchange for Urtubia’s supplying the printing 
plates he used to make them. Citibank thus neutralized Urtubia’s disrup-
tion by becoming the patron of his act of forgery, much as Amazon became 
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the patron of Amazon Noir by buying Ubermorgen’s code. However, unlike 
Ubermorgen’s, Urtubia’s action has a clear redistributive function that goes 
well beyond its heuristic dimension. Urtubia sums it up this way: “As the 
revolutionaries say, robbing and expropriation is a revolutionary act as long 
as one doesn’t benefit from it.”56 
Enr ic  Dur a n
In 2008 Enric Duran, a Catalan anticapitalist activist, announced that over 
the course of two years he had “robbed” thirty- nine Spanish banks of nearly 
500,000 euros, taking out sixty- eight commercial and personal loans: “I have 
‘robbed’ . . . from those who rob us the most,” he said in an online statement 
and video, characterizing his actions as “financial civil disobedience.”57 He 
used the funds to finance projects aimed at building alternatives to capital-
ism. Like Urtubia’s, Duran’s methods made the banks complicit with his 
action. It can be argued that Duran stole from the banks only insofar as he 
accepted the banks’ invitations to borrow money he could not afford to pay 
back, again and again. He exploited a loophole in the banking system by 
which an individual can pass himself or herself off as a company, avoiding 
the scrutiny of a credit check, in order to get the same loan from multiple 
banks for a single item (e.g., a video camera). Duran writes:
After some research and attempts, in the spring of 2006, I started going 
ahead definitely with this idea; I was making various banks, savings banks 
and financial credit establishments think that I wanted to refurbish my 
flat or buy a new car. In some cases, I was doing that by using a company 
I created with the aim of justifying certain investments as the purchase of 
audiovisual materials for a production company. The advantages of asking 
for a loan by a company are that debts as a company, even when it is a sole 
shareholder company, do not get registered in your personal credit history, 
so you can always increase your debts indefinitely without being detected 
by c ir be  (information system about debts from the Bank of Spain). . . . 
These loans were applied without any guarantee neither from another 
person nor from any properties, just by my signature and an invented 
occupation with a great false payroll that was making them believe I was 
earning enough money to cover the financing by far.58 
As Duran explains it, banks promote indebtedness without meaningful re-
gard for the risks; the fact that the banks have no functional structure for 
confirming whether the lendee can repay the amount or for confirming col-
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lateral (such as payroll records, which may be falsified) means that they are 
irresponsible in their lending practices (a claim that seems to have been con-
firmed by the 2008 global financial crisis). Rather than purely relying on the 
bank’s mechanisms, Duran misrepresents his intentions to the banks so as 
to shape their decision to loan to him — introducing, on his part, a degree of 
moral ambiguity into the act. 
Since that time Duran has shifted his efforts to radical cooperativist or-
ganizing of the kind discussed in chapter 1; he initially used the funds he got 
from the banks to set up Catalan Integral Cooperative, a network of coop-
eratives operating in the separatist region of Catalonia. But his latest project 
is FairCo- op, what has been described as “no less than a whole new kind of 
global financial system” wherein “cooperatives around the world would be 
able to trade, fund one another’s growth, redistribute wealth, and make col-
lective decisions.”59
Duran’s actions can be seen as a response to the Belgian philosopher 
Michel Feher’s call to undermine neoliberal capitalism by engaging it on 
its own terms, by embracing the status of the investee. Feher suggests that 
while leftists — reformist and radical alike — have insisted on approaching 
the problem of neoliberalism from the outside, they would do better “to ac-
cept and inhabit a certain mode of subjection in order to redirect it or turn 
it against its instigators.”60 He calls for “the possibility of defying neoliberal-
ism from within — that is, by embracing the very condition that its discourses 
and practices delineate,” an approach he locates in early feminist and labor 
movement tactics.61 (What Feher is calling for here is what I term “para-
sitism.”) Duran argues that citizens’ participation in the economy of debt 
demonstrates their complicity with the wider forms of oppression and ex-
ploitation that attend a capitalist system; the banks need to extend credit to 
justify their own existence, and complicity maintains individual investment 
in a system that relies on their sense of indebtedness to keep them paying. 
But Duran’s project, much as the Strike Debt movement has, calls the bluff of 
a predatory debt system: “Banks need to grant loans because that is the main 
way for them to get benefits and . . . because the financial system needs to sign 
out more and more bank credits to create more and more money each time. 
By keeping loans, credit cards and checking accounts, we are an accessory to 
the banks which represent the heart of the capitalist system that is spreading 
our planet’s destruction, poverty and our life’s slavery all around.”62
Duran did not internalize responsibility for the loans. Instead he em-
braced the position of the defaulter. His indifference to legal authority recalls 
a scene in Foucault’s Discipline and Publish: the thirteen- year- old delinquent 
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Béasse, charged with vagabondage, models a kind of freedom in his refusal 
of legal rationality (a refusal to internalize legal authority and social respon-
sibility for his crime) in the face of the court. In this encounter between the 
unaffected delinquent and the judge reading out his punishment, Foucault 
sees a model of what he calls indiscipline: “Hearing his sentence of two years 
in a reformatory, Béasse ‘pulled an ugly face, then, recovering his good hu-
mour, remarked: “Two years, that’s never more than twenty- four months. 
Let’s be off, then.”’” Foucault writes that this scene anticipates anarchist re-
sistance to come. In the late nineteenth century, “taking the penal apparatus 
as their point of attack,” anarchists recognized in delinquency a militant re-
jection of the law: a means “to disentangle delinquency from the bourgeois 
legality and illegality that had colonized it; when they wished to re- establish 
or constitute the political unity of popular illegalities.”63 
The disentanglement from legality and illegality that characterizes delin-
quency is also the position of the parasite. However, the parasite maintains 
the fiction that it is in fact still beholden to “bourgeois legality”; the parasite 
manipulates the host’s false perception that proximity indicates investment 
in and faithfulness to the social order — that the parasite’s structural posi-
tion in relation to the host means that they share the same goals. This per-
ception is maintained by the fear of complicity, but the sense that proximity 
equals similarity can also be weaponized by the parasite. In Güell’s and Pi-
etrobono’s performances of parasitism, they use their complicity as a tool of 
solidarity with others who have less access to the host. These works gesture 
toward the redistributions that are enabled by parasitical performances of 
complicity that refuse to internalize belief in the intrinsic ethics of the law. 
In a neoliberal system increasingly invested in generating responsible moral 
subjects in order to exonerate itself, the parasite models what it could mean 
to refuse (or to perform its refusal) to internalize a position of indebtedness 
(both literal financial indebtedness and the debt of gratitude that the guest 
is thought to owe to the host). In the process, these performances also chal-
lenge the overdetermined narrative of interpellation. In other words, the 
parasite embedded in its host is not an ontological condition but a structural 
one. At the same time, where the figure of the reformist or the cynic presup-
poses externality, the parasite cannot be extricated from the system in which 
it operates. Detaching their identification from the larger structures they 
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THREE HANGERS- ON
Ch r is Kr a us’s Pa r a sit ic a l F eminism
In many cases, the man can commit acts with woman’s complicity that degrade 
her without tarnishing his lofty image. . . . Officially the man renounces her, 
those are the rules of the game. . . . When one speaks to these women of dignity, 
honor, loyalty, and all the lofty virile virtues, one should not be surprised if they 
refuse to “go along.” They particularly snigger when virtuous males reproach 
them for being calculating, actresses, liars: they know well that no other way is 
open to them. . . . The woman has been assigned the role of parasite. — SIMONE 
DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX
T he title of Chris Kraus’s 1997 cult novel, I Love Dick, rings out as an ad-mission of shame and a badge of defiance: I am attached to and titillated 
by a patriarchy that oppresses me. It is a performative study of the female 
abasement and complicity that attends heterosexual desire — a problematic 
that radical feminist thought has long explored in terms of the maligned 
“female parasite.” Panned by early critics, the book has since become a full- 
blown cultural juggernaut, embraced by a new generation of internet- savvy 
feminists and reappraised by critics as a feminist classic that arrived “20 
years early.”1 “Critics don’t seem to like Chris Kraus’ ‘novels’ much,” ob-
served Joan Hawkins in her afterword to the book’s 2006 reissue. “I say ‘nov-
els’ (in quotes) because I’m not entirely sure Kraus’ works belong in the ge-
neric category of ‘novel.’ Rather . . . Kraus’ prose works constitute ‘some new 
kind of literary form,’ a new genre, ‘something in between cultural criticism 
and fiction.’ ”2 In a 1998 review for Bookforum, David Rimanelli memorably 
described it as “a book not so much written as secreted,” a frank character-
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ization of a work that viscerally enacts the very abjection that it sets out to 
critique.3 In I Love Dick, Kraus chronicles the romantic obsession of her pro-
tagonist, “Chris Kraus,” with “Dick,” a character later identified as the Brit-
ish cultural theorist Dick Hebdige.4 Dick is an academic colleague of Chris’s 
husband, “Sylvère,” an influential French theorist and downtown cult fig-
ure presumably based on Kraus’s then- real- life husband, Sylvère Lotringer. 
(The conflation of real and fictional and the ambiguities it produces is en-
capsulated in this confusion over names; to minimize this confusion, I use 
first names to refer to the characters — as the book does — and last names to 
refer to the writers and public figures.) After only a single meeting, which 
Dick describes as “genial but not particularly intimate or remarkable,” Chris 
makes Dick into an idol, an object of worship, a figure to whom she confesses 
both her intellectual rapacity and her feminist shame at being Sylvère’s fre-
quent “plus- one,” his perceived “hanger- on.”5 In over two hundred letters 
written to Dick, she rewrites him, transforming him from a real, unique per-
son into a faceless, patriarchal screen (as in “every Tom, Dick, and Harry”) 
onto which she projects her sexual fantasies, personal anxieties, and critical 
interventions. 
Where the first half of this book examines the redistributive potential of 
the parasite, this chapter initiates the second half ’s exploration of parasitism 
as an emblematic site of feminist politics. The chapter reads I Love Dick and 
its critical reception to theorize a particular type of parasitism as a manic 
mode of feminist performativity. It pursues a comparative analysis of the 
compromised utility of a parasitical feminism by reading the novel alongside 
the French conceptual artist Sophie Calle’s epistolary art project Take Care 
of Yourself (2007). Both works mobilize the genre of epistolary exchange, and 
both model practices of feverish accumulation, producing hundreds of love 
letters that feed on and ultimately destabilize the male lovers — the ostensible 
hosts of these works — who have jilted them, making these men unwitting 
symbols of heteropatriarchy. Calle and Kraus are not the first writers or art-
ists to marshal epistolary and diaristic practices, often seen as feminized lit-
erary forms (at least in the European tradition), to challenge the role played 
by heterosexual love and romance in the abjection of women.6 Their works 
draw on conventions within feminist art practice established by works such 
as Carolee Schneemann’s Interior Scroll (1975), Adrian Piper’s Calling Cards 
(1986), and Tracey Emin’s Love Poem (1996), which use an autobiographi-
cal epistolary address to raise questions of sexual and racial abjection.7 In 
Calle’s and Kraus’s projects, correspondence represents a kind of ludic back 
and forth in which gendered opponents feed on each other in a dynamically 
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unstable game (though this play remains unidirectional in these works, as 
the overtures are unreciprocated). These correspondences recall a question 
posed by Judith Butler: “Can the exchange of speech or writing be the occa-
sion for a disruption of the social ontology of positionality?”8 In these works, 
women’s desire (both real and performed) to “literalize,” to put into let-
ters their social revenge takes on a decidedly literary character; reading and 
writing become conditions of possibility for turning the “law of the father” 
against itself, letter by letter. 
What is particularly ingenious about I Love Dick is that it is underwrit-
ten by the very poststructural stakes by which Hebdige, as a Birmingham 
school cultural critic, made his name: an openness to experimentation and 
radical transgression that is articulated through his work on symbolic re-
sistance and punk subcultural style.9 In a dynamic that echoes that between 
Byrne and Hendricks, Kraus calls Dick’s intellectual bluff, showing that this 
self- proclaimed “subcultural transgressor” and theorist of power is himself 
unable or unwilling to play along when he is the one being transgressed. In 
his refusals to respond to Kraus’s letters and his rumored attempts to block 
the book’s publication, it seems that Dick would prefer to see his position as 
outside of the structures of power that his scholarship theorizes. Elizabeth 
Gumport writes of Hebdige’s response to the release of I Love Dick: 
Shortly after I Love Dick was released, New York magazine reported that 
Hebdige had attempted to block publication of the book on grounds that 
it invaded his privacy. “I don’t like reading bad reviews,” he said, “and this 
book reads like a bad review of my presence in the world . . . If someone’s 
writing gets read because it exploits a recognizable figure, then it really 
is a despicable exercise.” Kraus defended her project on the grounds it 
“explod[ed] the ‘right of privacy’ that serves patriarchy so well.” Hebdige 
scoffed: “A feminist issue? Tell her to take it up with Princess Diana.”10
Hebdige thus responds to Kraus’s transgression by dismissing the value of 
her contribution in terms strikingly similar to those Hendricks uses to dis-
miss Byrne. He refuses to countenance Kraus’s work as a critical interven-
tion on its own merits, characterizing it as an unoriginal “review” of him. As 
Kraus counters, Hebdige invokes privacy as an alibi against women’s right to 
a public discourse about misogyny’s specific interpersonal guises and mani-
festations. Hebdige’s attempt to legally block the book’s publication for in-
vasion of privacy operates similarly to Amazon’s nondisclosure agreement 
with Ubermorgen, as both are attempts by hosts to use their power to pre-
vent their exposure. 
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Dick was a ready-made allegory for British cultural studies’ early exclusion 
of women. Hebdige was criticized by feminist Birmingham school scholars 
like Angela McRobbie for framing subcultural style as a predominantly male 
phenomenon, ignoring its gender ambiguities and the extent to which it is 
informed by “patriarchal meanings.”11 Kraus’s parasitism of Hebdige can in 
turn be read as allegorizing what Stuart Hall called the “ruptural” interven-
tion of feminism on male- dominated British cultural studies in the early 
1970s.12 Hall recalls the intrusion of feminism into Birmingham’s Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies having witnessed male cultural studies pio-
neers struggle to account for the blind spots of their own internalized sexism. 
Pioneering feminist cultural studies scholars have also published impor-
tant reflections on this moment, but Hall’s recollection is worth quoting at 
length:13
As the thief in the night, [feminism] broke in; interrupted, made an un-
seemly noise, seized the time, crapped on the table of cultural studies. . . . 
Because of the growing importance of feminist work and the early be-
ginnings of the feminist movement outside in the very early 1970s, many 
of us in the Centre — mainly, of course, men — thought it was time there 
was good feminist work in cultural studies. And we indeed tried to buy 
it in, to import it, to attract good feminist scholars. As you might expect, 
many of the women in cultural studies weren’t terribly interested in this 
benign project. We were opening the door to feminist studies, being good, 
transformed men. And yet, when it broke in through the window, every 
single unsuspected resistance rose to the surface — fully installed patri-
archal power, which believed it had disavowed itself. There are no leaders 
here, we used to say; we are all graduate students and members of staff 
together, learning how to practice cultural studies. You can decide what-
ever you want to decide, etc. And yet, when it came to the question of the 
reading list . . . Now that’s where I really discovered about the gendered 
nature of power. Long, long after I was able to pronounce the words, I en-
countered the reality of Foucault’s profound insight into the individual 
reciprocity of knowledge and power. Talking about giving up power is a 
radically different experience from being silenced.14 
Hall captures firsthand the men’s rush to immunize themselves against claims 
of sexism. The men’s “good- natured” self- justifications in response to chal-
lenges to their positions demonstrate how power is disavowed not on a sys-
temic or institutional level but on a personal level and, further, how propri-
ety is employed as a shield for this disavowal. 
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The symbolic place Hebdige is made to occupy is as if fated by the mis-
fortune of the punning endowment afforded by his first name. But while 
Hebdige’s real- world persona is essential to the success of Kraus’s conceptual 
gesture, I Love Dick is ultimately not about Dick Hebdige, any more than it 
is about any other specific man of his social standing; rather it is about the 
patriarchal symbolic capital he both represents and benefits from. Kraus’s 
decision to violate the condition of privacy presumed by interpersonal in-
timacy or familiarity in order to make a feminist statement about the rou-
tine sexual humiliation of young women prefigures similar post- digital- era 
accounts such as those associated with the Me Too movement and call-out 
culture, which have brought into the mainstream this kind of public expo-
sure and real- name truth- telling about power dynamics under patriarchy 
and white supremacy. Many have debated the ethics of these tactics of public 
exposure, while others have pointed out how normative ethical approaches 
to this question continually position the targeted individual’s comfort and 
privacy as the paramount considerations. 
In the case of the Me Too movement, such acts of public exposure buck 
intense pressure to continue doing what women have been doing forever: 
internalizing and dissociating their shame by not talking about a sexual 
culture that is, as the blogger Katie Anthony has put it, “fucking awful and 
ordinary.”15 Rather than silently accepting her abjection, Kraus hyperbolizes 
and publicizes it. By manically embracing and performing her social role as 
a “romantically dependent” woman, the protagonist of I Love Dick reappro-
priates as a tactical model the figure of the parasitical woman, long reviled 
in nineteenth- and twentieth- century radical Western feminist history and 
criticism. In this way Kraus follows Simone de Beauvoir’s call in The Second 
Sex to take up, to intensify the role of the parasite to which woman has been 
consigned. For Beauvoir, woman (who is, for her, French, white, bourgeois, 
and heterosexual) is locked into a degraded role by a patriarchal order that 
makes her dependent upon it and then punishes her for it. She can either 
fight this structural role and lose, or she can accept it and play it to her ad-
vantage: “those are the rules of the game.” In Beauvoir’s framing, woman’s 
parasitical social position constitutes a kind of loophole; woman’s lack of 
self- determination can allow her to evade culpability. “There is, however, an 
advantage that woman can gain from her very inferiority,” she writes. “Since 
she is from the start less favored by fortune than man, she does not feel 
that she is to blame a priori for what befalls him; it is not her duty to make 
amends for social injustice, and she is not asked to do so.”16 These works ex-
plore how women’s secondary status might allow them to sidestep their sup-
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posed ethical and moral responsibility to a patriarchal system on which they 
depend but in which they hold no stake of ownership (akin to the woman 
who may run the house but whose name does not appear on the deed) — an 
alibi that feminists might turn to tactical or reparative ends.
Exemplifying the deep historical interlocking of femininity and com-
plicity, the female parasite consolidates feminist anxieties about the roman-
tically and financially dependent woman whose identity performance as 
heterosexual and/or bourgeois makes her complicit with patriarchal struc-
tures and relations (such as marriage and domestic life). Rather than flee-
ing charges of overattachment, Kraus embraces the compulsiveness and 
overintimacy with which the so- called dependent woman has already been 
charged. (In this way I Love Dick can be read as part of a longer history of 
feminist guerrilla tactics that might include the Irish suffragette Mary Ma-
loney, the original femme troll, who followed Winston Churchill around for 
a week ringing a dinner bell whenever he tried to speak publicly.)17 Kraus’s 
performance of her real identity traffics a parasitical representational poli-
tics that is at once subversive and reactionary. As Amber Jamilla Musser has 
argued of female masochism, femininity functions here as a screen for the 
problem of complicity as “a product of [woman’s] relative powerlessness in 
a patriarchally ordered world.”18 This chapter likewise attempts to theorize 
complicity as a tool for fashioning modes of feminist agency in patriarchal 
spaces where women cannot set the terms of engagement.
DEAR DICK
I first began writing about I Love Dick in 2004, when it was an unlikely ob-
ject of academic inquiry. When Kraus’s book was first published, it horrified 
many readers, including many feminists who read it as a confessional mem-
oir and found troubling its gleeful self- abasement and reckless exhibition-
ism.19 In two articles, published in 2011 and 2012, I argued that this reading 
of the novel as a straightforward autobiography failed to register the feminist 
value of its ambivalent address, which I contended should instead be read 
as a performance.20 Around that time the book appeared at last to find its 
core readership in millennial feminists (generally middle class and urban- 
dwelling). In the intervening years there have been public acknowledgments 
of its influence by the writers Sheila Heti, Heidi Julavits, and Ariana Reines 
and celebrities like Lena Dunham, and discussions of it have circulated vi-
rally via feminist fanzines, Instagram, and Tumblr. The book has become a 
rallying cry for young feminists, who seem to read it as empowering — not 
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as a story of reveling in abjection but as a story of refusing to play the silent 
counterpart in a coercive script.21 Loosely adapted as an Amazon original 
series in 2016, the book has now been absorbed into the cultural zeitgeist (if 
for only a niche population).22 In the wake of its television debut, the novel I 
Love Dick was widely revisited and positively reviewed in venues such as the 
New Yorker and the London Review of Books. 
This dramatic shift in critics’ appraisal of the book since it was reissued 
in 2006 is largely thanks to a new willingness to acknowledge it as having 
innovated a hybrid genre combining memoir with fiction. The performance 
studies scholar Barbara Browning sums it up well: “I Love Dick is only inter-
esting . . . if one recognizes it as a work of fiction. That is, if you read it simply 
as a compulsive, stalkerish, neurotic confessional narrative, it’s ‘interesting’ in 
a kind of vulgar way, but it really gets theoretically interesting when Kraus is 
pushing you to contemplate the performance of academic rock stardom, and 
the fictional construction of erotic and intellectual cathexis.”23 Within this 
double frame I Love Dick becomes recognizable not as mere autobiography 
but as a performance of autobiography. The scandal of the novel remains its 
insistence on itself as real. “But Dick, I know that as you read this, you’ll know 
these things are true,” Chris writes in one letter. “You understand the game 
is real, or even better than, reality, and better than is what it’s all about. . . . 
Better than means stepping out into complete intensity.”24 The performative 
excess of her insistence places the narrative’s content in tension with its form 
(i.e., its generic packaging as fiction). Kraus rides the line between fiction and 
nonfiction, unflinchingly (some say heedlessly) using real names and real 
historical circumstances. 
While Hawkins calls this genre “theoretical fiction” and others call it 
“autofiction,” I argue it is best read as performance art, a medium defined 
by its capacity to hold as one the ambiguous imbrication of life and art, real 
and performed bodies. Indeed Kraus writes admiringly about performance 
art in I Love Dick, calling the performance artist Hannah Wilke “a model 
for everything I hope to do.”25 Applying critical reading methods in per-
formance studies to Kraus’s text, Browning elsewhere observes this about 
Kraus’s mode of address: “If one of the goals of performance art is to make 
audiences aware of their own complicity in the event, this confessional mode 
of performative fiction, often incorporating direct address, similarly puts a 
demand on a reader to contemplate his or her own performative force in the 
encounter on the page. But another part of the implicit contract with the 
reader/listener is his or her acceptance of the possible unreliability of the narra-
tor.”26 Browning follows the performance theorist Richard Schechner in her 
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insistence that the character Chris Kraus is not Chris Kraus and yet not not 
Chris Kraus.27 I Love Dick’s claim to be real (which cannot be ignored even 
if it cannot be taken as fact) is explicitly lodged as doing feminist work be-
cause it aspires to say something about actual bodies, events, consequences: 
“Why does everybody think that women are debasing themselves when we 
expose the conditions of our own debasement?” Chris writes in another let-
ter. “Why do women always have to come off clean?”28 
Ultimately the conceptual payoff of the project depends on Kraus’s reader 
allowing for both frames of her narrative, reading it as both real and fic-
tional. The constitutive undecidability of performance lends the author- 
character amalgam Kraus- Chris a double cover against the pitfalls to which 
feminists are particularly vulnerable, including narrative overdetermination 
and theoretical delegitimation. The narrative technique by which Chris in-
sists on the material trace of her body pushes against the generic limits of 
the novel form, enacting in writing what Rebecca Schneider has called the 
“explosive literality” of the work of feminist body artists like Wilke, Karen 
Finley, and Annie Sprinkle.29 Browning suggests that Kraus’s “confessional 
mode of performative fiction” was likely informed by her close proximity 
to and occasional participation in precisely this burgeoning scene of 1980s 
downtown performance art.30 
Kraus and her character Chris use the genre of correspondence rather 
than her body as the medium for her performance. In I Love Dick, Chris 
turns to the letter form to avenge her sense of personal and sexual abjec-
tion. With the force of Chris’s pen, the proper name Dick becomes dick, the 
phallus; he is thrust into the Symbolic. Now an abstraction, he is made to 
stand for the very idea of men, occupying the structural position of Man in 
Chris’s litany of disappointments in the spheres of love, sex, and art. Chris 
graphically recounts her humiliations, from Dick’s refusal to get romanti-
cally involved with her to the “insults, slights, and condescension” that she 
endured as the self- described “failed filmmaker” wife of a successful, ten-
ured academic and public figure. He gets top billing; she is his perpetual 
“plus one.” Sylvère (like Lotringer, a longtime Columbia University French 
professor) is an avant- garde philosopher. Known for his kinky sexual and 
critical appetite, he plays dominant- submissive to her submissive- dominant, 
academic host to her abject professional parasitical supplementarity. She has 
a place in the worlds of art and academia only insofar as he provides it. “Syl-
vère’s fans were mostly young white men drawn to the more ‘transgressive’ 
elements of modernism, the heroic sciences of human sacrifice and torture 
as legitimized by Georges Bataille,” writes Chris. She notes that they were of-
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ten rude to her, and she responded by “milking money from Sylvère’s grow-
ing reputation, setting ever- higher fees [for his professional appearances on 
his behalf].” Chris’s claimed outsiderness is complicated by her status as a 
very well connected (if still parasitical) “hanger- on.” A self- described finan-
cial and emotional drain on her husband’s resources, she is emotive excess, 
spilling over the boundaries of institutional permissiveness granted to Syl-
vère with his subversive Ivy League deconstructive critical cachet. This emo-
tional excess seems deliberately performed, as when Chris writes to Dick, 
“And I wonder if there’ll ever be a possibility of reconciling youth and age, 
or the anorexic open wound I used to be with the money- hustling hag I’ve 
become.” She swears her love for Dick, concluding her daily letters to him 
with affirmations of his sexual power, critical majesty, and patriarchal om-
nipotence. Her shrill performance of sincerity hits some hilariously deadpan 
notes. She signs off in one entry, “I keep you in my heart, it keeps me going,” 
and in another, “Knowing you’s like knowing Jesus. There are billions of 
us and only one of you so I don’t expect much from you personally. . . . I’m 
touched by you and fulfilled just by believing.”31
Chris’s “love letters” to Dick constitute an act of public exhibitionism. In 
this sense the project recalls Derrida’s reflections on the postcard as an open 
letter, a mode of intimate exchange that remains unsealed and can thus be 
read at any moment.32 The letters taunt Dick, mocking him for being forced 
to watch from the sidelines (“You, poor Dick, do not deserve to be exposed to 
such a masturbatory passion”) while inviting him to participate in his own 
spectacularization by writing the introduction for the letters’ publication. “It 
[the introduction] could read something like this,” Sylvère (who has agreed 
to play the role of co- conspirator) suggests in one letter. “I believe these let-
ters will interest the reader as a cultural document. Obviously they manifest 
the alienation of the postmodern intellectual in its most diseased form. I 
really feel sorry for such a parasitic growth, that feeds upon itself.” The let-
ters, both personal and impersonal, are received as irritants, like spam or 
junk mail. In their address to Dick, they insist on being read because they 
are personal rather than anonymous, even as they make him anonymous, 
make him stand in for any man. The letters make him into the parasitical 
appendage — make him, ultimately, an appendix to her book. I Love Dick 
concludes with the letter that Dick eventually sends to Sylvère, in which 
he misspells Chris’s first name: “I found the situation initially perplexing, 
then disturbing, and my major regret now is that I didn’t find the courage 
at the time to communicate to you and Kris [sic] how uncomfortable I felt 
being the unwitting object of what you described to me over the phone be-
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fore Christmas as some kind of bizarre game.”33 Dick’s missive, directed to 
Sylvère and intended to remain between the two men, recalls Gayle Rubin’s 
account of the transacting of women in homosocial kinship networks.34 By 
excluding her from this conversation about her work, Dick attempts to write 
Chris out of her own story. 
In the larger economy of the book’s publication and publicity, Kraus’s 
correspondence continues to stalk Dick, assigning him in the public record 
of her “open book” the role of reluctant art object. Dick is given no choice 
but to hold the position Kraus has given him. Her subterfuge turns Dick’s 
own logic (the logic of the dick, of patriarchy) against him. She insists on the 
excess produced by the system’s supposedly supplementary parts — namely, 
feminine affect — that cannot be taken into the court record; she uses the 
“nonserious” mediums of love letters and diary entries because they are un-
likely weapons, inadmissible evidence. Kraus’s work perverts the normative 
meaning of the letter, which is typically a private exchange between two en-
tities, for the letters in I Love Dick are one- way projections, serialized and 
bound. They render Dick impotent, not only through the manic intensity of 
their proliferation but also, finally, through their legitimacy once circulated 
as a published book.
Despite the lengths to which Chris goes to perform the wretchedness of 
her own unflattering female self- portrait, the joke always appears to be on 
Dick, and as the letters mount, the project’s conceptual chorus sings louder 
and louder: “Dick, you’re so vain. I bet you think this book is about you.” 
On his own, though, Dick is mostly a token of exchange, first between Chris 
and Sylvère and then between Kraus and her reader, for the book guaran-
tees that the letters written “to his address” are intercepted by the reader. As 
“Dear Dick” replaces “Dear Diary,” the form of the letter becomes a means 
of transforming Dick from subject to object, writer to text, critic to critique. 
FEMINIST VIRALITY
Love can be the becoming which appropriates the other for itself by consuming 
it, introjecting it into itself, to the point where the other disappears. — LUCE IRI-
GARAY, ELEMENTAL PASSIONS
Throughout the pages of I Love Dick, Kraus acknowledges her debt to Sophie 
Calle, the French artist widely credited with having set the gold standard in 
the genre of “breakup art” with works such as No Sex Last Night (1996) and 
Exquisite Pain (2004).35 Many of Calle’s works begin from flirtatious collabo-
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rations with various boyish artists, intellectual studs, and theoretical father 
figures: Suite vénitienne (1980) with Jean Baudrillard; Appointment with Sig-
mund Freud (1998), a project about the archetypal father figure; Psychologi-
cal Assessment (2003), a collaboration with Damien Hirst, which originated 
in Calle’s request that Hirst send her a love letter; and her creative entangle-
ment with the U.S. writer Paul Auster, out of which grew a whole series of 
performance- based projects, including Gotham Handbook (1994), The Chro-
matic Diet (1997), and Days under the Sign of B, C, & W (1998). Calle thus 
made her career on explorations of the conceptual politics of romantic art 
practices and on one- way investigatory performances. 
In 2007 Calle upped the ante on these methods with her much- praised 
Venice Biennale exhibition and subsequent book project, Take Care of Your-
self (Prenez soin de vous). Both exhibition and book showcase the abun-
dance of the return on Calle’s missive to 107 women professionals: she re-
quested that these women read and analyze, according to their particular 
occupational skill sets, a breakup email that she claims to have received. 
Calle writes, “I received an email telling me it was over. I didn’t know how 
to respond. It was almost as if it hadn’t been meant for me. It ended with 
the words, ‘Take care of yourself.’ And so I did.”36 And so they did — over a 
hundred women, chosen for their professional skills and distinctions. The 
lexicometrist produces an extended literary and linguistic analysis of the 
email, noting the overwhelming dissymmetry in sentence structures with I 
to you pronouns (a ratio of 4 to 1). The proofreader rips the email apart, cit-
ing “clumsy sentence openings” and “long, ill- constructed sentences.” The 
cartoonist literally makes him into a caricature of himself. The press agent 
turns him into “yesterday’s news.”
Take care of yourself. In jilting her, her ex- lover leaves her with a polite 
imperative to do as he asks one final time. Yet in appropriating his parting 
words, it is Calle herself who has the last word. Take Care of Yourself high-
lights the arrogance of that parting line, announces itself as a critique of the 
Western patriarchal tradition that paradoxically offers the door to freedom as 
a trap. How can one exercise one’s freedom if to do so means obeying an im-
perative? Calle, like Kraus, attempts to negotiate what appears to be the coer-
cive hospitality of a patriarchal injunction to be independent. In both Dick’s 
and the letter- writing ex’s desires to rid themselves of Chris’s and Calle’s 
attachments, the men disavow that they are the ones who set the terms. 
Grand in size and ambition, Take Care of Yourself is a massive effort that 
matches the frantic multiplication of I Love Dick. Barbara Cassin notes Calle’s 
use of seriality as a formal technique: “To create a series oneself via oth-
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ers, the others making up a series themselves to the extent that they have 
an identity trait — you’ll all be women reacting to his way of leaving me . . . 
you’re all laid out in this notebook. . . . In the case of me barbara, it’s in the 
role of a philologist to fill in the sophie series. You want to be used up this 
way, you want that? Yes I want.”37
The viewer’s encounter with Calle’s ex is signified by the very sign of 
multiplication: in the place of its absent referent (the ex) is the signature 
X.38 Calle outsources to these women a task of interpretative labor that they 
mass- produce, alchemizing the host text (the original breakup email) into 
an intermedial army of feminist re- representations (figure 3.1): photographic 
portraits of Calle’s sister- readers, each holding the email, their accompany-
ing textual analyses personalized in a diverse lexicon of styles (handwritten, 
digitized, animated), as well as filmed performances of some of them sing-
ing or citing the text. Calle welds together a network of diverse media — film, 
performance, painting, sculpture, text, and photography — into a sophisti-
cated conceptual weapon that she turns on X’s crude and informal original 
text. The massive art book that archives the exhibition, exceptional for its 
sheer size (424 pages), is the product of skilled and networked creative mass 
production. 
FIGURE 3.1 Installation view, “Sophie Calle.” Whitechapel Art Gallery, London, 
2009 – 10. Source: Sophie Calle and Paula Cooper Gallery.
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Calle thus masterminds in Take Care of Yourself a viral and networked 
feminist aesthetic, which is uncannily mirrored in the way that I Love Dick 
emerged as a viral meme on the social media platforms Instagram and Tum-
blr. The Tumblr account “Selfies with I Love Dick by Chris Kraus,” main-
tained by the writer and blogger Emily Gould, features hundreds of selfies 
of young feminists holding up the book, including a photoshopped image of 
Lisa Simpson with her head in the book (figures 3.2 and 3.3). Feminist social 
media’s embrace of I Love Dick cannot be overstated; the logics of the inter-
net are central to its legibility as a feminist act. Today it’s a cliché to observe 
that the digital has exploded the public- private distinction, bringing infor-
mation that was formerly confined to the private sphere into the public fo-
rum. Digital- savvy, twenty- something feminists have sought to appropriate 
social media to feminist ends (with debatable results), anticipating practices 
now associated with the Me Too movement and call-out culture. Some have 
posted dating interactions they’ve had with real men on Tumblr accounts; 
others, like Marie Calloway, have (like Kraus) published intimate descrip-
tions of private interactions with noted public figures; and many feminists 
of color have leveraged the public nature of social media to denounce indi-
viduals whose actions would otherwise go unchecked.39
While the male figures Dick and X are ostensibly at the core of these proj-
ects, they begin to look insignificant as they become buried under Kraus’s 
proliferating sentiments and Calle’s multiplicity of interpersonal media-
tions. Calle writes, “I asked 107 women . . . to analyze it, comment on it, 
dance it, sing it. Dissect it. Exhaust it. . . . Answer it for me.”40 And just as 
Calle’s triangulated dissections undo X, Kraus’s words ultimately pick Dick 
apart. Both men become details that recede into the background of the vast 
expanses of the projects’ more striking conceptual and aesthetic fields; with 
so much else to take in, they are soon forgotten.41 These works of viral prolif-
eration have the effect of burying the men alive. As Joan Hawkins observes 
of Chris’s early collaboration with Sylvère in the book, “At first they just 
share the letters with each other, but as the pile grows to 50 then 80 then 180 
pages, they begin discussing some kind of Sophie Calle – like art piece, in 
which they would present the manuscript to Dick. . . . ‘Dear Dick,’ she writes 
at one point, ‘I guess in a sense I’ve killed you. You’ve become Dear Diary.’ ”42 
Similarly Calle admits in an interview, “After one month I felt better. . . . The 
project had replaced the man.”43 Dick and X are thus perfect hosts, supplying 
the very structures that threaten them, feeding the artists’ discursive attacks 
against them, growing these women’s projects until the hosts are emptied of 
substance and the artists are lauded as never more original. Kraus and Calle 
FIGURES 3.2 AND 3.3 “Selfies with I Love Dick by Chris Kraus” 
Tumblr account. Source: ildselfies.tumblr.com.
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exploit the strategic supplementarity of the parasite in relation to her host to 
operate a feminist remapping of the structural dynamics of gendered terri-
toriality: the parasite comes to overwhelm the terrain of its host.
Of all of Calle’s work, I Love Dick most closely resembles not Take Care 
of Yourself but The Address Book (1983), an early work that experimented 
with invading the privacy of a real man — a project with which Kraus and 
Lotringer would have been familiar. Having found an address book on the 
street, Calle photocopies its contents before anonymously returning it to 
its owner, whom she dubs “Pierre D.”44 Calle then interviews all of the peo-
ple whose addresses appeared in the book, constructing an exhaustively re-
searched, speculative portrait of its owner.45 Yve- Alain Bois writes, “Each 
morning the newspaper published an interview along with a related photo-
graph, not necessarily taken by Calle (that of an artwork Pierre D. was said 
to like, for example). The fact that the piece kept building for a whole month, 
day after day, added to the mystery. . . . Three weeks after the final entry ap-
peared, Libération published, in the same half- page format, the furious re-
sponse of Pierre D. (who signed his real name, Pierre Baudry).”46 
Baudry, a documentary filmmaker, had been in Norway the whole time, 
and it was only upon his return that he discovered the exposure of “so many 
facts of his life and traits of his character — including his repugnance toward 
any form of publicity.”47 In discussing the work, Calle notes how the deni-
ability afforded by her status as an artist served as an effective cover until it 
was revealed that her target was a real person:
There was a huge discussion because the journalists wanted to know why, 
as an artist, I was allowed to do something in the newspaper that they 
were not allowed to do: intrude into someone’s life. Many people liked it 
because they thought it was a fiction, but when the guy answered and gave 
his name, proving that he really existed, it became evident that it was not 
a fiction, and the same people started to really dislike it because of the 
outrage. Then others, who didn’t like it initially because they thought it 
wasn’t risky enough, started to like it. It was a complete mess!48
According to Calle, Baudry retaliated by publishing a headless nude photo-
graph of her, but this attempt at what would today be called revenge porn 
was defanged by the fact that she had already published The Striptease, a 
project that featured a topless photograph of her working as a stripper in 
Pigalle.49 Calle said later, “He is still resentful. He has let me know.”50 But 
despite the one- sidedness of her feelings, Calle professed in later interviews 
to have fallen in love with Pierre D: “I lost control. . . . I completely fell in 
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love with that man, I changed my life for him. . . . I went to live in his neigh-
borhood, only saw his friends, went to eat in the places he liked to go. . . . 
When he came back he hated me and I really felt rejected, but at the same 
time it’s better than real love, because all this was completely fake.”51 Calle’s 
and Kraus’s projects’ claim to being about love is reflected in this process of 
narcissistic deterritorialization, which Roland Barthes equates with love: “It 
is my desire I desire, and the loved being is no more than its tool. I rejoice 
at the thought of such a great cause, which leaves far behind it the person 
whom I have made into its pretext.”52
The Address Book is an uncanny precursor to I Love Dick, both in life and 
art. It was reported that Baudry threatened to sue for invasion of privacy 
(Calle said in 2011 that she had nearly been sued twice), much as Hebdige 
is said to have tried to block the publication of I Love Dick and reportedly 
threatened to sue Kraus on similar grounds.53 Some argue that this attempt 
to keep private life out of the public eye is a patriarchal gesture, one aimed 
at protecting men by delegitimizing women’s experiences and concerns (cer-
tainly, privacy is deployed to serve whiteness in much the same way). Eliza-
beth Gumport writes of I Love Dick:
What the pretense of privacy often does is protect us from reality. It is called 
on to conceal the fact that there are two realities: the world as it is lived in 
by men, and the world of women, which has historically been exiled from 
political and philosophical consideration. It has been regarded as be-
neath such consideration, its truths narrowly and inescapably personal — 
rather than universal — and therefore inevitably trivial. Hence Hebdige’s 
invocation of Princess Diana. . . . Placing domestic and intimate relation-
ships outside the boundaries of legitimate public interest in this way con-
demns them permanently to the status of intractable nature, or “frivolous 
gossip,” discouraging intervention and thereby preserving invisible prac-
tices of domination.54 
Just as Hendricks questioned and dismissed Byrne’s work, relegating it 
to a student project or a bad imitation, Hebdige refused to acknowledge the 
critical and artistic legitimacy of Kraus’s work. He implied that the book’s 
only interest lay in its trafficking of his celebrity, in its attempt to cash in on 
a personal relationship, rather than as a legitimate exploration of the dynam-
ics of that relationship (and the relationship between men and women, be-
tween patriarchy and feminism). Like Hendricks, Hebdige refuses to regard 
Kraus as an artist. Instead he insists on treating her as a mere documentar-
ian, classifying her work not as fiction or literature but as autobiography. 
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This is a misogynist framing that disavows the intellectual labor that its 
creation required. “People acted when I wrote the book,” Kraus has said, “as 
if it had just appeared on my pillow because I slept with Dick — like I didn’t 
have to do anything at all.”55 
In all of these projects, the male hosts minimize the roles of the parasiti-
cal female creators that target them: Hendricks dismisses Byrne’s work as 
imitation, as a student project that she must justify to him; Baudry attempts 
to punish Calle by transforming her into a disembodied sexual image; and 
Hebdige classifies Kraus’s task as simply recording information rather than 
creating art. Hebdige’s rejection of her piece as art, a study worthy of critical 
examination, is an attempt to eject the parasite, to expunge it from its host’s 
body. Shortly after its publication in 1997, Hebdige made his only known 
public comments about the book in an interview with New York magazine: 
he said that the book was “beneath contempt,” a sentiment the interviewer 
would characterize as “a surprisingly earnest complaint coming from a se-
miotician of popular culture.”56 Dick’s attempts to exclude her from the ar-
tistic conversation is equally clear at the end of the book in his response 
to the project, which he addresses to Sylvère, merely sending Chris (whose 
name he misspells) a photocopy of the letter. 
While the hosts attempt to minimize or exclude their female parasites, 
the artists make their male hosts into oversized projections. We find in De-
leuze and Guattari’s reading of Kafka’s letters to his “father figure” the basis 
for such a parasitical tactic of feminist viral or manic proliferation in re-
sponse to the overwhelming presence of the male figure. In Kafka: Toward 
a Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari describe “the interest of the letter” 
as lying in “a particular sliding effect” by which Kafka moves from a classic 
Oedipal conflict, “where the beloved father is hated, accused, and declared 
to be guilty, to a much more perverse Oedipus.” “The letters are a rhizome, 
a network, a spider’s web,” they write. “There is a vampirism in the letters, 
a vampirism that is specifically epistolary.”57 Like Calle’s multiple crowd-
sourced replies to X and Kraus’s unfettered stream of letters to Dick, which 
hyperbolize and reduce them from complex individuals to mere symbols, to 
occupiers of particular structural positions, Kafka’s letters dramatize and 
allegorize the father to the point of rendering him unrecognizable as an 
individual entity.58 Deleuze and Guattari describe Kafka’s reproach to his 
father as “a reproach that is so strong that it becomes unattributable to any 
particular persons and unlimited . . . and passes through a series of para-
noid interpretations.” They propose that Kafka’s hyperbolic inflation of the 
overpowering image of the father figure paradoxically creates a “way out”:
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The goal is to obtain a blowup of the “photo,” an exaggeration of it to the 
point of absurdity. The photo of the father, expanded beyond all bounds, 
will be projected onto the geographic, historical, and political map of the 
world in order to reach vast regions of it . . . an Oedipalization of the uni-
verse. . . . Beyond that, to the degree that one enlarges Oedipus, this sort 
of microscopic enlargement shows up the father for what he is; it gives 
him a molecular agitation in which an entirely different sort of combat is 
being played out. One might say that in projecting the photo of the father 
onto the map of the world, Kafka unblocks the impasse that is specific to 
the photo and invents a way out of this impasse.59
By re- presenting the father of the classic Oedipal narrative in these out-
sized terms, Kafka produces the father as an outsized caricature of patriar-
chy, whose exaggerated pores are distended into pixelated openings primed 
for infestation. In I Love Dick, this infestation gains entry by means of love 
letters that operate like spam — fired off in rapid succession, hitting ran-
dom targets. As Deleuze and Guattari note, the epistolary genre itself has a 
vampiristic — or, in my terms, parasitical — quality. By obsessing over Dick 
and X, by making them the unwilling muses and patrons of their artworks, 
Kraus and Calle shield themselves behind Kafkaesque blown- up images of 
their hosts, which serve as cover, allowing the parasites to grow unnoticed 
until it is too late for their hosts. 
FEMINIZED PARASITES
Complicity is like a girl’s name. — CHRIS KRAUS, I LOVE DICK
In the history of Western art and literature, femininity is often figured as an 
alien threat to an otherwise healthy patriarch, one that gradually weakens 
him through her dependence. In the 1969 novel The Estate, Isaac Bashevis 
Singer’s narrator observes, “He had seen women ruin men. They wove a net 
about a man, entangled him with duties, ensnared him with parasitic chil-
dren, and finally destroyed him.”60 Parasitism is a misogynist trope that por-
trays femininity as smothering and overly reliant: the “clingy” mistress, the 
idle “trophy wife,” the “kept woman,” the “plus one,” the “hanger- on” who 
“makes it [her] profession to dine at another’s table.”61 (Though the parasiti-
cal feminine is typically deployed as a descriptor of bourgeois womanhood, 
it need not be biologically female.) Such pejoratives denigrate and disavow 
the labor of the feminine (femme or feminized) companion — usually labor 
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that is invisible, reproductive, affective. Typically the feminized parasite is 
figured (as it is in botany) as a form of suffocating dependency that femi-
ninity poses to masculinity.62 The gendering of the parasite is described by 
J. Hillis Miller in his influential essay “The Critic as Host,” his retort to at-
tacks casting deconstruction as a parasitical mode of criticism. Miller writes 
that the parasite “suggests the image of ‘the obvious or univocal reading’ 
as the mighty, masculine oak or ash rooted in the solid ground, endangered 
by the insidious twining around it of ivy. English or maybe poison, some-
how feminine, secondary, defective, or dependent, a clinging vine, able to 
live in no other way but by drawing the life sap of its host.”63 It is the femi-
ninity attached to this image of clinging that interests me; in his epigraph 
to this essay, Miller further highlights the feminine nature of clinging, cit-
ing the French proverb “Je meurs où je m’attache,” which translates literally 
as “I die where I cling/I am attached” — effectively “’Til death do us part.” 
A poetic symbol of feminine devotion and fidelity, this image can be traced 
back to Ovid’s Metamorphoses and the Book of Psalms, and it also appears as 
an Elizabethan homily on marriage in Shakespeare’s The Comedy of Errors: 
Thou art an elm, my husband; I a vine, 
whose weakness married to thy stronger state 
makes me with thy strength to communicate. 
If aught possess thee from me, it is dross, 
usurping ivy, brier, or idle moss, 
who, all for want of pruning, with intrusion 
infect thy sap, and live on thy confusion.64 
The feminine, then, is historically framed, even defined as that which is 
parasitical, which can survive only at the pleasure of another. But this image 
has been put not just to misogynist ends. Feminists have also long employed 
the language of female parasites to critique certain women’s investment in 
maintaining the patriarchal, bourgeois, and white supremacist status quo 
for its material benefits. Parasitism became shorthand for the problem com-
plicity with patriarchal structures poses for radical feminists, from Victo-
rian suffragettes to lesbian separatists. As early as 1792 Mary Wollstonecraft 
employed the imagery of the ivy and the tree, writing, “It might be proper, 
in order to make a man and his wife one, that she should rely entirely on 
his understanding . . . the graceful ivy, clasping the oak that supported it.”65 
(Wollstonecraft’s use of the image was not negative but used to symbolize 
the complementarity of the masculine and feminine.) But by the early twen-
tieth century, the parasite is consistently invoked as a negative dependency 
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on a patriarchal capitalism. In 1911 the suffragist Olive Schreiner compared 
women’s dependence on men to “the most deadly microbe.”66 In 1912 Rosa 
Luxemburg warned that bourgeois women, complicit consumers of what 
their husbands extort from the proletariat, are “parasites of the parasites 
of the social body.”67 In 1949 Simone de Beauvoir called women “clinging,” 
“dead weight,” “parasite[s] sucking out the living strength of another organ-
ism.”68 In 1970 Germaine Greer famously urged “feminine parasites” to stop 
“cajoling and manipulating” and instead to claim “the masculine virtues of 
magnanimity and generosity and courage,” and Gloria Steinem called them 
“dependent creatures.”69
Parasitism, as it was eventually absorbed into the U.S. and European fem-
inist mainstream, captures an early strand of radical feminist thought argu-
ing for a kind of feminist separatism. These feminists saw certain women as 
capitulating to the patriarchal norms of heterosexual domestic life, marriage, 
and child rearing in exchange for the protection and rewards of bourgeois 
privilege, a dynamic encapsulated by the figure of the housewife.70 “For the 
master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house,” Audre Lorde famously 
argued, concluding, “This fact is only threatening to those women who still 
define the master’s house as their only source of support.”71 In her landmark 
1970 manifesto, “The Dialectic of Sex,” Shulamith Firestone writes, “Un-
less revolution uproots the basic social organization, the biological family — 
the vinculum through which the psychology of power can always be smug-
gled — the tapeworm of exploitation will never be annihilated.”72 The mili-
tant lesbian feminist Valerie Solanas equated married women with men “and 
other degenerates.”73 In various radical feminist critiques, wage labor, the 
annihilation of the nuclear family, and sexual autonomy have been seen as 
liberating women from the tyranny of dependence.
These texts differ in the degree of individual agency they ascribe to wom-
en’s complicit status.74 Schreiner advanced in her 1911 Women and Labour an 
excoriation of “feminine economic parasitism,” the characteristic feminist 
belief of the period that “women were responsible for their own freedom,” 
even if they were not necessarily materially able to realize it, and that their 
continued subordination was therefore attributable to them.75 Beauvoir at 
times used rhetoric similar to Schreiner’s, but in The Second Sex she de-
scribed dependency as a structural role: “The woman has been assigned the 
role of parasite: all parasites are necessarily exploiters; she needs the male to 
acquire human dignity, to eat, to feel pleasure, to procreate; she uses the ser-
vice of sex to ensure her benefits; and since she is trapped in this function, 
she is entirely an instrument of exploitation.”76 Generally, though, parasitism 
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has been viewed in certain strands of feminist history and criticism as a con-
taminating lack of self- sufficiency, and the abiding concern with it speaks to 
how the liberal discourse of the rational, autonomous subject (woman as free 
agent) has underwritten twentieth- century feminist conceptions of power 
and agency. Such liberal feminist mandates of freedom, autonomy, and self- 
determination have been critiqued by scholars such as Gayatri Spivak, Saba 
Mahmood, and Linda Zerilli.77 
Parasitism thus encapsulates a fundamental problem for twentieth- and 
twenty- first- century feminism and feminist theory: that women — and fem-
inism — are constituted in relation to and in reaction to patriarchal struc-
tures. In her 2009 book One- Dimensional Woman, a treatise on the state of 
contemporary feminism, philosopher Nina Power observed, “Many of the 
tactics of feminism thus far — rewriting cultural histories, reclaiming the 
body, occupying ‘male’ positions — have had significant effects, but have not 
been able to touch the basis of the problem at hand.”78 When asked “What’s 
‘wrong’ with feminism today?” during a 1991 interview, Avital Ronell an-
swered, “Feminism today has a parasitical, secondary territoriality. . . . If 
you respond to present conditions, you’re subject to reactive, mimetic, and 
regressive posturings. So the problem is: how can you free yourself? How can 
you not be reactive to what already exists as powerful and dominating? How 
can you avoid a resentimental politics?”79 Here Ronell seems to mean a “reac-
tive” politics, but her choice of word also evokes the Nietzschean concept of 
ressentiment, which denotes a psychological state arising from feelings that 
cannot be acted upon and results in a symptomatic form of self- abasement. 
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche describes the moment of ressen-
timent as the one in which suffering crystallizes around a site of external 
blame, a figure upon which one can avenge, and thus displace, one’s hurt. In 
States of Injury, Wendy Brown revisits Nietzsche’s account to argue that res-
sentiment has effected a contemporary political identity that understands it-
self as mediated through notions of injury and redress rather than freedom, 
producing versions of “resistance” that are prefigured and conditioned by the 
very structures they purport to oppose. Brown contemporizes Nietzsche’s 
notion by making it speak to the liberal subject of U.S. leftist politics of that 
time. She argues that liberalism contains from its very inception a general-
ized incitement to ressentiment as “the moralizing revenge of the power-
less,” or for Nietzsche, “the triumph of the weak as weak.” “Ressentiment in 
this context is a triple achievement: it produces an affect (rage, righteous-
ness) that overwhelms the hurt, it produces a culprit responsible for its hurt, 
and produces a site of revenge to displace the hurt (a place to inflict hurt as 
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the sufferer has been hurt),” writes Brown. “Together these operations both 
ameliorate (in Nietzsche’s terms, ‘anestheticize’) and externalize what is oth-
erwise ‘unendurable.’ ”80 While both Nietzsche and Brown articulate ressen-
timent as a problem — Brown describes it as liberalism’s “wounded attach-
ment” to the trauma associated with systems of inequality — ressentiment 
finds a useful inflection in the metaphor of the parasite. Ressentiment mim-
ics parasitical logic in that it facilitates a productive if counterintuitive move 
away from closure, suture, and healing. In her outline of a feminist tactics 
of a Nietzschean ressentiment, Beauvoir observes, “The tyranny wielded by 
the woman only manifests her dependence: she knows the success of the 
couple, its future, its happiness, and its justification, resides in the hands of 
the other; if she bitterly seeks to subjugate him to her will, it is because she 
is alienated to him. She makes a weapon of her weakness; but the fact is she 
is weak.”81 In Sensational Flesh, Amber Jamilla Musser ties Beauvoir’s em-
ployment of the language of parasitism (which Musser characterizes as that 
of ressentiment) to Beauvoir’s engagement with masochism, seeing both as 
a means of reflecting on women’s internalization of their own complicity 
with “the paucity of choices” available to them (“as parasites who dwell on 
their own victimization”). Musser writes, “Masochism is born from female 
objectification under the male gaze and women’s compliance with the dic-
tates of patriarch.” In her reading of female masochism in Pauline Réage’s 
The Story of O, Musser locates potential “pockets of agency” in an aesthetics 
of complicity in precarious spaces prescripted by domination: “When O is 
framed as complicit with her objectification, complicity emerges as a mode 
of self- fashioning in which agency and aesthetics collide.”82
Advising feminists as one would a friend trapped in a bad relationship, 
Ronell and Beauvoir ask how women might free themselves (Beauvoir: find 
“living strength of their own” and “the means to attack the world and wrest 
from it their own subsistence”), how they might move forward and beyond 
their structural dependence on patriarchy. They ask how wounded and at-
tached women can recover, once and for all, and achieve a sense of wholeness 
and independence — a question that posits the space of feminism as outside 
of the patriarchal order. But to “treat” feminism’s ressentiment as a malady 
that women must heal themselves from — to posit that women should take 
care of themselves — is, following Lauren Berlant, an engagement in a neo-
liberal feminist politics of cruel optimism. “Cruel optimism is the condi-
tion of maintaining an attachment to a significantly problematic object,” 
she writes.83 
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Calle and Kraus, if with different intensities and to different ends, re-
frame ressentiment not as a reaction, a form of weakness, but as a mode of 
feminist performativity. As Dick and X are erased, the women’s engagements 
with them shift: “It’s all about you” slowly turns into “It’s all about me.” This 
shift is visually represented on the title page of the 1997 Semiotext(e) edition 
of I Love Dick, which features a large, bold I that dominates the Love Dick 
below it, in smaller print (figure 3.4). In Calle’s project, the designation X 
comes to represent the absent center, the male figures that haunt these proj-
ects, caught in significatory limbo. X represents Calle’s conceptual ex, whose 
email to the artist invites the extended reading that he unwittingly agrees to 
host. When Dick invites Kraus and her husband to dine with him, he steps 
into the role of host, naïvely inviting in the parasite. 
FIGURE 3.4  





Is it possible for Dick and X to answer these projects in an ethical fash-
ion? Would it have made a difference if X had not signed his email in this 
way, or if Dick had responded earlier? It may be that Dick didn’t respond 
because he doesn’t want to be swallowed up by the Kraus machine — the in-
stinct that helped Paul Auster avoid Calle’s trap for him, refusing when she 
asks him to script a year of her time. What would an ethical response from 
Dick or X even look like? As Ronell asks in The Telephone Book, “What does 
it mean . . . to make oneself answerable to it in a situation whose gestural 
syntax already means yes, even if the affirmation should find itself followed 
by a question mark: Yes?” And, as she writes, “No matter how you cut it, on 
either side of the line, there is no such thing as a free call.”84 If to answer the 
call is to rise to meet its demand, to accept the imposition or pay the debt, 
we might say that Dick at first lets the phone ring unanswered, then finally 
takes it off the hook. We might ask whether these projects really leave room 
for Dick or X to answer — whether any answer might have been accepted or 
acceptable. Can the host welcome the parasite knowing that it is a parasite? 
Perhaps the inadequacy of the men’s responses is inevitable; perhaps no re-
sponse is answerable enough.
How to be answerable, to be personally accountable to one’s own power is 
a difficult and resonant question, from which the feminist theorist of power 
herself is not immune. In 2018 Kraus publicly supported Ronell when she 
was accused of having used her power abusively by a former male gradu-
ate student, who filed charges of harassment against the philosopher.85 She 
framed the student’s “accusations [as] couched in the disingenuous senti-
ments of #MeToo” and characterized him as “an empowered and privileged 
actor . . . [who] feigned helplessness after the fact.”86 Kraus’s defense of Ronell 
disparaged the movement that she helped inspire and engaged in victim- 
blaming that protected alleged toxic behavior of the very kind that I Love 
Dick empowered a generation of feminists to stand against. The episode ex-
emplifies how compromised Kraus and Ronell (as well as other prominent 
figures I cite and rely on for my argument in this chapter) have become as 
they have grown ever more deeply embedded in academia and the art mar-
ket. Other feminist and queer luminaries who signed the letter of support 
for Ronell (including Judith Butler) are also radical theorists who have made 
their careers spotlighting, contesting, and analyzing structural power but 
who in the process have accrued plenty of their own.87 For many, Kraus’s 
cultural prominence now exceeds that of Hebdige; she is far from the self- 
described “failed filmmaker” she claimed to be when she wrote I Love Dick. 
This development does not nullify the critical and feminist potency of the 
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book, but it does demonstrate the historical and contextual contingency of 
radical authorship. While no one wants to admit their own implication in 
these systems, it is a reminder that no one is outside of this structural ecol-
ogy; who inhabits the positions of the parasite and host is not a given. 
FEMINIST ENDGAMES
While I Love Dick and Take Care of Yourself mirror and reinforce one other, 
their performances of parasitism also diverge in important ways. There 
would seem to be something altogether more unhinged about Kraus’s “par-
asitical growth” than Calle’s, which remains carefully calibrated to the con-
ceptual boundaries of her coolly played representational game. Whereas for 
Calle parasitism represents a mask that can be taken off and put away, for 
Kraus it is not so easy to rid yourself of your attachments. Calle’s relationship 
with X is indulged more in the realm of the symbolic, remaining an ongoing 
hypothetical in her collaborator’s interpretations, but Kraus’s relationships 
to Dick and Sylvère are more exposed, as shown by her willingness to name 
names of real men, both public figures. Kraus recounts telling Dick, “ ‘Cause 
don’t you see?’ I said, ‘It’s more a project than a game. I meant every word I 
wrote you in those letters. . . . Don’t you think it’s possible to do something 
and simultaneously study it? If the project had a name it’d be I Love Dick: 
A Case Study.’ ”88 Kraus’s relationships with Dick and Sylvère make her a 
parasite in double measure. Lotringer’s professional success feeds, clothes, 
houses, and affords Kraus’s creative work and also helps ensure the book’s 
publication by Semiotext(e), the press that he founded. 
Meanwhile, Calle’s previous work notwithstanding, one can never be sure 
that X is real. Calle plays the parasite, but one has the sense that it is just that: a 
piece of theater or a game with a finite duration.89 One can visit the exhibition 
and grab dinner after. Perhaps Calle “takes care of herself” after all by mod-
eling a parasitism that is not self- destructive. She puts far less of herself on 
the line in her project, instead enlisting others to speak on her behalf. Kraus’s 
game, on the other hand, has no foreseeable end and no visible boundaries. 
For Kraus, there is little buffer between fact and fiction; deeper drives seem 
to be at work for her. Names are not changed to protect the innocent, leav-
ing everyone who is naïve enough to let Kraus near looking somewhat guilty. 
Calle and Kraus perform parasitical feminism to different ends. Kraus’s 
performance manifests a certain resistance to resolution — a desire to have 
it continue on beyond the boundedness of the encounter, the page, the 
book — and, at the same time, a reckless disregard for survival. For Calle, the 
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performance of the parasite is worn as a mask that leaves viewers wonder-
ing “Was she or wasn’t she playing herself?” Calle’s parasitism is a carefully 
elaborated game that endures to play again, whereas Kraus’s performance 
takes on the inflection of an opening night that is mere minutes from a very 
real breakdown. Her parasitical performance would appear to signal a per-
formance whose emotions (even as they are being rehearsed) the performer 
is still really experiencing. At the halfway mark of I Love Dick, Chris and 
Sylvère decide to separate. Her husband, who was once game, is no longer 
sure if the structure of their marriage can withstand the hacking blows dealt 
it by each letter to Dick. (Kraus and Lotringer have since divorced.) In the 
midst of this, Chris claims to have shown up unannounced to Dick’s home 
and had sex with him, a claim Kraus has reiterated in interviews.90 While 
unverified, if true these actions would have transgressed (at least within the 
diegetic frame of the novel) the rules of her epistolary game. 
“You have to pay for indulgence,” Lotringer later said of the project in 
an interview, “it was a risky operation.”91 As if surgically to remove herself- 
as- appendage from her husband’s overpowering career, Kraus’s conceptual 
project hacks away at the relentlessly accommodating structure of patriarchy 
without considering what would happen to her if it collapsed. If the parasite 
is rejected by its hosts (Dick and Sylvère), who will bestow the intellectual 
nod of approval on which the project at times appears to depend — who will 
publish her manuscript, if not Semiotext(e), the press Lotringer founded in 
1974? In other words, can the parasite survive without its host? What will 
happen when the bond is severed? Kraus’s dedication to the project bespeaks 
the intensity of an artist willing to cut deeper and further than anyone ex-
pects her to go. Unlike Calle, who feeds at the surface of the skin, operat-
ing in the sphere of the conceptual, Kraus burrows ever deeper into the real 
until the accommodating structure finally gives way. Kraus writes in I Love 
Dick, “But Dick, I know that as you read this, you’ll know these things are 
true. You understand the game is real, or even better than, reality, and bet-
ter than is what it’s all about. . . . It’s not about giving a fuck, or seeing all the 
consequences looming and doing something anyway.” She closes the letter, 
“Sylvère thinks he’s that kind of anarchist. But he’s not. I love you Dick.”92 
THE BRACKETED FEMININE
In May 2011, I received my own correspondence from Chris Kraus. An ar-
ticle I had published about I Love Dick had come to her attention.93 “The 
concept you develop of parasitical feminism is provocative and fascinating,” 
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she wrote. “I respect your right to discuss the book on your own terms but 
would like to bring a factual error to your attention.” Kraus was uncomfort-
able with my claim that I Love Dick was framed by an infrastructural de-
pendence on Lotringer for its publication by Semiotext(e). She objected to 
my suggestion that she was supplemental to and parasitical on, not Lotringer 
himself, but his press, where she was a coeditor. “I Love Dick was published 
by Semiotexte in 1997,” she wrote. “I became a co- editor of Semiotexte in 
1989 when I launched the Native Agents imprint. . . . Therefore, I Love Dick 
was self- published (abjection maybe of another kind) but not dependent on 
Sylvère’s editorial decision.”94 She added in a subsequent email:
I had already published books by Ann Rower, Cookie Mueller, Kathy 
Acker, Lynne Tillman and Barbara Barg in the Native Agents series. Syl-
vère and I saw the fiction books as an American analog to French the-
ories of subjectivity (Deleuze Guattari Foucault) published in the For-
eign Agents series — which, by the 90s, had already in our minds run its 
course — by that time, these theorists were being published by univer-
sity presses in the US; Semiotexte had already done its job by introduc-
ing them. Our goal has always been to intervene intellectually at certain 
cultural moments. Semiotexte remains an amateur enterprise: our list is 
highly curated — we never do a book that we don’t feel is vitally impor-
tant. So when [I Love Dick] shaped up as a book, with the upstate NY es-
says, it seemed like a perfect fit for the series.95 
Kraus’s description of her role in the founding of the Native Agents series, 
and more generally her influence in the operations of Semiotext(e), was re-
iterated in an essay published by Elizabeth Gumport in the February 2012 
issue of n+1. Gumport notes that Kraus established the Native Agents series 
as a feminist corrective to Lotringer’s Foreign Agents series: 
Kraus — who had met Lotringer earlier that decade . . . suggested Semio-
text(e) turn to face America directly and recover the original, unpardon-
ably forgotten contribution the United States had made to intellectual life 
in the years after 1968, namely, feminism. This recovery took the form of 
the Native Agents series. . . .
When the imprint was launched in 1990, with Kraus as editor, For-
eign Agents had never published a book by someone who wasn’t a white 
man. Semiotext(e) had “missed out” on the feminist movement entirely. 
“It happened,” Lotringer told an interviewer, “and I wasn’t aware of it.” He 
hadn’t published women, Kraus explained, “because the only women he 
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knew writing theory were doing psychoanalytic theory, which he wasn’t 
so interested in.”96
Kraus insists that Semiotext(e)’s publication of I Love Dick was not a result 
of her being Sylvère’s plus one but an independent action that she took on 
her own account (“self- published”). Yet Semiotext(e) made its name by sup-
porting and sustaining a “boys only” theoretical network, and it is difficult 
to argue that the Native Agents series was not a compensatory measure for 
the publishing house’s long- standing “bracketing of the feminine,” formal-
ized in the “silent e,” in French the grammatical marker of the feminine (e 
muet).97 This is a bracketing that Kraus nevertheless persisted in trying to 
unbracket in her exchange with me, in each of her emails writing the title of 
the press as “Semiotexte” rather than “Semiotext(e).” By pointing out in its 
title what I see to be a structural secondariness of the feminine, Semiotext(e) 
is performing a kind of institutional hospitality for Kraus, who holds a po-
sition much like that of the Native Agents series itself: a kind of integrated 
outsider, a feminist parasite on the masculinist Foreign Agent series. I do not 
mean to diminish Kraus’s merits in any way; quite the contrary, the story of 
the Native Agents series further illustrates the persistently disavowed femi-
nine supplementarity that I Love Dick so unflinchingly calls out.98 But her 
initial defensiveness at being labeled a parasite off the page betrays a residual 
attachment to seeing herself as autonomous rather than dependent.
How exactly are we to understand Kraus and Lotringer’s contract? Who 
is the contractual host and who is the parasite? In other words, where is the 
power in this host- parasite relation located? In 1989 (the year Kraus became 
a coeditor at Semiotext(e) and launched the Native Agents series) Kraus 
and Lotringer cowrote the foreword to their reprint of Leopold von Sacher- 
Masoch’s Venus in Furs. “Sacher- Masoch was an early feminist,” they write 
playfully. “He supported ‘women’s studies’ and celebrated them throughout 
the ages. . . . Masoch unconditionally supported women, urging them to be 
strong the way he wanted them to be.”99 Here Lotringer and Kraus point to 
the irony of Sacher- Masoch’s contract (the s/m contract between the master 
and the slave, whom we might reframe in terms of the host and the parasite) 
as one that ultimately serves the masochist. 
In her work on male masochism, Suzanne R. Stewart further elaborates 
this critique, writing of Venus in Furs, “It is here, before the signing and the 
writing [of the masochistic contract], where the question ‘Am I a man or a 
slave?’ is posed, that Severin finds his identity. . . . It will depend on the pos-
sibility or the promise that Severin can see himself being seen, on the con-
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dition that the passive phrase ‘I am tortured by Wanda’ means ‘I can direct 
my own torture at the hand of Wanda.’ Thus, the passive or masochistic 
subject- position must be just that: a subject- position in charge of its own 
destiny.” Stewart reads in Venus in Furs’ sadomasochistic contract, which 
passively constructs male masochism, a feminist problematic. Male masoch-
ism is always framed by the contract, “the letter of the law,” which is always 
underwritten by patriarchal dominance. In effect, male masochism is a top-
ping from the bottom; even when it is submissive, patriarchy still covertly 
exercises control by scripting the terms of its submission. In the novella it 
is Severin who determines his own submissive position — a prescripted vul-
nerability that, as Stewart notes, is subject to interruption and redirection. 
Although Wanda appears to take control of Severin, she still does not domi-
nate him, for it is he who scripts their encounter.100 The story of Wanda’s 
dominance of Severin is just one narrative within the novella’s larger narra-
tive framework, where it serves as a story within a story, a scripted dialectics 
of power playing out within the larger metanarrative of gender relations in 
patriarchal society. 
In much the same way, I Love Dick represents a contract between Kraus 
and Lotringer wherein she plays (emphasis on plays) the sadist to his maso-
chist, as triangulated through Dick. But these dynamics do not appear to 
be fully transferable to their professional relationship. The limits of Chris’s 
dominance, like the limits of Wanda’s, become abruptly clear when one con-
siders the legal contract that binds the two: although both their signatures 
appear under the foreword, Lotringer alone is credited on the copyright page 
of Venus in Furs, which reads only “Foreword © Sylvère Lotringer.” (In get-
ting the first word, Sylvère has the last word.) As such, it appears that it is 
only within the bounds of that which is labeled fiction — under the cover of 
“just playing,” acting, performing — that woman is able to assume the role 
of self- determination, for the terms can be set by male editorial discretion. 
Kraus has said that the art she likes most “doesn’t try to make itself love-
able.”101 Still, Chris’s love for Dick always appears to be a performance that is 
intended primarily for Sylvère. Her anarchic parasitism, with its willful de-
structiveness (and unflinching rawness), allows Kraus to show up Lotringer’s 
investment in the kinds of transgression that are valorized by the French 
theory published by Semiotext(e). By deconstructing Dick, Kraus pushes 
poststructural premises to their furthest conclusions. Kraus positions herself 
as the Thelma and Louise of deconstruction, as willing to drive feminism 
right off a cliff. By piercing and feeding on Dick and X, both Kraus and Calle 
swell with critical significance, bloated parasites who slowly dwarf their 
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hosts. These projects reverse the idea that women’s emotionality is a point 
of weakness by remapping affective and sexual attachments as para- sites — 
sites of the para, a prefix indicating “beside or alongside, wrongfully, harm-
fully, unfavorably, among,” which, Miller notes, has come to mean “the 
boundary line, threshold, or margin, and at the same time beyond it . . . at 
once a permeable membrane connecting inside and outside [and] confusing 
them.”102 In the parasite, femininity’s claimed dependency is transfigured, 
becoming something that pierces that boundary, creating a loophole, a back-
door, a tunnel to a possible outside. There is a space in performance for femi-
nized subjects undetectably to change the game. But the opening offered by a 
parasitical feminism does not guarantee survival or even successful escape. 
Casualties are inevitable.
FOUR A SEAT AT THE TABLE
Feminist P er f or ma nc e Ar t ’s Insti t uti ona l   
Absor pt ion a nd Pa r a sit ic a l L eg a c ies
If I was trying to do something that nobody else has done, I would, like, shoot 
myself on stage. I’m not trying to break some boundary. . . . I’m aware that peo-
ple have done things before me. — ANN LIV YOUNG, INTERVIEW
The parasitical feminist practices examined in chapter 3 took the hetero-sexual couple as its site of intervention. This chapter displaces that gen-
der conflict onto a generational divide. At a January 2011 show for the Amer-
ican Realness Festival of contemporary dance and performance at New York 
City’s Delancey Lounge, the choreographer- turned- performance artist Ann 
Liv Young taunted the pioneering gay rights activist Jim Fouratt (an audi-
ence member she didn’t recognize) about his age, only to have the emcee 
Penny Arcade confront the younger performance artist for disrespecting her 
elders.1 According to a tabloid write- up of the show in the New York Daily 
News declaring “intergenerational hipster warfare,” Arcade, a fixture on 
the downtown performance art scene since the late 1960s, who has worked 
with the likes of Jack Smith and John Vaccaro, yelled, “Pull off her head!” 
Young responded by throwing things at the stage, hitting another attendee 
in the head with a large ceramic necklace.2 As Young proceeded to remove 
her top, Arcade boomed, “Being topless in the East Village [in 2011] is not 
radical!” 
This intense onstage confrontation condenses a dramatic shift in the re-
lationship between younger female performance artists like Young and the 
artists who blazed the trail for this new generation. The aptly named Young 
has claimed that she is not interested in “studying performance history or 
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what other people have done.”3 Indeed, when she gave one interviewer an ex-
ample of an “original idea,” she volunteered that she would shoot herself on 
stage — not, in fact, an original idea, but a restaging of Chris Burden’s Shoot 
(1971), one of the most iconic and widely discussed works of the performance 
art canon. When asked about the Delancey Lounge incident, Young stated 
that she did not know who Fouratt was, adding, “I still don’t,” and mused 
that Penny Arcade was “probably [just being] defensive about her own age.”4 
She said that her only “real regret” about the performance was losing her 
necklace.
What is to be made of this unhinged spectacle of willful historical igno-
rance on one side and territorial defensiveness on the other? This chapter 
explores a curious development: an emerging cohort of younger female per-
formance artists who, while recognizably working within the vein of 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s U.S. feminist performance art, refuse to revere, or at times 
even acknowledge, the feminist artists and traditions from which they nev-
ertheless pilfer and whose work they appropriate and ironize.5 At a moment 
when established female performance artists such as Marina Abramović, 
Carolee Schneemann, Hannah Wilke, Adrian Piper, Yayoi Kusama, Karen 
Finley, and Ana Mendieta (to name a few) were receiving mainstream recog-
nition and art historical canonization, this younger cohort was facing a gen-
erational resource gap and negotiating the period of austerity caused by the 
2008 global financial crisis.6 Young’s performed refusal to acknowledge her 
forebears is not a simple display of cluelessness or disrespect, as some have 
framed it; it signals a growing mistrust, both real and performed, among 
younger performance artists toward the generation of pioneering artists that 
preceded them. While feminist performance art has always been a vocation 
that garners little recognition and even less pay, this mistrust evidences a 
recent transformation in how both liberal feminism and performance art are 
perceived within this small niche as it has shifted from a site of struggle and 
marginalization to one of (relative) exclusivity and increasing institutional-
ization. The monumentalization of 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s feminist perfor-
mance art — once a fringe genre, seen as anathema to commodification — 
is eroding the genre’s original “claims for resistance to commodity capi-
talism,” grounded in “the idea that performance does not offer an object 
for sale.”7 As high art institutions like the MoMA, the Whitney, the Gug-
genheim, and the Getty have spent the past decade acquiring performances 
for their permanent collections and hiring curators to preserve and exhibit 
them, these foundational ideas no longer bear the same transgressive signa-
ture. The genre’s new institutional status is reflective of the younger genera-
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tion’s changing relationship to feminism, both as an aesthetic practice and 
as a mode of identification.
Early feminist performance artists worked to reclaim their images and 
bodies, using them to draw attention to patriarchal systems and social 
norms, to fight the systemic sexism that excluded them from institutions, 
and to represent their social experience. These women’s defiant and trans-
gressive work thematized questions of agency and self- representation by ex-
ploring powerful, taboo subjects like pornography, explicit sexuality, and 
trauma, both sexual and social.8 What happens when a formation that has 
historically been understood as radical and minoritarian comes to be per-
ceived as hegemonic by its would- be beneficiaries? What changes when 
those who have long identified as parasites become institutional stakehold-
ers with cultural and financial capital — in other words, when they are able 
to occupy the position of host? 
This chapter examines how the institutionalization of feminist perfor-
mance art creates a growing disjuncture between how two generations of 
artists view the works (and artists) that founded their genre. Certain pio-
neering feminists of the earlier generation see themselves as embattled and 
disenfranchised, while a precarious younger generation instead sees them 
as occupying structurally powerful and privileged positions. The younger 
artists, facing mounting student debt and narrowing professional prospects 
in an ever more proprietary landscape for performance- based art, appear 
increasingly to view the legacy left by the previous generation of artists not 
as a gift but as an imposition, a debt to be paid. This dynamic was crystal-
lized by Abramović’s 2010 Museum of Modern Art blockbuster retrospective 
Marina Abramović: The Artist Is Present. The decade- defining exhibition, a 
galling instance of the performance of coercive hospitality that I theorize in 
this book, spotlighted “reperformance,” a generational patronage model (as 
it was devised for the Abramović exhibition) by which an established art-
ist hires less- established performers (generally working artists in their own 
right) to reenact their work. 
The work of the contemporary artists examined here suggests that in or-
der to be a feminist artist today, one cannot be a feminist artist; the syntagm 
feminist artist now registers as something of a contradiction in terms. The 
avant- garde art market demands originality, enjoining the artist to break with 
her predecessors, but at the same time a certain invocation of second- wave 
feminist politics demands deference to those predecessors. The issue at hand 
is not necessarily with feminist politics itself but with the particular demand 
of fidelity made on the contemporary generation of feminist artists, many of 
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whom are struggling to survive in a neoliberal climate of austerity, precarity, 
and the gig economy. This is a double bind: feminist identification can be 
neither fully refused nor fully accepted. In the face of this dilemma, younger 
white performance artists have taken up parasitism as an artistic strategy 
for disidentifying with — adopting, exaggerating, and critically reworking — 
 the structural privilege that comes with being a white middle- class femi-
nist, which is made visible in this inheritance. I argue that younger perfor-
mance artists — Ann Liv Young, Anya Liftig, Amber Hawk Swanson, Kate 
Gilmore, and Lauren Barri Holstein — have sought to resolve this tension of 
feminist inheritance by articulating their relationship to feminism ironically 
or through layers of mediation; they have done this, moreover, by channel-
ing the performed indifference of the adolescent figure, by enacting a kind 
of teenage rebellion. By characterizing this mode as parasitical, I mark how 
these artists have appropriated and played their derivative and contingent 
status vis- à- vis their feminist art forebears as an ambivalent mode of femi-
nist identification. These artists wield the strategic short- sightedness of the 
parasite — its presentism, its short- term memory, its claimed indifference to 
history, its intentionlessness — as a disidentificatory register for contending 
with what it means to make feminist performance art in the present moment 
on their own terms. 
The younger performance artists discussed in this chapter pointedly stage 
the problem of feminist legacy as a mother- daughter conflict. This conflict 
seems like a straight recapitulation of tired generational models and hetero-
normative family metaphors, and it troublingly posits feminism as consist-
ing of two distinct waves or generations, both primarily white.9 But these 
younger artists’ engagements do not straightforwardly identify with white-
ness or femininity or even generational transmission; rather these works 
enact a mode of critique, an ironic “putting on” of white feminist complicity 
and privilege that is signaled by these younger artists’ hyperbolic and irrev-
erent identification with the stereotypical signifiers of hypercommodified 
femininity (often depicted white): high heels, hair ribbons, tattered prom 
dresses, candy- colored teen girl clothes, synthetic blond “Barbie hair” wigs 
(at times over hair that is already blond).10 I understand these parodic prac-
tices to be attempts to contest the legacy of white liberal feminism (much 
as the artists in chapter 2 sought to use the logics of private property and 
nationality to resignify the subject positions associated with these logics). 
These practices represent the artists’ critical disidentification with their own 
cultural and racial privilege.11 The artists I explore reflect, refract, and exag-
gerate tropes of 1960s and 1970s feminist art — particularly the over- earnest 
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politics symbolized by underarm hair and “vaginal scrolls” — in order to 
break with them, in order to signal their refusal of an inherited feminist 
script. These artists instead play with these tropes, using them to signify 
nothing or signify differently, all in service of claiming a sense of ownership 
over their own representation.
My discussion of artists who have taken up this performance strategy 
focuses primarily on younger white artists because the cultural legacy of 
white liberal feminism and its resources (the symbolic cultural and political 
capital) are still largely concentrated among white women; the question of 
inheritance or legacy is less relevant to those who have historically been ex-
cluded from such intergenerational resource transfers. Even as they strug-
gle under precarious economic conditions, the artists I discuss make work 
that reflects their own structural implication in systems of privilege: they 
are white women who have benefited from legacies of capital accumulation 
and racial privilege passed on through mechanisms of social reproduction. 
However, these white performance artists’ appropriation of earlier white 
performance artists’ works (even in the reflexive mode of self- critique) per-
forms yet another erasure of trans feminists and feminist women of color, 
repeating the marginalization performed by historiographies of feminist art, 
which, as Uri McMillan has shown, treat “white female subjectivity . . . as 
an unofficial norm.”12 These younger artists’ emphasis on generation also 
elides the significant differences between feminists from the second wave 
and present- day feminists, differences that go beyond issues of precarity. So 
while these artworks do little to directly redress the legacy of white liberal 
feminism’s exclusions (and may therefore compound these violences), I see 
them as contesting the idea of legacy itself — contesting its logic of racial and 
cultural inheritance (which unequally creates precarity), perhaps even con-
testing the notion that legacy can exist, that there is something to leave, that 
a future exists in an increasingly dystopian world.
What is especially challenging about the works I examine is that here the 
critique of the host is expressed even more indirectly — a divergence from the 
more clearly delineated parasite- host incursions I have described in previ-
ous chapters. These artists challenge the host’s authority not explicitly but 
through performances that disavow the host’s originality; these challenges 
are mounted by their disidentification with the historical influence of the 
(always overdetermined and caricatural) feminist foremother, a disidenti-
fication that they perform in their creative practice. This disidentification 
is sometimes expressed through spectacles of aggressive overcitation (a hy-
perderivative aesthetic I call parasitical homage) and at other times through 
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spectacles of willed historical ignorance (what I call parasitical disavowal). 
(We see both of these techniques at work in Young’s performance with Ar-
cade.) At yet other times their disidentification with the legacy of the lib-
eral feminist host warps into a kind of reflexive self- critique, a self- parody 
of their own implication in the structures they find intolerable and want to 
challenge (what I call manic autogenesis).
This version of parasitism looks less like the slowly weakening resistance I 
have described in previous chapters and more like a mutation of this logic, a 
form of zombification — an endlessly reanimating and self- cannibalistic fem-
inist aesthetics. The chapter explores what happens when the host in ques-
tion is neither patriarchal nor misogynist but matriarchal and feminist — 
and when the parasite does not simply undermine the host but embodies and 
imitates it and iterates that imitation, thereby revising, reiterating, reproduc-
ing, and infecting it for its own ends. Later in the chapter I attend to the dif-
ficulty of reading the feminist substance of this highly ambiguous aesthetic 
gesture. Under what conditions can, or should, this gesture’s refusal of leg-
ibility be read as feminist? What is the feminist politics of the often dizzying 
strategies of re- reproduction, imitation, parody, refraction, doubling, and 
multiplication employed by these artists? Although these parasitical strat-
egies afford a kind of protective feminist illegibility within the contempo-
rary art market (they prevent these artists from being too easily identified 
or pinned down, from losing their place at or near the table), they also serve 
as modes of self- making or self- generation, by which these artists negotiate 
their position as both inside and outside a cultural inheritance that cannot 
be given back even when it is refused. 
PATRONIZING PRECARITY
In the late 2000 s feminist performance art was undergoing a cultural revival 
in the United States. During this period there was a major symposium at the 
Museum of Modern Art called “The Feminist Future: Theory and Practice 
in the Visual Arts” (2007) and two marquee retrospective exhibitions were 
mounted: wa c k ! Art and the Feminist Revolution at Los Angeles’s Museum 
of Contemporary Art (2007), which later traveled throughout North Amer-
ica, and Global Feminisms (2007) at the Brooklyn Museum, which was be-
coming a major collector of feminist art. Also in 2007 the Brooklyn Museum 
opened the Elizabeth A. Sackler Center for Feminist Art, now the permanent 
home of Judy Chicago’s landmark work, The Dinner Party (1979), widely re-
garded as the first major feminist artwork. 
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These events celebrated the glory days of bygone eras while largely brack-
eting the status of the feminist art present. wa c k ! promised a historical sur-
vey of feminist art from 1965 to 1980, focusing heavily on U.S.- based art-
ists, whereas Global Feminisms was promoted as an international survey of 
feminist art from 1990 to the present. The feminist artist and writer Mira 
Schor points out that the two timelines effectively erased from the histori-
cal archive the 1990s generation of publicly politically committed feminist 
artists.13 These exhibitions thus denied an unambiguously feminist cadre 
of artists historical recognition, instead celebrating as the preeminent 
woman artist of the modern era a figure who has steadfastly renounced the 
label “feminist artist,” Marina Abramović. At these events, Schor writes, 
Abramović introduced herself by saying “I have never had anything to do 
with feminism”; here Schor adds, “(as she does at every feminist art event to 
which she is invited).”14 Abramović, who has received more mainstream rec-
ognition than any other woman artist in recent memory, was catapulted into 
the popular spotlight by her 2010 MoMA retrospective, which brought her 
extreme, durational body art to a wider audience (figure 4.1). The retrospec-
FIGURE 4.1 Marina Abramović: The Artist Is Present, Museum of Modern Art, 
2010. Source: MoMA Talks.
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tive, curated by Klaus Biesenbach, comprised both “a new, original,” “single 
solo piece” by Abramović and live “reperformances” of the Serbian artist’s 
most recognized works, carried out by younger performers.15 
During the retrospective’s mid- March – to – late- May run, Abramović per-
formed The Artist Is Present, a piece lasting over seven hundred hours, in 
which she sat silent and immobile in the museum atrium at a wooden table 
with two chairs opposite one another. In her staging of this performance 
Abramović literally assumes the role of host: the performance’s scenography 
makes her a permanent fixture of the museum, while the guests (including 
both museum visitors who sit across from her and her equally anonymous 
and itinerant reperformers) come and go. Abramović has said that her aim 
was to channel an empathetic presence of pure receptivity, “to be fully pres-
ent, concentrating on connecting with whoever came in to sit down opposite 
her.”16 But this empathy seems absent in her relation with the reperformers 
of her work. This is quite different from Chicago’s germinal feminist work 
Dinner Party; this large- scale dinner table installation, made up of thirty- 
nine elaborate place settings representing the contributions of thirty- nine 
different women, was intended to symbolize a redress of women’s exclusion 
from the proverbial table of history. In contrast, Abramović celebrates only 
her own arrival at what is effectively a table for one (and the various reflec-
tions of that one). The artist’s reperforming stand- ins are present but elided 
(in an exhibition that could more accurately be called The Artists Are Pres-
ent). The exhibition and performance drew 750,000 visitors to the museum 
(among them the celebrities Lou Reed, James Franco, and Björk) and many 
more via web feed. It garnered considerable critical attention, including a 
2012 documentary directed by Matthew Akers, The Artist Is Present, about 
the making of the retrospective. It also garnered mass media coverage, fur-
ther launching Abramović into the art celebrity stratosphere; she was the 
subject of a video game, appeared on the covers of fashion magazines, and 
participated in subsequent collaborations with the likes of Lady Gaga and 
Jay- Z. “It was [a] complete surprise,” Abramović later said, “this enormous 
need of humans to actually have contact.”17 
Although Abramović’s hospitality came with strict conditions (visitors 
were instructed not to touch or speak to her), I am less interested in these 
conditions than in the way that the framing of the exhibition, its stated 
goal of creating a space of mutual contemplation for facilitating deep con-
nectivity and openness, worked to absolve Abramović of her active par-
ticipation in and patronage of a new labor economy that concentrates all 
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resources — wealth, fame, critical acclaim, originality — into her hands (and 
the hands of those like her) by exploiting the conditions of precarity and 
scarcity faced by younger feminist performance artists.
Abramović did not see herself as exploitative, as a coercive host — or at 
least she did not admit to it. She framed herself instead as a generous host, 
one who was there to distribute her largesse to the next generation. Her 
sense that she legitimately held a proprietary claim on performance art and 
its resources and could distribute them as she wished is condensed in her 
documented investment in protecting her artistic legacy. Shortly after The 
Artist Is Present, in 2011 she began a regular column called “Marina’s Diary” 
in Flash Art, declaring her efforts to establish a legacy not only for her own 
work but for the genre of performance art itself: “For me, the education of 
young artists has always been part of my work. I have always wanted to give 
unconditional experience to the younger generation. . . . My generation of 
performance artists stopped performing by the end of the ’70s. Only a few 
of us are still here. To keep performing art is so emotionally and physically 
demanding that it is not easy to continue for a long period of time. At the 
moment, all my attention goes toward establishing a legacy that will permit 
performance art to continue growing and developing.”18 (Until a few years 
ago Abramović often referred to herself as “the grandmother of performance 
art”; she recently disowned the label “grandmother” in favor of “pioneer.”)19 
For Abramović, the future of performance art lay in reperformance, a 
“practice of re- playing or re- doing a precedent event, artwork, or act.”20 This 
inherently privileges the historical and the previous over the potential cre-
ativity of new works and younger performers; in this paradigm, younger 
performers must stifle their own ideas to reperform the ideas of others, and 
the practice itself contributes to shutting these performers out of the limited 
art market, as its bandwidth is increasingly taken up by restaging already 
known pieces.21 In 2005 Abramović reperformed a series of major perfor-
mance art pieces from the 1960s and 1970s at the Guggenheim Museum; 
for this work, which she called Seven Easy Pieces, she reperformed works by 
Bruce Nauman, Vito Acconci, Valie Export, Gina Pane, and Joseph Beuys, 
as well as two of her own previous works. “Reperformance is the new con-
cept, the new idea!” she proclaimed at a MoMA workshop about preserving 
and exhibiting performance art held before the opening of her retrospective. 
“Otherwise it [performance art] will be dead as an art form.”22 In a New York 
Times piece exploring the implications of performance art’s absorption by 
high art institutions like MoMA, Carol Kino writes:
152 CHAPTER FOUR
Ms. Abramović saw [Seven Easy Pieces] as a way “to take charge of the his-
tory of performance.” In the 1990s, as younger artists became interested 
in work of the ’60s and ’70s, she said she noticed that some were restaging 
historical works themselves, often without consulting or even crediting 
the originator. “I realized this is happening because performance is no-
body’s territory,” she said. “It’s never been mainstream art and there’s no 
rules.” Finding this unjust, she decided to set them herself, by recreating 
the works in consultation with the relevant artists and estates. Better she 
do it now, she said, because “they will do it anyway when you’re dead be-
hind your back.”23
By claiming as her property the historical archive of her practice via re-
performance, Abramović made herself the sole benefactor of her work, in 
perpetuity (figure 4.2).24 “My idea was to establish certain moral rules,” she 
explains, describing a particularly restrictive approach to intellectual prop-
erty as if it were the only way, ignoring licensing options that allow free shar-
ing (not to mention the fact that parody and transformational works are not 
covered by copyright): “If someone wants to remake a performance, they 
must ask the artist for the rights and pay for it, just like it’s done with music 
or literature. For me, this is the honest way to do it, even if you want to make 
your own version.”25 Here Abramović frames her discussion of copyright 
and ownership in terms of morality. Indeed she uses morality as an alibi 
for her installation of a financial and legal debt structure atop the (suppos-
edly radical and revolutionary) field of performance art: she equates “moral 
rules” with royalty payments. She cloaks a system of contractual and finan-
cial obligation in the language of honor and fidelity, in effect demanding 
that younger artists pay taxes on her artistic legacy (an inheritance that, as 
we will see, many of them do not even want). Abramović’s “one- sided” in-
vestment in legacy (as she says, she is interested in “establishing a legacy,” 
not passing on a legacy that she herself inherited from others) begins and 
ends with her; she advocates for a future of compulsory acknowledgment 
and debt — a future from which she exempts herself as an artist who insists 
on always being present.26 
In her campaign to stake her legacy in the permanent present of perfor-
mance, Abramović advances a proprietary form of reproducibility — a freez-
ing in time, a legacy of repetition, that betrays what some performance theo-
rists have characterized as the art form’s transient and immaterial ontology. 
For example, Richard Schechner declared in 1985, “Performance originals 
disappear as fast as they are made. No notation, no reconstruction, no film 
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or videotape recording can keep them. . . . One of the chief jobs challenging 
performance scholars is the making of a vocabulary and methodology that 
deal with performance in its immediacy and evanescence.”27 Peggy Phelan 
echoes this sentiment: “Performance’s only life is in the present. Perfor-
mance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in 
the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it be-
comes something other than performance. To the degree that performance 
attempts to enter the economy of reproduction, it betrays and lessens the 
promise of its own ontology. Performance’s being . . . becomes itself through 
disappearance.”28 Both of these accounts define live performance as singu-
lar, noniterable, and grounded in presence (although others, like Rebecca 
Schneider, have countered by arguing that performance is always already 
mediated).29 
Abramović has her cake and eats it too. Her discourse borrows and capi-
talizes on the auratic originality of presence that Schechner and Phelan as-
cribe to performance, while at the same time making performance a repro-
ducible and thus ceaselessly commodifiable form. By securing originality 
for herself and reproducibility for others, Abramović assumes the role of 
host — a duplicity evident in the very architecture of The Artist Is Present 
retrospective, which in the very same moment finds the artist imparting the 
pure generosity of her presence on visitors in one wing of the museum while 
exploiting the labor power of fellow performers in another. Abramović’s 
desire to enter the halls of the “Great Masters,” Schneider observes, runs 
counter to performance art’s historical aversion to high art institutions: 
“The battle of the ‘rebel art’ to enter the esteemed galleries of high art mu-
FIGURE 4.2  
Relation in Time, 
reperformed by 
Arna Sam and Hsiao 
Chen. Photo by 
Jonathan Muzikar 
© The Museum 
of Modern Art, 
New York. © 2019 
Marina Abramović. 
Courtesy of Sean 
Kelly Gallery / 
(ARS), New York.
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seums should be approached with a great measure of irony, since so much 
performance- based artwork in the 1960s and 1970s (influenced by a lengthy 
heritage of ‘anti- art’ avant- garde forms) was arguably more invested at that 
time in seceding from the . . . Great Masters than joining [them].”30 
Schneider connects Abramović’s desire to enter high art institutions to 
her interest in her legacy: “Marina Abramović herself is interested in the 
‘correct’ transmission of ‘seminal’ works, including ‘extremely strict instruc-
tions,’ payment of copyright, and permissions to reperform — and she sees 
the move into venerated art museums as ensuring her ability to control his-
tory from beyond the grave.”31
THE ECONOMICS AND ETHICS OF REPERFORMANCE 
Abramović’s embrace of reperformance reflected a larger shift in the art mar-
ket, which in the early 1990s moved toward what Claire Bishop has called 
“outsourced” or “delegated performance” — a shift away from the paradigm 
of art as located in the artist’s personal body and toward the business logic 
of subcontracting the performance to other bodies to maximize profits. As 
Bishop puts it, “Artists of the late ’60s and early ’70s — for example, Marina 
Abramović, Chris Burden, Vito Acconci, and Gina Pane — turned to their 
own bodies as the privileged site of artistic action. . . . Today their bod-
ies also function art historically, as signs of an artistic practice that con-
sciously placed itself at one remove from the market: in Western Europe 
and North America, performance and body art of the late ’60s and early 
’70s frequently stood as a refusal of the portable object and the circulation 
of commodities.”32
Abramović adopted this logic of outsourcing performance via reperfor-
mance, a form of bodily commodification that her original performances 
worked to undermine by virtue of being live; as Bishop points out, Abramo-
vić’s own body no longer functions artistically but “art historically” — as 
part of an artistic legacy — when she turns to permanently subcontracting 
these performances, privatizing the live artwork, participating in the mar-
ket shift toward reperformance and thereby denying a younger generation 
of artists a living wage. Abramović maintains her status as author of these 
performances, retaining the financial reward and agency of creative author-
ship while displacing the emotional and physical labor of performance onto 
younger artists. In this economy of reenactment, other, younger bodies are 
substituted for Abramović’s to feed the machine of her artistic legacy. As one 
commenter (Steven Kaplan) on the online art magazine artcritical notes, 
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“The idea of substituting new, younger performers is what leads to the ap-
pearance of inequities and the charge of abuse of privilege. When Abramović 
herself was the performer, willingly suffering the slings and arrows for the 
sake of her art, the worst charge that could be leveled was masochism. But 
when other bodies — young, powerless, on display for the delectation of the 
powerful — are drafted for the sake of aggrandizing the arts institution, and 
for the ambitions of art plutocrats, there is obvious exploitation.”33
Three of the reperformers of The Artist Is Present — Abigail Levine, Gary 
Lai, and Rebecca Brooks — published an open letter asserting that their ini-
tial offer from MoMA “struck many of us as untenable: $50 for a 2½ hour 
performance shift, no compensation for prep time or time in between shifts, 
and, most troublingly, no workman’s compensation, which would cover us 
in the case of injury.” “Through a first round of negotiations, we achieved a 
modest pay increase and a change of status to ‘temporary employee,’ which 
provided us workman’s compensation and some other benefits,” continue 
Levine, Lai, and Brooks (who note that MoMA’s operating budget was $160 
million in fiscal year 2008 – 9). “However, we were only able to approach a 
fair wage for our work after two fainting performers made evident the dif-
ficulty and risk of our work.”34 Pushing the burden onto young artists is es-
pecially exploitative; the financial burdens and limited professional horizons 
faced by working artists reflects a larger trend for younger people.35 College- 
educated millennials, like many of the artists examined in this chapter, have 
seen the classic playbook of middle- and upper- middle- class social mobility 
ripped up before their eyes.36 Education and hard work now bring not guar-
anteed success but guaranteed debt, with no expectation of secure work to 
offset it. “In order to fully recognize the scope of these changes,” urges the 
critic Malcolm Harris, “we need to think about young people the way indus-
try and the government already do: as investments, productive machinery, 
‘human capital.’ ”37
The MoMA reperformers’ experience corroborates other accounts of the 
under- remuneration and lack of institutional support for Abramović’s re-
performers. The legendary dancer and feminist filmmaker Yvonne Rainer 
became the public spokesperson for another reperformer, this time for a 
gala performance at LA’s Museum of Contemporary Art. According to one 
account, Rainer felt compelled to write to Jeffrey Deitch, the museum direc-
tor, after hearing an account of the audition process from the dancer Sara 
Wookey.38 Rainer’s letter (which may or may not have been sent to Deitch 
before it was obtained and published by various media outlets) denounced 
the fact that, according to Wookey, in a scene calling to mind Roman Bac-
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chanalia, performers had been asked to spend three hours with “their heads 
protruding through the gala’s tabletops, kneeling on Lazy Susans below to 
slowly rotate in circles while maintaining eye contact with guests [while 
other] performers [were to] lay nude on tables with fake skeletons on top of 
them, recreating Abramović’s famous Nude With Skeleton performance, as 
reperformers did at her MoMA retrospective.” For this difficult, strange, and 
highly vulnerable work, the reperformers were to be paid $150 and to receive 
a one- year moc a  membership. Wookey informed Rainer, “Of course we 
were warned that we will not be able to leave to pee, etc. That diners may try 
to feed us, give us drinks, fondle us under the table, etc., but will be warned 
not to. Whatever happens, we are to remain in performance mode and un-
affected.”39 While Rainer’s letter drew attention to the treatment of younger 
artists, it also exacerbated the problem that it attempted to alleviate, effec-
tively dispossessing Wookey of her own exploitation; it was Rainer’s letter 
rather than Wookey’s complaint that received attention in a social media 
controversy widely billed as “Rainer vs. Abramović/Deitch.”40 
The curatorial practice capitalizes on a winner- take- all contemporary art 
star system in which a few artists are given the majority of the resources and 
the majority of artists receive little to no compensation.41 When reperfor-
mance offers younger performers low pay and few protections, it takes ad-
vantage of their economic and professional vulnerability in an era of auster-
ity to push them into reperforming the works of famous artists rather than 
pursuing their own creative opportunities.42 Exploiting what Lauren Berlant 
sees as the retraction of sociodemocratic promises of “the good life” — the 
withdrawal of promises of upward mobility, job security, and the social 
safety net in recent decades — these sorts of required reperformances hinder 
younger artists’ shots at professional advancement or creative fulfillment.43 
Reperformance interrupts the “natural transmission” of opportunities and 
resources from avant- garde generations past to present (in other words, the 
transmission of resources without hope of gain — a form of legacy that is 
disinterested rather than interested, that does not offer the testator control 
or self- enrichment). Reperformance, and Abramović’s use of it in particu-
lar, is both coercive and exploitative, only posing as hospitable — the classic 
position of the host who says one thing (“I’m open and receptive”) and does 
another (privatizes resources and access, takes the money and runs). 
Harris and others assert that this unprecedented political and economic 
climate has been unduly minimized or even dismissed by older generations, 
baby boomers in particular, who view it as young people “paying their dues.” 
The journalist Michael Hobbs writes of the intergenerational conflict that 
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attends the increasingly insecure work and life conditions faced by young 
people, “This is what it feels like to be young now. Not only are we screwed, 
but we have to listen to lectures about our laziness and our participation 
trophies from the people who screwed us. . . . From job security to the social 
safety net, all the structures that insulate us from ruin are eroding. And the 
opportunities leading to a middle- class life — the ones that boomers lucked 
into — are being lifted out of our reach. Add it all up and it’s no surprise 
that we’re the first generation in modern history to end up poorer than our 
parents.”44
While intergenerational conflict (feminist or otherwise) is nothing new, I 
argue that under neoliberalism the structure where this conflict plays out — 
that of the host- parasite relation — is new. What can The Artist Is Present, as 
both a durational enactment and a disavowal of the absolute asymmetry of 
the host- guest relation, tell us about how older generations of feminists, both 
those in the art world and those in other fields, perceive the political strug-
gles faced by today’s emerging artists and intellectuals? Some of these pow-
erful feminists retain an outdated idea of their own subject positions; they 
see themselves as marginalized, a view that has not caught up with the fact 
that they are now in the institutional positions of power — well- connected, 
professionally and financially secure — that they had at one time aspired to 
overturn. They have a standing seat at the table. 
Indeed, the art world and the world of higher education — two somewhat 
politically progressive sites — reflect each other in many ways. A number of 
op- eds have discussed the precaritization of higher education, emphasizing 
the generational betrayal felt by younger scholars at the patronage model 
that underpins a neoliberal academy built on insecure and contingent labor 
conditions produced by decades of austerity and adjunctification. “Imagine 
if these protected and relatively privileged academic workers had the fore-
sight, the solidarity, and the courage to stand and refuse to disown their 
present and future colleagues — not to mention their students — coming up 
behind,” writes Joseph G. Ramsey.45 
In this context, once- radical academic feminists are (like Abramović) at 
times perceived as hosts. In 2018 the feminist philosopher Avital Ronell, an 
academic star, was accused of harassment in a Title IX lawsuit filed by her 
former graduate advisee Nimrod Reitman. Many, many radical feminist, 
queer, and postcolonial thinkers, including Judith Butler, Jack Halberstam, 
Lisa Duggan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, and Joan Wallach Scott, quickly 
closed ranks around Ronell. (In a blog post, Chris Kraus, whom I discussed 
in chapter 3 as parasiting the academic cultural critic Dick Hebdige, who 
158 CHAPTER FOUR
served as host, issued her own startlingly aggressive and premature take-
down of Reitman.)46 Nick Mitchell has characterized the bitter debates that 
followed as “an archive of generational antagonism” that lays bare “a class 
struggle disavowed by the protocols of professionalization.” “What happens 
when [your boss’s or advisor’s] understanding of what it means to be an in-
tellectual means that they don’t see themselves as your boss?” Mitchell asks.47 
Senior scholars defending Ronell and their junior academic counterparts 
spoke from entirely different subject positions.48 Established scholars empha-
sized the ever- increasing demands of the neoliberal university and the non-
hierarchical conventions of queer intimacy, effectively minimizing the power 
differential between the two groups; graduate students and other members of 
the academic precariat insisted on one simple fact: they cannot refuse their 
advisors’ demands, no matter how outré or bizarre, without fear of compro-
mising their livelihood and future employment.49 For Mitchell what the se-
nior professoriate fails fully to recognize is that the infrastructure necessary 
for doing radical academic work no longer exists in the same way it once did.
In Abramović’s defense, the performance scholar Lydia Brawner (one of 
Abramović’s reperformers) suggests that some of her detractors are moti-
vated by ageism and sexism, that the critiques of the pioneering artist for 
exploitation are in fact alibis for the real resentment: that Abramović dares 
to remain in the spotlight while aging.50 In the final analysis, the exploitative 
structure of The Artist Is Present is both about Abramović and not about her 
(much as Kraus’s feminine abjection enacted in I Love Dick is both about 
Hebdige and not about him). Abramović is both a parasite and a host, for 
while she exploits others, she is herself (according to her) exploited by much 
larger structures of exploitation and oppression. (Abramović has pointed 
to what she perceives as the system’s exploitation of her: for mounting The 
Artist Is Present she was paid only an honorarium of $100,000 , which she 
said did not cover the year of work, the cost of maintaining a staff and office, 
and the three years it took her to physically recover from the performance.)51
What is at stake in The Artist Is Present (and, I will argue, in the para-
sitical homages and disavowals it elicits from younger performance artists) 
is a claim to the entire present, a claim to the right to occupy the present 
rather than having to cede one’s place to others. For Abramović, the others 
are the generation of young artists who come after — and threaten to super-
sede — her. For the younger generation, the others are the older generation of 
feminist artists who came before — and threaten to exploit and overshadow — 
 them. I invoke Berlant’s use of the term present: an affective purchase on the 
contemporary that is always up for grabs, a “mediated affect” that is “under 
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constant revision,” an “extended now whose very parameters (when did ‘the 
present’ begin?) are also always there for debate.”52 
What is problematic in Abramović’s approach is her desire to own the re-
performance in perpetuity, rather than the fact of the reperformance itself. 
Her enthusiastic promotion of reperformance- with- permission (a reitera-
tion rather than a reimagination of the original) seems designed to exclude 
younger female performance artists who wish to reinterpret iconic works 
on their own terms. In order to participate in the art economy, this younger 
generation must accept the terms established; performances of historical in-
debtedness have become compulsory. In Abramović’s claim to the present — 
to being the past, present, and future of feminist art — she performs her co-
ercive hospitality. The established artist invites a younger generation of per-
formance artists to the museum, not to be present but to re- present. The 
competing temporal and ontological meanings of presence and present here 
index the contradictions of this ungenerous invitation. Abramović’s pres-
ence represents an appeal to the past, sold over and over again, that echoes 
a blind spot of the high art market, which seems able to look only backward 
or forward, never at the present. 
Younger performance artists have resisted the system’s demand for re-
performance, which concentrates profit in the hands of established creators. 
Instead of simply reperforming or strictly reenacting earlier works, some 
younger artists re- create or reinterpret iconic feminist artworks on their 
own terms. Among these artists are Lauren Barri Holstein, Emily Roysdon, 
and Gretchen Holmes, who have re- created Carolee Schneemann’s iconic 
feminist performance Interior Scroll (1975), and Lilibeth Cuenca Rasmussen, 
who performed thirteen different re- creations within a three- hour span, in-
cluding Shigeko Kubot’s Vagina Painting (1965), Ana Mendieta’s Blood Signs 
and Body Tracks (1974), and Janine Antoni’s Loving Care (1992 – 96), as well 
as one of her own works.53 These artists reinterpret these pieces for their 
own context. In a 2010 piece, Holmes observed that the political context of 
Schneemann’s performance (defined by such causes as “the er a , Equal Pay 
for Equal Work, education reform”) was unambiguous compared to the dis-
persed and ambivalent feminist political climate that framed her re- creation 
of it. “While the original ‘Interior Scroll’ emerged at the confluence of Fluxus 
Happenings and Women’s Liberation, a site primed for the radical gestures 
and collaborative interventions characteristic of 60s and 70s feminist art,” 
she writes, “my recreation was submerged in a contemporary feminism over-
whelmed by contradictory attitudes towards femininity, sexuality, and femi-
nism itself.”54 
160 CHAPTER FOUR
Still other younger performance artists reject the position of the protégé 
and instead adopt that of the parasite. In what follows I differentiate three 
aesthetic strategies by which younger performance artists have performed 
their disidentification — by appropriating, reperforming, challenging, and 
resignifying — with the legacy of feminist art. These young artists reimagine 
their broader structural positions in the art world, particularly their relation 
to the political and aesthetic legacies imposed by white liberal feminism. 
I call these strategies parasitical homage, parasitical disavowal, and manic 
autogenesis. The remainder of this chapter explicates these three strategies, 
particularly as they become increasingly more reflexive, turning their social 
critique inward on themselves, examining and highlighting their own com-
plicity. Ultimately, parasitism here describes not simply this younger cohort 
of white performance artists’ disidentification with their white liberal femi-
nist forebears but the strategies by which they disidentify with the legacy of 
white liberal feminism more generally and the impoverished representations 
that it makes available to them. 
PARASITICAL HOMAGE
If you choose to be a performance artist, you really drink the Kool- Aid. Your 
brain goes off the grid of success. Big cars, flashy jewels, home ownership. Re-
cessions don’t really matter, because your life is just one long recession. — ANYA 
LIFTIG, “ANXIETIES OF INFLUENCE”
In this chapter’s clearest and most recognizable example of the “classic” type 
of parasitism, the Brooklyn- based performance artist Anya Liftig’s interven-
tion into The Artist Is Present imitated and literalized Abramović’s refusal to 
cede her place to a younger generation of artists.55 For the performance, the 
younger artist dressed as Abramović (in a long, dark blue dress, black braid 
swept over one shoulder); sitting across from Abramović, Liftig mirrored her 
for the entirety of March 27. Liftig refused to cede the guest chair in a timely 
manner, creating a kind of standoff between the two artists (figures 4.3 – 4.5). 
But her parasitical challenge only played within the bounds that the space 
implicitly allowed; as a fellow artist, Tatiana Berg, later told Liftig, “No one 
said you couldn’t be dressed a certain way, no one could say you had to get 
up and let someone else have a turn.” Liftig insisted that her performance 
was an expression of veneration, that she accepted the rules of the encounter 
in order to author something new within the frame of Abramović’s unfold-
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ing artwork: “I wanted to operate within the piece as Marina had defined it 
to create something that was more ambiguous.” She would later say that the 
experience gave her “even more respect” for Abramović’s work.56 Liftig’s per-
formance demonstratively is not original, seeming instead to be a poor copy: 
she mimics Abramović, doing exactly what Abramović does. Rather than 
elevating Liftig, the overall effect of this mirroring staged the asymmetry 
between the two artists. Over the course of their showdown this asymme-
try can be seen in the invisible advantages accorded Abramović over Liftig, 
such as her ability to go to the bathroom; if Liftig had left the guest chair, she 
would have been replaced by the next guest. The artists’ ability to meet their 
basic physical needs speaks to the false pretense of equality in Abramović’s 
performance: she had an invisible system hidden within her dress and un-
der her chair that allowed her to relieve herself without leaving the space, an 
infrastructural support built into the very apparatus of the museum. Liftig 
recalls, “I wanted to pee really badly. . . . I wanted a way in. I wanted my con-
tacts to stop falling out of my eyes. Every time I thought about leaving the 
chair, I got pissed at myself. I got pissed at her. I got pissed at the museum. 
I just got pissed. And damn it felt g o od .” Liftig’s parasitical homage is an 
ironic (if also partly sincere) performance of humility and flattery. (It recalls 
the overexaggerated reverence that Roisin Byrne performs for Hendricks 
and Chris Kraus for Dick.) Appearing to venerate Abramović — imitating 
and refracting Abramović’s performance — affords Liftig the opportunity to 
call out the older artist’s undeniable position as a host by challenging her 
own replaceability. The art historian Indra K. Lācis observes, “Construed as 
a slyly humorous, mocking gesture and as a profound homage to the older, 
established artist, Liftig’s six- hour staring contest with Abramović zeroed 
in on the main concerns currently preoccupying performance art histori-
ans and critics. As Abramović’s döppelganger for a day, Liftig confronted 
issues of authenticity, authorship and collaboration; copy and original; in-
fluence, reverence and derivation; as well as the problem of managing one’s 
brand.”57 
Liftig titled the piece The Anxiety of Influence (2010), a nod to the liter-
ary critic Harold Bloom’s 1973 treatise by the same name, where he famously 
proposes that poets are hindered in their creative process by an ambiguous 
relationship to the poets who came before them. Bloom argues that “the poet 
in a poet” may be inspired by reading another poet’s work, but the poetry 
produced is derivative, weaker because it is unoriginal.58 Liftig recalls her 
encounter with Abramović:
FIGURES 4.3 – 4.5 Anya 
Liftig, The Anxiety 
of Influence, 2010. 
Portrait photographs 
by Marco Anelli 
© 2010. Video still 
captured by MoMA’s 
live video feed.
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I went through so many transformations as I sat there. Initially, I wanted 
some rise out of her, some acknowledgement of my gesture. Then I wanted 
to confess, as if I had been a bad child. Then, I felt myself get so angry that 
I almost started to cry. Why was she so special and why was I so small and 
weak? The glory of the venue wore off rather quickly. At a certain point, I 
felt like we were locking horns. She leaned forward and so did I. I started 
aping her every little movement and I kept hearing myself say, “move over 
bacon, here comes sausage.” Then I would crack again. She’s so strong. I 
was intimidated. She is like a mountain. She is my hero.59
Liftig’s performance as guest makes more visible the cracks in Abramović’s 
performance of receptivity; it shows that she is not as charitable or messianic 
as she seems. Liftig has said that Abramović gave her a slight smile when it 
was over, but that when she attempted to approach and thank her afterward, 
Abramović avoided her, literally watching her own back — a demonstration 
(like Amazon’s decision to settle out of court with Ubermorgen) of the host’s 
desire to keep its parasites at a comfortable distance. 
She kept making eye contact with me and avoiding me, almost running 
away. . . . Eventually I just left, but we ended up on the same escalator. I 
turned, and she said, “Those eyes. I remember those eyes.” I was like, “Yes, 
Marina. I’m the girl who sat with you all day.” She said, “I know. I remem-
ber.” I was like, “Well, I just wanted to say thank you, it was a really great 
experience.” She said, “Thank you. Thank you, too, thank you,” and then 
she scurried away, walking backwards, facing me.60
PARASITICAL DISAVOWAL
While Liftig accepts the invitation offered by the structure of Abramović’s 
performance in order to intervene in it, Ann Liv Young denies any anxiety 
of influence, even as she titles her first solo exhibition after Abramović’s most 
famous work. Ann Liv Young: Sherry Is Present opened at the Louis B. James 
Gallery in New York City’s Lower East Side in early December 2011. Span-
ning the holiday season, the ribald exhibition was advertised as a camp exer-
cise in holiday overkill, Young’s own version of the “Twelve Days of Christ-
mas,” with nightly events, including a lecture on coping with holiday stress, a 
tree- trimming session (“Trim the tree and then trim your bush,” the gallery 
advertised), and a “holiday masturbation workshop.” The exhibition allowed 
seemingly endless opportunities for Young’s obliging self- commodification 
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as the omnitalented Sherry, professional multitasker (couples Sherapy® for 
$75 per session! Sherr- aoke party!). 
Young had gained a steady audience as a performance artist, regularly 
booking shows at festivals and experimental venues in New York City and 
Europe and having her work consistently puzzled over in the pages of Art-
forum and the New York Times, when she began in the early 2010s to per-
form regularly as “Sherry,” her trash- talking, entrepreneurial southern al-
ter ego, who has earned the artist more than a few enemies.61 Empathetic, 
brash, and indifferent to internal contradiction, Sherry embodies the hyper-
assimilated logic of evangelical capitalism. Always looking for new avenues 
of spiritual self- commodification, she is a therapeutic guru, a self- employed 
self- starter, a karaoke maestro, and a Christian radio host — all rolled into 
one white southern woman who is constantly taking off her pants and los-
ing her wig. Young created Sherry when she was pregnant with her first 
child and could not maintain the strenuous rehearsal schedule required by 
her choreography- intensive performances. According to Young, Sherry was 
“borne [sic] out of [her] desire to create an economically sustainable perfor-
mance model that ‘always succeeds.’ ”62 The Sherry shtick is thus a perfor-
mance technology for a neoliberal era, a character built to weather the inse-
curity and inconsistency of the experimental performance and art market 
by being able to secure an audience without having to rely on institutional 
funding. The character has her own “Sherry Truck,” which enables the art-
ist to take her practice on the road, making her less reliant on traditional art 
institutional bookings (just as food trucks have made the restaurant industry 
more accessible to low- capital entrepreneurs). As one bio put it, “Sherry . . . 
has been branching out and breaking free of the churches and theaters of 
the bourgeoisie.”63 
Ann Liv Young: Sherry Is Present quite obviously borrows its title from 
Marina Abramović: The Artist Is Present. With this title (which, tellingly, 
is misidentified on Young’s own cv  as Ann Liv Young: The Artist Is Pres-
ent) Young restages by allusion Abramović’s exhibition, not in the lofted 
white cubes of midtown Manhattan but in the cramped quarters of Louis 
B. James’s downtown location.64 Upon entering the gallery, one is greeted 
by acrylic cases containing Sherry’s fake nails and yellow pumps, exhibited 
alongside the artist’s urine displayed in perfume bottles. The gallery’s lower 
level has been transformed into the “Sherry Shop,” a veritable garage sale of 
Young’s performance props and castoffs (figure 4.6). “Everything is for sale!” 
a young woman supervising the shop booms as she greets newcomers. “Ev-
erything is for sale!” And she isn’t kidding. Young’s curatorial shakedown 
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knows no shame; a half- inflated unicorn balloon from an earlier perfor-
mance hangs pitifully from the gallery ceiling, available for purchase.
Young’s reimagining of The Artist Is Present as a tacky garage sale strips 
away the slick veneer of high art conferred by a major museum exhibition, 
highlighting the economic precarity of the younger generation of perfor-
mance artists as they scrape together resources to support themselves and 
their art careers; for these artists, everything is literally for sale, as many sell 
possessions or work side hustles to pay rent. Young’s Sherry show also lam-
poons the high production cost and elitist sensibility of Abramović’s perfor-
mance at the MoMA by inverting the dynamic, reimagining the show as a 
low- rent, low- class version of itself. (However, it should be noted that, while 
Young trades in an amateur aesthetic, she has enjoyed more support from 
major institutions and curators than most of her peers.) The artist’s garage 
sale installation revels in a kitschy debunking of the idea that performance 
art can exist outside the vulgar economies of commodification. (The show 
calls to mind Martha Rosler’s Monumental Garage Sale [1973], a work that, 
FIGURE 4.6 Installation view of Ann Liv Young: Sherry Is Present, Louis B. James 
Gallery, New York City, 2011 – 12. Source: Louis B. James Gallery.
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fittingly, Rosler herself restaged at MoMA in 2012 as The Meta- Monumental 
Garage Sale.) When Young asked me to write the wall text for the exhibition, 
I noted her obvious appropriation of Abramović’s exhibition title: “Ann Liv 
Young: Sherry is Present lampoons the austere self- importance of the much- 
hyped 2010 Museum of Modern Art exhibition, Marina Abramović: The Art-
ist Is Present, challenging Abramović’s claim to the throne of feminist art.” 
When I sent her what I had written, Young wrote back that she and her col-
laborator and then- partner Michael Guerrero did not think there should be 
any mention of Abramović: “sherry doesn’t know or care who M A is . . . un-
less of course she’s met her at a bible study (which i don’t think she has).”65 
Young’s repurposing of Abramović’s exhibition title throws into relief the 
contrast between the two exhibitions, highlighting differences in the present 
that these two artists inhabit. Sherry may not have heard of Abramović, but 
of course Young has. Nevertheless, in pretending to be someone who hasn’t 
the younger artist seems to locate a certain creative freedom, a certain dis-
tance from the anxiety of influence. And yet she has something important in 
common with Abramović. She does not engage directly with Abramović, as 
Liftig does, but insists, above all, on her ability to control her own narrative.
ADOLESCENT SELF- PARODY
Before I proceed with my discussion of the third central aesthetic strategy 
deployed by these young artists, I must first make visible a crucial element of 
several of the younger artists’ works I discuss in this chapter: their adolescent 
aesthetic. These performances exploit the already performative aesthetic of 
the adolescent girl as she is construed in mainstream and feminist discourse, 
refracting this figure into generative and ironic reflections: a chain of signifi-
cations, a network of reflections that bounce off each other — the adolescent 
girl, the girliness of girl power, the riot grrrl, the girl with her doll, the girl as 
the doll — the adolescent girl is always multiple, overdetermined, allegorical, 
and caricatural. These artists mobilize the tactics of adolescent performance 
and adolescent refusal to exploit the impurity of these reflections, to expose 
them as constructed and unrealistic, reappropriating images that have been 
projected onto them but that they do not recognize as representative.
As a reaction to notions of generation or legacy, this aesthetic is a form 
of self- parody (more accurately, “self”- parody). More specifically it is an at-
tempt to disidentify with white feminism by appearing to overidentify with 
it, following Stevphen Shukaitis’s theorization of overidentification as a dis-
simulating form of resistance, whereby one feigns hyperbolic agreement 
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with authority in order to sow dissent. In its over- the- top, plastic, hyper-
commodified, grotesque manifestations, I understand this parody form as 
an attempt to try on many alternative positions in order to break out of the 
overdetermined molds of white femininity and white feminism. This ado-
lescent aesthetic is essential to understanding the posture of illegibility and 
evasiveness — of reflection, doubling, multiplicity — cultivated by these art-
ists, for this posture is more scattered, more referential, more illegible, and 
more difficult to pin down than the parasitical tactics I have previously ex-
amined in this book. 
Young’s aesthetic practice exemplifies this posture, characterized as it is 
by an unflinching embrace of all things kitsch and juvenile. Any day of the 
week Young’s crackpot personal website might display something like the 
following (which appeared in the spring of 2009): “march 12th/7pm/bring 
your girls along and let’s do a girls night. It’s a girl’s night out. tickets are $15 
per person. we’ll do facials, nails, a little cooking and some masterbation [sic] 
techniques! (of course we do not descriminate [sic] against men or trans.)” 
Young’s appeal to all her “girls” satirizes third- wave feminism’s slogan “girl 
power”; her over- the- top fervor for “girl stuff” (facials, nails, cooking, mas-
turbation) lampoons the production and exploitation of a particularly com-
modified representation of white bourgeois feminism (“$15 per person”). Her 
comical attempt to di y this cheaper version of commodified feminism has 
the effect of estranging and denaturalizing the more polished commercial 
version. It parodies the commodification of feminism, reflecting it back in a 
way that makes it appear foolish.
In Young’s kitschified fairy tale online universe, careless spelling errors, 
cursing, unicorns, dogs, and naked exhibitionism reign. On her website one 
is greeted with what sounds like the voice of a demented witch screaming: 
“Mwahahahaaa!! Welcome to my website. I am Ann Liv Young, demon mas-
ter!!!” Her homepage features collaged, scrapbook cutout images of evil trees, 
a fairy castle, and Young in a bikini with a young child playing beside her. 
Further in, one finds a selection of buttons on a background of ornamental 
doilies, lavender doodles, and amateur drawings done in Microsoft Win-
dows Paint: “dv ds,” “Dance company,” “Performances,” “Animals,” “Raps,” 
“Contact Us,” and “Copy right” (a misspelling that suggests, in contrast to 
Abramović, an irreverent and nonsystematic relationship to copyright pro-
tocols) (figure 4.7). Almost none of the links work.66 
This girly aesthetic that Young’s website captures is particularly char-
acteristic of Young’s early career performances (2005 – 10), before she be-
gan performing regularly as Sherry. It is these performances that I am most 
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interested in here. After 2010 her work became more improvisational and 
concerned with dynamics of audience confrontation and less interested 
in the aesthetic of reflection, in working out her ambivalent relationship 
with popular culture and institutional authority, be it feminist art history 
or the art world. After this period Young performed primarily as Sherry, 
gaining a reputation for performances that border on bullying, even on 
violence — performances that make her clash with Penny Arcade look tame. 
(Although I publicly supported Young’s earlier work, and while I admire 
her talent and conviction as a performer, I have been less willing to offer the 
same critical support of this later body of work in light of what I perceive 
to be its menacing turn.) As Sherry, she has variously performed in black-
face, gyrated naked on unconsenting audience members, and interrupted 
and verbally abused the lesser- known artist Rebecca Patek during a piece 
(purportedly) about Patek’s sexual assault.67 Young’s trademark “Sherapy” 
is an audience interaction – based performance of psychological quackery 
during which Sherry encourages, even intimidates audience members into 
sharing traumatic histories and memories. The theater historian Andrew 
Friedman captures the general progression of Young’s Sherry shows well: 
“The shows centre on Sherry’s efforts to question and reveal the fraudulence 
of others’ affectations through Young’s own phony persona. These encoun-
ters begin with Sherry asking audience members innocuous questions and 
quickly proceed towards invasive lines of inquiry, including one’s relation-
ships, sexuality, or — equally troubling — thoughts about the show itself or 
art in general. . . . Young’s desire to forcibly engage her audiences echoes the 
assaultive language and methods of the antagonistic avant- garde.”68 Young’s 
Sherapy is a manipulative instrumentalization of others’ personal pain that 
exceeds Abramović’s pretension to the healing power of presence in The 
Artist Is Present. In some cases these performances have cost Young hard- 
earned institutional support, recalling the threat that Kraus’s reckless para-
FIGURE 4.7  
Ann Liv Young’s 
personal web page, 
annlivyoung.com, 
2011. Source:  
Ann Liv Young.
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sitism posed to her personal and professional hosts — namely, Sylvère and 
Semiotext(e). Friedman notes the self- destructiveness and lack of regard for 
professional consequences in Young’s recent performances: “Even if such 
behaviours accrue symbolic capital, they can result in the loss of actual in-
come: the stuff that pays the rent. While the link between institutions and 
provocation may be continual, some works actually and purposefully risk the 
destruction of their institutional relations.”69
But before Sherry took over, Young’s earlier works — deranged, camp fairy 
tale adaptations like Melissa Is a Bitch (modeled on Peter Pan), Snow White, 
and Cinderella — garnered the artist a loyal, if befuddled cult following. It 
is in these works that Young would craft and hone her persona of adoles-
cent performance. She displays in this kitschy, consumerist early work a self- 
conscious aesthetic of failure, but this failure is in fact highly rehearsed. 
Throughout the performances Young shouts commands (onstage and off) at 
her performers like a drill sergeant. The bawdiness of her play with graphic 
(if utterly de- eroticized) nudity and foul language becomes surreal under 
her militaristic direction and disciplined choreographic methods. She is a 
perfectionist reigning over a total mess. This aesthetic of failure is in fact an 
adolescent refusal to internalize and comply with particular narratives: of 
professional art practice, with its insistence on acknowledging one’s legacy; 
of the compulsory performance of artist, of woman, of feminist. 
But Young’s intentional aesthetic of failure has been consistently misread 
as an actual artistic failure on her part — as an attempt to fulfill these ex-
pectations that falls short. In early November 2010 she opened Cinderella at 
Brooklyn’s issu e Project Room. After three “false starts,” the performance 
began when Young- as- Sherry- as- Cinderella glided out on a pair of roller 
skates through a field of iridescent balloons. In a review of Cinderella, filed 
as a dance review, the New York Times critic Alastair Macaulay makes clear 
that he came to the show expecting to see a particular brand of avant- garde 
virtuosity (pegging Young, at the outset of the review, as “belong[ing] to the 
movement in the arts that was labeled Sensation in the 1990s”) and left dis-
appointed. He writes, “There are three things for which I was unprepared 
on Friday night . . . the startling ineptitude of Ms. Young’s performance; 
the campy, cliquey way she assumed that everyone present already knew all 
about this show and her previous ones; and the silly consensus whereby most 
of her audience, giggling coyly now and then, encouraged her.” Macaulay 
scolds Young for her general ineptitude, boring performance style, and weak 
diction: “[The show’s] first 95 minutes demonstrated many layers of failure. 
Principally, Ms. Young lacks technique. In addition to the problems already 
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cited, she had to consult notes, repeat passages to get them right and tell her 
audio technician to change things.”70 
The review’s hostility condenses all the things that Macaulay simply 
doesn’t get about what Young is doing as an artist: principally her fearless-
ness onstage, her ability as an improvisor, and her shrewdness in deploying 
this aesthetic of failure. For Young cannot fail, since failing is exactly what 
she sets out to do in the first place. Failure is success. Failure is the con-
dition of possibility for the creation of something unpredictable and sur-
real. Poorly fitting prom dresses, campy animal balloons, terrible wigs, false 
starts, cheesy pop music — to call Young’s performances “bad” is to state the 
obvious. (As an adolescent might say, “Duh.”) Macaulay critiques the art-
ist (and her audience) using the very aesthetic and ideological frameworks 
that her performance practice works against — frameworks that postulate, 
for instance, that art must aim toward ideals of mastery, beauty, coherence, 
professionalism, and resolution. In so doing, Macaulay and likeminded crit-
ics unwittingly validate the relevance of her method, providing more grist 
for the mill of an artist who has said of her process, “I want to regurgitate 
what people think of me onstage.”71 Young’s practice unerringly exposes in-
stitutional orthodoxies and the hypocrisies they mask.72 Andrew Friedman 
observes, “The central opponents for Young/Sherry are the values of the art 
world, which is ‘full of people that think they have the authority to say, “This 
is good, this is bad. This is art, this is not. This is worth fifty thousand dol-
lars, this is worth nothing.’ . . . Most objectionable to Young is accepting an 
aesthetic that seemingly renders sincerity impossible.”73
Despite Macaulay’s savage pan of the show, many weird and interest-
ing things were, in fact, happening during her performance of Cinderella, a 
performance that really began in the lobby, where a female usher badgered 
waiting audience members into buying candy from her for five cents. In-
side the theater, Young’s collaborator Michael Guerrero, whom in one in-
terview Young comically describes as playing a “stunt double” in the show, 
is adorned in an even cheaper version of Young’s own spectacular costume: 
a worse- fitting wig and even tackier cerulean Lycra leotard with what ap-
pears to be a menstrual stain down the back.74 As the show begins, he fidg-
ets with the tech under Young’s hostile glare. Before long, Suzanne Vega’s 
1984 a cappella hit “Tom’s Diner” plays over the speakers, while one of 
Young’s two male backup dancers, increasingly sweating and exhausted as 
the song continues, resorts to keeping the rhythm by violently cracking a 
whip against the floor. The innocent and nostalgic quality of Vega’s folk- 
inspired song is disrupted by the lurid spectacle of a young South Asian 
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male dancer forced to labor to its saccharine beat. Amid the trappings of a 
little girl’s birthday party, the dancer stops when Vega stops and starts when 
she starts, highlighting consumer culture’s complicity with racialized labor 
and implicating the audience in a particularly earnest portrait of whiteness 
(figure 4.8). 
Next, Young performs her trademark hardcore karaoke, singing Whit-
ney Houston’s “I Wanna Dance with Somebody” and rapper T.I.’s “What-
ever You Like” as if her life depended on it. She sings T.I.’s graphic lyrics 
(“Stacks on deck / Patrón on ice / And we can pop bottles all night / Baby 
you can have whatever you like [you like] . . . / Late night sex so wet and 
so tight . . . / Baby you can go wherever you like [you like]”) earnestly and 
intensely. The soberness of her vigorously performed hip- hop minstrelsy 
refuses the conniving wink that might defuse the cringe effect of her aes-
thetic choices. Rather than rushing through particularly graphic lyrics, she 
enunciates them as one might declaim romantic poetry. Young’s performed 
overidentification with the song’s misogyny, which presents women as easily 
acquired and easily discarded materialists (a reading that the song’s music 
FIGURE 4.8 Ann Liv Young, Cinderella, issu e Project Room, Brooklyn, 2010. 
Photo by Davide Trentini.
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video reinforces), is itself a kind of disidentification, dissonant rather than 
straightforwardly critical. 
Young borrows the camp fairy tale from drag performers. (Esther New-
ton explains the typical drag scenario: “Almost every joke the camp makes 
elaborates . . . the stories of Snow White or Cinderella.” The drag queen, ex-
plains Newton, says, “ ‘Mirror, mirror on the wall, who’s the fairyest of them 
all?’ and the mirror [responds] [sarcastically], ‘you are, girl.’ . . . But usually 
the mirror brutally replies, ‘Snow White, you ugly bitch!’ ”)75 The artist de-
files her fairy tale princesses, staging deconstructed versions in which her 
protagonists appear lost, their gowns dirty and tattered and their romances 
perverted. In Snow White, “Prince Charming” is played by a young actress 
who dons a nude strap- on to Aaliyah’s “Are You That Somebody?” Cinder-
ella concludes not with a “happily ever after” but with Young attempting 
to defecate on command. Despite the show’s fairy tale titles, Young’s work 
borrows more from drag subcultures than from Disney; in her narrative the 
white fairy tale princess, represented as the pure and unqualified ideal of 
white femininity, is camped, debased, and worn down. 
Consider another performance artist whose work plays with an adoles-
cent aesthetic in order to complicate not only stereotypical femininity’s ra-
cial politics but also its heterosexism. Amber Hawk Swanson made The Fem-
inism? Project (2006) while an mfa  student at the School of the Art Institute 
of Chicago. The artist asked women from her home state of Iowa, including 
fellow sorority sisters and her own mother, to describe their relationship to 
feminism. In a series of short videos, Swanson performs these responses as 
monologues while engaged in charged or graphic sexual scenarios: having 
her toenails painted by her father, giving a hand job to her then- boyfriend, 
being spanked and penetrated by him, being fondled by a woman, and be-
ing penetrated by another woman. In the scene with her father, the artist 
props herself up on a ruffled bedspread in a lavender bedroom.76 Wearing a 
matching pink sweatshirt and shorts, the artist poses in the foreground with 
a teddy bear perched behind her. In another, Swanson applies depilatory 
cream on her eyebrows and upper lip in the bathroom mirror as she dead-
pans a script with Valley- girl intonation:
I don’t really spend a lot of time thinking about feminism because I view 
women and men as equals and that’s the definition, so . . . I do think it is 
represented in me. I don’t ever think of myself as inferior to a man. In fact, 
most of the time I find myself smarter or more well- rounded. But I don’t 
know, I mean, men and women are equal and whether the guy next to me 
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thinks so or not, this is my life, so . . . I mean I know a lot of women, and 
not necessarily lesbians, or people who are really political, spend a lot of 
their life fighting for it. I guess I just have other things to do.77
Swanson’s naïve delivery of these scripts underscores the disjointedness, 
the lack of logical connectors, the moments of trailing off in the women’s re-
pudiation of feminism, which they often characterize as culturally outmoded 
(“because men and women are equals and that’s the definition”). Feminism 
is a project reducible to “lesbians” or “people who are really political,” and 
thus peripheral to the women originally interviewed, who claim that femi-
nism constitutes more of a threat than “the guy next to [her].” Swanson calls 
attention to the adolescent quality of the original speaker’s discourse and its 
suspended inarticulation (“I mean . . .”; “I guess . . .”; “so . . .”) by ironically 
restaging it, by reflecting it back without comment — a deadpan technique 
that highlights the naïve and uninformed nature of these arguments via 
Swanson’s mere repetition of them. 
Swanson’s delivery of these monologues while engaged in graphic sex 
acts undercuts the clichéd rhetoric and stereotypical gender performances 
of these sorority girls and suburban princesses. These scenes track a pro-
gression, beginning with Swanson being infantilized by her actual father in 
a sexualized way, moving to her being infantilized by her boyfriend (by be-
ing spanked), and ending with her having sex and orgasming with women. 
This trajectory suggests a feminist progression in the transition from patri-
archal approval to lesbian sexual fulfillment. As the scenes get progressively 
gayer, the sex becomes less and less perfunctory. In the final scene Swanson’s 
performance climaxes in an interruption of the artist’s feminist script as she 
reaches orgasm with a female partner. As the scenes progress, Swanson, her-
self a former sorority girl, outs herself as the lesbian that the young woman 
had phobically coded as feminist. Swanson thus performs and herself em-
bodies the disjuncture between mass culture’s stereotypes of feminism and 
the artist’s own sexual identity narrative — a narrative that presumably re-
veals a kind of answer to the question of contemporary feminism posed in 
her title.
In a subsequent project, To Have and to Hold and to Violate (2006 – 8), 
Swanson orders a Realdoll — the Hollywood special effects version of a blow-
 up sex doll — in her own likeness (figure 4.9) and makes it into her own per-
sonal voodoo doll and lover. Part coming- out project and part public ex-
periment in sadomasochism, the Pygmalionesque project explores themes 
related to her until- now- latent lesbianism alongside a performance of hyper-
FIGURE 4.9 Amber Hawk Swanson, To Have and to Hold and to Violate, 2006 – 8. 
Source: Amber Hawk Swanson.
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femininity, a conceptual and aesthetic juxtaposition that has become her 
trademark. The artist (who has the word Bully tattooed on her wrist) and 
her doll (with the word Prey painted on its wrist) were married in a backyard 
ceremony. The performance event was documented in an eleven- minute 
video, during which guests were invited to interact with Amber Doll for the 
cutting of the cake, the first dance, the tossing of the garter, and the bou-
quet toss. Reception guests could also pose with Amber Doll, and the por-
traits were later exhibited as part of the project. Swanson’s work explores 
the aesthetic impact of her “double embodiment of femininity”: as a lesbian 
(whose art practice explores sadomasochistic desire) and as the Realdoll, 
her literal double, her other self. Swanson examines this double feminin-
ity as that which would seek both to “have and to hold” itself; she offers her 
image as both object of self- possession (its to- be- hadness) and object of self- 
abandonment (its to- be- heldness). 
Swanson’s creation and manipulation of the doll, which is associated with 
a disquieting sexualized femininity, conflates two sites of femininity’s com-
modification that typically are seen as contradictory. Amber Doll disturb-
ingly combines and confuses the child’s doll with the sex doll, with the same 
signifier simultaneously invoking both innocence and perversion. Swanson 
has said of her decision to acquire the Amber Doll, “I was looking for a re-
ceptacle for the onslaught of attention and negative feedback — a stand- in 
for myself. It was just the right amount of crazy to order a $12,000 doll.” She 
continues, “The total time from the beginning of my discussions with them 
to eventually picking her up to be mine was nine months. Which of course 
cracks me up, thinking about her as my twin, my wife, and a baby of sorts.”78 
The doll is a parody, but a parody of herself, in her own likeness. By making the 
doll symbolize women’s objectification — by making herself into an object 
for her own objectification — Swanson produces herself as an objective cor-
relative of femininity through which she can exorcise her own ambivalent 
feelings toward “herself.”
Let’s finally consider a last, brief example of an artist who, like Young and 
Swanson, foregrounds a girlish aesthetic as a feminist form of self- development. 
Kate Gilmore is a performance artist known for methodically constructing 
physical obstacles and claustrophobic environments — propelled objects, 
plaster walls, piles of rocks — that she must either withstand or demolish in 
her short performances, which she documents as videos.79 The artist kicks, 
hacks, claws, and hurls her weight through these obstacles during her physi-
cally demanding performances. Her targeted actions are reminiscent of con-
ventions established by Fluxus artists, as if she were following a simple score 
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or set of instructions for performing the work: keep smiling while things 
are thrown at you, break through a wall, stuff your head through a wooden 
cutout of a star (figure 4.10). In Walk This Way (2008), Gilmore performs for 
a still camera. Wearing a color- coordinated dress and high heels, she begins 
to knock down an exposed wall, hurling the weight of her body against it, 
battering it with her heel (figure 4.11). The vaginal- like rupture she creates 
reveals that the interior side of the wall is a glossy magenta, matching the 
silk flower in her hair. For Standing Here (2010), featured in the 2010 Whit-
ney Biennial, Gilmore, in a polka- dotted dress and a ponytail, exerted the 
full force of her weight to puncture holes, find footing, and ultimately scale 
the inside of a self- designed column — an uncanny structure that echoes a 
vertical tunnel or an upstanding birth canal. Referencing Schneemann’s 
iconic feminist performance Interior Scroll, the art critic Lyra Kilston writes 
of Gilmore, “The bluntness of her acts seems appropriate for the female ste-
reotypes Gilmore parodies, yet this is not your mother’s feminist video art: 
FIGURE 4.10 Kate Gilmore, Star Bright, Star Might, 2007. Source: Kate Gilmore.
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lipstick, color- coordinated hair ribbons, and an eager- to- please smile usurp 
1970s scraggly underarm hair and vaginal scrolls.”80 Often these young art-
ists are clearly drawing on the history of feminist art. But as we will see, as 
they become increasingly more reflective and imitative, they also become 
increasingly less inclined to credit (or even admit that they know) their origi-
nal sources.
NOT YOUR MOTHER’S PERFORMANCE ART
On one level, the works of Young, Swanson, and Gilmore certainly read as 
feminist art. They utilize the familiar tropes of abjection and shock (cringe 
and disgust, ingestion and expulsion, explicit nudity and sexuality) associ-
ated with feminist performance art, and they carry the affective charge asso-
ciated with those tropes. But while women performance artists of the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s engaged in arguably more sincere, explicit, and overtly po-
liticized body art practices, the work of these contemporary artists registers 
a certain amount of ambivalence about what it means to explicitly and pub-
licly avow a feminist position — which is not the same as ambivalence about 
in fact being a feminist. When asked directly in a 2007 interview about Snow 
FIGURE 4.11 Kate Gilmore, Walk This Way, 2008. Source: Kate Gilmore.
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White, “Is this a feminist piece?,” Young answered, “I don’t know. I don’t 
know what the fuck it is. I mean, some people would say it is. We’re actu-
ally doing two shows in Italy this year, and one is a women’s- gender yadda 
yadda. These people are really into the piece, which I find very interesting. 
It makes sense that they would be, but I don’t know. I feel like this piece is 
so open- ended. I guess I don’t really see it as a feminist piece. I see it more as 
a solo.”81 Here Young disarticulates her practice from the tradition of femi-
nist art, framing it as singular and iconoclastic, as not inheriting from any 
particular political position or aesthetic tradition. But in my own interview 
with the artist, Young responded to this same question with an altogether 
different answer:
Definitely. One hundred percent for sure. I think [the works] are femi-
nist because I’m a female and I made it. The word feminist is so funny to 
me because it’s become such a broad term, and I think that in some ways 
that’s good and in some ways it’s sort of confusing. I think they are femi-
nist, but I am not trying to make feminist work. . . . Whatever I am think-
ing about at that time, whatever I’m trying to do at that time is . . . I’m 
not like “Women should be free.” You know what I mean? For Sherry, it 
is like “Women should be free.” But that’s not my goal. My goal is to por-
tray this character. But yeah, I think they are definitely feminist. I don’t 
see how they couldn’t be. . . . It’s like yes and no mean the same thing to 
me. I could say “Maybe.”82
Young reserves for her alter ego Sherry the clear statement of the (feminist- 
identified) belief that “women should be free,” using Sherry as an alibi to say 
what she will not say herself. It is Sherry who represents a liberationist posi-
tion as a caricature, and it is Sherry who defers revolutionary politics to the 
land of make- believe. By reserving the emancipatory outlook for her alter 
ego, Young offers a sly critique of the outmodedness of a feminist approach 
that could imagine such a thing as freedom to be within the realm of possi-
bility. When she speaks for herself, she refuses to be pinned down to a par-
ticular position. Her position is illegible, and deliberately so. Like Tristan 
Tzara’s provocation in his “Dada Manifesto” that “affirmation=negation,” 
she engages in maneuvers of obfuscation and multiplication: yes, no, maybe.83 
Young, a self- described “escape artist” when it comes to explaining her prac-
tice to other people, performs ideological inconsistency and historical igno-
rance to avoid having to maintain a single political pose that would too easily 
risk becoming dogmatic or fossilized over time.84 
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In the question “Is your work feminist?” Young hears instead “Is your 
work original?” She explicitly rejects the idea that her work inherits feminist 
art traditions, that it is part of a history. By making her work and her ideas 
and affiliations illegible, she routes around political expectations of trans-
parency or internal coherence that would enable her and her work to be 
placed within an institutional context and history. This type of illegibility, of 
committing to no coherent ideological position that lasts past the moment, 
this posture of refusal — these are the characteristics of the parasitical art-
ists in this chapter. They are still parasites, but this insistence on incoher-
ence, on multiplying reflections and parodies, on copying and stealing and 
refusing credit is what sets apart the particular artists I examine here (and 
this generation of artists) . Young encapsulates this contemporary parasitical 
sensibility when she insists on the original authorship of her work: “I guess 
I don’t really see it as a feminist piece. I see it more as a solo.” She goes on to 
say that she “[doesn’t] really know what feminist art is”; that “to be perfectly 
honest” she had never heard of Marina Abramović; that she knows only “a 
little bit about” Annie Sprinkle; and that until “the other day,” she had “never 
seen anything by” Karen Finley (although the two are constantly compared). 
It seems impossible that Young’s assertions are true. Echoing many of Fin-
ley’s performances, Young poured chocolate all over herself in her 2006 per-
formance Solo (figures 4.12 and 4.13) — an ironic title that rejects the idea of 
being part of a tradition of feminist art while at the same moment clearly 
reflecting and referencing a famous body of work that came before.
Young doesn’t shy away from referring to (even, as in the case of Solo, par-
tially reperforming) these previous foundational works. Instead she refuses 
to cite them, refuses to be identified as inheriting their legacy. Claims Young, 
“What is so funny is that I am really not influenced by anybody else and I 
think for some people that is frustrating because I don’t go see performances 
and I don’t support my community, whatever that is supposed to mean. I 
think that is so silly because what is supporting community? Is there only 
one way to do that? By making work I am supporting my community. Yes it’s 
feminist art.”85 Like Penny Arcade (who during their onstage confrontation 
called Young “a fake radical” who “lacks material” and “has no technique”), 
critics don’t buy Young’s professed ignorance of her feminist foremothers’ 
work nor the originality of her own: “Karen Finley has been doing basi-
cally the same thing for 30 years, only better,” writes Andy Horwitz, a dance 
and theater blogger. “For that matter Penny Arcade, Diamanda Galás and 
countless other women performers have explored these ideas — and presen-
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tations of the human body — in more intelligent, capable, insightful and art-
ful ways.”86 Similarly the New York Times critics Claudia La Rocco and Gia 
Kourlas write of Young’s show The Bagwell in Me (2008), “There was nothing 
in this half- baked mess that many an artist hasn’t done before, and better. 
Ms. Young has trumpeted her willed artistic ignorance and disdain for her 
peers. Let’s hope for her sake that’s the truth, as, just 27, she still has time to 
look around and learn her history. Either of these actions would enrich her 
compellingly raw but one- note stage presence. If only she would show less of 
herself and more of the world.”87 
Yet Young remains undeterred. The artist’s “willed artistic ignorance” ex-
tends to her interactions with the well- known artists whose work she draws 
on. In 2010 Young said that she had been approached about doing a double 
bill with Karen Finley, an offer that she says Finley subsequently declined: “I 
feel like she is offended or something because she is like ‘She is trying to re-
FIGURE 4.12 Karen Finley, We Keep Our Victims Ready, 1990. Source: Walker Art 
Center Archives.
FIGURE 4.13 Ann Liv Young, Solo, 2006. Source: Ann Liv Young.
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place me,’ but I don’t know anything about her. I would think that might be 
insulting to her. I was thinking like, should I approach her and try to get her 
to do this double bill with me and act as if I am a huge fan? Or should I tell 
her, ‘I don’t know anything about your work’?”88 Finley seemed to take small 
revenge (whether intentionally or not), returning Young’s willed ignorance; 
a few years later, when she and Young were co- headliners for a panel on the 
politics of censorship and performance at nyu  in 2013, Finley persistently 
referred to Ann Liv throughout alternately as “Ann” and “Anna.”
Young responds with a shrug of ironic indifference to those who have 
come before her, a reaction that is perhaps in alignment with the antiestab-
lishment aesthetic and political values of Abramović as well as many of her 
feminist predecessors (although where Young answers yes, no, maybe to the 
question of her feminism, Abramović answers only no). Perhaps Young’s re-
flection and rearticulation of the feminist art tradition is more faithful to its 
founding values than the grandes dames of feminist performance might like 
to admit, at least when they are on the receiving end of it. It is certainly more 
aligned with their radical spirit than the reverence called for by La Rocco 
and Kourlas. These critics’ expectations betray their own misunderstanding 
of artists such as Schneemann and Finley, whose body art critiqued precisely 
the masculinist formal preoccupation with concepts such as originality and 
genius — the same concepts that they wish Young would internalize. While 
Young is sensitive to the charge of unoriginality, she lays no claim to novelty 
(“I’m not trying to break some boundary”), instead (like Swanson and Gilm-
ore) employing hackneyed signifiers, generating an aesthetic of failure that 
troubles the overly prescriptive politics of an institutionalized feminist art 
whose radical politics has been sanitized. These artists take pains to avoid 
using these signifiers by superimposing a positive feminist meaning in the 
empty place where politics used to be — a refusal that is at times madden-
ing. In this way their work shifts from an active to a passive feminist aes-
thetic. When Young sidesteps the logic of art historical progression (yes, no, 
maybe), perhaps she is refusing the anxiety that comes with acknowledg-
ing the influence of the feminist art “mother” — anxiety that would (though 
ironically) put her into deeper conversation with the previous generation of 
artists, the artists whose legacies she would inherit. But, like an adolescent, 
she refuses that potential affinity and slams the door behind her.
It ultimately does not matter whether or not Young actually knows her 
art history. (In truth, her ignorance appears to be both an over- the- top 
put- on and the effect of years of studied indifference.) But her adolescent 
performance of “willed artistic ignorance,” whether conscious or not, stages 
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a compelling tactic that can be used by others. She implicitly challenges the 
desirability of a patrimony- based model (a structure of legacy and inheri-
tance) for the politics of feminist identification. This critique is itself not 
original, recalling prior feminist critiques such as those of Sandra M. Gil-
bert and Susan Gubar, who critiqued Bloom’s The Anxiety of Influence for its 
treatment of poetry as an Oedipal struggle, as “intensely (even exclusively) 
male, and necessarily patriarchal.” “Where, then, does the female poet fit 
in?” they ask. “Does she want to annihilate a ‘forefather’ or a ‘foremother’? 
What if she can find no models, no precursors?”89 
What if, instead of wagging a finger at Young and her peers for failing to 
fall into line with a larger historical schema, we read Young’s claimed igno-
rance as a queer feminist performance of political forgetting — a “shadow 
feminism,” a willful interruption of generational modes of transmission (fol-
lowing Jack Halberstam)?90 How might her aesthetic of parasitical disavowal 
allow for the emergence of a different conception of history? These artists 
inhabit the structure of feminism, although their works (and their identifi-
cations) do not necessarily bear feminism’s name. By saying “I think [the 
works] are feminist, but I am not trying to make feminist work,” Young sug-
gests that her kind of feminism exceeds the possibility of its representation, 
that it thwarts the consolidation of feminism with a particular set of visual 
and rhetorical practices. These artists activate the adolescent as a figure of 
overdetermination or caricature, one that works to distance their relation 
not to feminist politics itself but to a particular set of assumptions about 
feminist art. They are feminist in that they reject older structures, but this 
is not a gesture of empty iconoclasm; it is a means of resisting the co- option 
of their voices. Yet they articulate no positive alternatives to the feminist art 
traditions they decline to inherit.
MANIC AUTOGENESIS
Swanson’s practice exemplifies the third of the shared tactics used by some of 
these younger feminist artists: artists who engage in what I call “manic auto-
genesis” reject legacy by doubling and reproducing themselves, by creating 
themselves outside of the tradition of feminist art. This autogenesis (orig-
ination with no external cause, or self- generation) ruptures the expected 
(patriarchal) forms of legacy and inheritance.91 Their works pay homage to 
the simulacrum — repetition, refraction, iteration, multiplication — while at 
the same time suggesting a nostalgia for a lost origin through the artist’s 
aesthetic accumulation of signs borrowed from childhood: fairy tales, sen-
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timental pop, baby- doll dresses. The depropriative quality of this work — its 
quality of a certain political homelessness — signals that, for these artists, 
everything is borrowed. The undecidability of irony, its constitutive double-
ness makes it a fitting mode for these artists’ passive expression of para-
sitical feminism. They advance an ironic and refracted aesthetic of self- 
representation, reworking borrowed images of themselves to represent (or 
to occlude) themselves. Manic autogenesis is, at its best, a parodic disiden-
tification with feminist art’s institutionalization as I have described it here, 
but it can also shade into a self- serving nihilism that is muddled to the point 
of unintelligibility.
In their performed ignoring, forgetting, and disavowing of the figure of 
the foremother, and in their reluctance to accept their generational position 
as the daughters of liberal feminism, these artists make visible an uncanny 
wish to birth themselves. Young sees her work “more as a solo.” Gilmore’s 
work obsessively reenacts a birthing of the self through her own physical 
materials, pushing her face through holes, breaching barriers with the full 
force of her being. Swanson undertakes to produce herself as her own child, 
“giving birth” to Amber Doll. This desire to re- produce the self comprises 
both the desire to birth the self (bypassing the figure of the mother) and the 
method of birthing the self: by producing multiple images of themselves, 
these artists create themselves as political subjects. (To understand the ges-
ture of representing the self as a source of power, one need only think of 
how significant the genres of autobiography and self- portraiture have been 
to feminism.) Yet this gesture of self- representation also seems to eat its own 
tail: by producing multiple representations and refractions of their selves, 
these artists seem also to disavow the coherence of identity. Artists like 
Swanson, Gilmore, and Young appear to be actively disidentifying both with 
feminism and with themselves, with those commercialized images of wom-
anhood that claim to represent them in mainstream culture and with the 
overdetermined feminist identifications on offer to them.
Consider an example that literalizes my reading of Young’s work as a 
performance of “self”- refraction and ideological multiplication. 37 Sherrys 
(2011) is a piece that emerged out of Young’s artist residency at the Amster-
dam Theaterschool (School voor Nieuwe Dansontwikkeling). The perfor-
mance, based on Young’s character Sherry, was created by Young in col-
laboration with thirty- six students, all of whom performed wearing Sherry’s 
trademark synthetic blond wig. During the performance, however, a handful 
of the copycat Sherrys turned on the original Sherry, in what Young would 
later insist was an unrehearsed ambush by four students (figure 4.14). As if to 
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demonstrate the reversibility of the parasitical tactics of homage, disavowal, 
and autogenesis all at once, these students hijacked Sherry, turning on their 
own “mother” by turning her methods against her. In a social media post, 
Young (as Sherry?) described the event: “I think they were saying that Sherry 
forces people to do things so they were gonna force me onto a table and tape 
me down but they didn’t get that far.”92 The students put into practice the 
very no- holds- barred improvisational method that Young herself practices 
as Sherry. By turning her methods against her, the students parasitized the 
parasite — and in so doing they converted Young’s position from that of para-
site to that of host. 
The artists I examine here turn the signifiers white, liberal, feminist, bour-
geois, femininity on their heads in multiple ways. In the hands of Young, 
Swanson, and Gilmore these signifiers are declassed, queered, worn down, 
and emptied out: gowns are worn too tight or too baggy, stained and dirty, 
lopsided and terribly unflattering, as in Young’s perfectly disturbed portrayal 
of a defecating Cinderella; in Gilmore’s work, in which she is all dressed up 
FIGURE 4.14 Ann Liv Young in collaboration with the Amsterdam Theaterschool 
(School voor Nieuwe Dansontwikkeling), 37 Sherrys, 2011. Photo by Michael A. 
Guerrero.
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with nowhere to go but through walls, soiling and breaking down her high 
heels; in the makeup caked on like a clown’s by Young’s alter ego Sherry. 
When they perform these distorted and degraded versions of the adolescent 
female figure, Swanson’s, Gilmore’s, and Young’s amateurish aesthetics of 
failure work to caricature the commodification of third- wave feminism by 
dragging its girl power. They stage tactical refusals of commercialized im-
ages of feminism that they do not recognize as representative of their own 
feminist politics. 
By performing in cheap blond Barbie wigs, Sherry and the thirty- six art-
ists who mirrored her reflect and parody what is overprocessed or synthetic 
about white femininity. Young’s blond wig is a gendered and racialized pros-
thesis, following in the tradition of Cindy Sherman’s Untitled Film Stills or 
Vanessa Beecroft’s durational, performance- based installations. But the wigs 
do not celebrate white femininity; they caricature it in the same way that, 
as Muñoz observes, Jack Smith’s work upends its seeming “orientalizing 
and tropicalizing aspects,” which are “imbued with a performativity that 
surpass[es] simple fetishization” and which “help[s] toxic images expand and 
become much more than quaint racisms.”93 As a tactical disidentification 
with whiteness, Sherry and company’s blond wigs serve a purpose closer to 
the black drag performance artist Vaginal Davis’ disidentificatory perfor-
mance of white girlness (worn in pigtails with a polka dot dress), theorized 
by Muñoz.94 Sherry’s blond wig also echoes the racial drag of Nikki S. Lee’s 
photo- performances of passing (The Ohio Project, 1999) and Kalup Linzy’s 
lo- fi video art performances (Conversations wit de Churen series, 2005) — 
anti-identitarian works that, like Young’s, insist on disassociating identifica-
tion from identity.
These performances enact a double disidentification: they challenge both 
second- and third- wave feminism in their performances of self- creation. 
These artists’ rebirthed images of themselves, far from idealized or aspira-
tional, model a politics that does not aspire to emancipation or even redemp-
tion. In these works the self- engendering described by autogenesis is a form 
of alienated self- parody that disavows inheritance through ironic represen-
tations of the self that are neither pure reproduction nor pure refusal. 
These artists complicate representations of themselves through perfor-
mance in order to renegotiate the models imposed on them by others. As 
performances, these works are deliberately illegible; they take an ironic 
stance that attaches to feminism a multiplicity of meanings (yes, no, maybe) 
that cannot be pinned down. These artists perform the adolescent for her 
ability to say things that authority does not completely understand, things 
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that cannot be easily co- opted or overdetermined because they are already 
caricatures. These performances of alienated self- parody thus turn the para-
sitical model back on themselves as a gesture of feminist self- making.
COPIES WITHOUT ORIGINALS
In March 2011 a review entitled “How 1 Become 2” appeared in the online 
London dance magazine Bellyflop.95 The unattributed post accused the 
London- based American performance artist Lauren Barri Holstein of pla-
giarizing the work of her contemporary Ann Liv Young. “This is shock value 
Live Art, you’ll never seen [sic] anything like it. Oh wait, you will, because 
actually Ann Liv Young is the real deal,” it read. “Some might argue we’re 
talking mere inspiration or appropriation, but I don’t buy that.” Silly grandi-
osity and slapdash prose aside, the review had a point. Holstein, like Young, 
often performs in a blond wig; her shows borrow heavily from fairy tales and 
feature gratuitous nudity; she vigorously performs pop karaoke. Holstein, 
like Young, started out as a dancer and choreographer, also undertaking an 
M.A. at Trinity Laban Conservatoire of Music and Dance. Holstein — who 
performs as “The Famous,” an alter ego she describes as “part- time sex ob-
ject, part- time flailing mess, part- time feminist” — has long proven a polariz-
ing figure on the London experimental performance circuit.96 Her unsparing 
performances of grotesque hyperfemininity, which have an even more ag-
gressive edge than Young’s work in the same vein, have found her thrashing 
around naked while suspended in a harness; popping balloons filled with 
red fluid with a knife inserted, handle- side up, into her vagina; “birthing” 
a McDonald’s Happy Meal toy; and urinating onstage while wearing a deer 
costume head. 
Despite clear commonalities between the two artists, the anonymous re-
viewer failed to appreciate the rather spectacular irony of positioning an 
artist like Young — an avowed and shameless appropriator (whom the re-
viewer calls with a straight face “the real deal”) — as the original of Holstein’s 
reproductions. (When I mentioned the accusation to Young, she simply 
shrugged at the idea, saying she’d never heard of Holstein. “Yeah I’ve never 
even seen her before, which is strange. I don’t think it looks anything like 
what I make.”)97 It is hard to imagine that the irony of earnestly investing in 
Young as an original artist is lost on Holstein, who wrote her master’s thesis 
partly on Young.98 In fact Holstein’s work differs from Young’s reliable per-
formance of ignorance primarily in its historical fidelity and critical rigor. 
Holstein completed a doctorate in English and drama at Queen Mary in 
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2015, with a dissertation that explores what she calls the “displayed” body’s 
access to self- determination in the works of artists such as Lynn Hersh man 
Leeson and Hannah Wilke. While it’s never clear whether Young has done 
her homework, Holstein most assuredly has — even if onstage it looks, at 
least to this reviewer, like she has copied someone else’s. Audiences of Hol-
stein’s 2013 performance of Splat! at London’s spil l  Festival of Performance 
saw The Famous suspended upside down and covered in ketchup, but they 
will likely never know about Holstein’s companion piece explaining how 
the show’s strategic deployment of “incompleteness” works against what she 
characterizes as “pop- feminist narratives of trauma and survival in which 
the affirmative female subject is defined by her victimization.”99 
Unlike Young, Holstein is unambiguous in her feminist commitments, 
and she enthusiastically acknowledges the influence on her work of 1960s 
and 1970s feminist artists such as Schneemann and Finley.100 (In her studied 
reverence for feminist art history, Holstein is perhaps closer to Liftig than 
to Young on the continuum of generational parasitism I trace in this chap-
ter.) For her 2011 performance How 2 Become 1 at the Barbican’s spil l  Fes-
tival of Performance in London, Holstein (who has also reimagined Yoko 
Ono’s iconic Cut Piece) staged her own reenactment of Schneemann’s Inte-
rior Scroll (figures 4.15 and 4.16). She would describe the performance as her 
response to the Bellyflop review’s accusation of plagiarism, during which she 
proceeded to pull from her vagina “a scroll,” reenacting Schneemann’s ges-
ture in the original work. But Holstein’s scroll, unlike Schneemann’s, does 
not contain a feminist diatribe against those who criticize her work for its 
“diaristic indulgence”; Holstein’s scroll lists the names of all the people the 
artist claims to have “plagiarized” (figure 4.17). The list begins with “Carolee 
Schneemann, Karen Finley, Ann Liv Young, Hannah Wilke, Marina Abro-
movic [sic]” and eventually gets around to scholars like Judith Butler and 
Laura Mulvey, pop stars like the Backstreet Boys, and fictional characters 
like Mr. Bubble and the Easter Bunny. 
Holstein’s parasitism is not a performance of refusing to acknowledge her 
debts to a larger system of feminist influence. Rather than the ironic amnesia 
or simple reference without citation deployed by the other artists discussed 
in this chapter, Holstein’s defense is one of hypercitationality. She might be 
said to overcompensate by providing too many acknowledgments (naming 
too many influences, a move that minimizes Young’s clear influence on Hol-
stein’s practice), and she eventually abandons the sincerity of the gesture 
altogether when she trails off into cartoon characters, ending with Mickey 
Mouse and Rainbow Brite.
FIGURE 4.15 Carolee Schneemann, Interior Scroll, 1975. Source:  
Carolee Schneemann.
FIGURE 4.16 The Famous Lauren Barri Holstein, How 2 Become 1, 2011.  
Source: Lauren Barri Holstein.
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But Holstein’s response to the accusation of plagiarizing a contemporary — 
the gesture of reenacting a forebear — is a curious, even defensive choice, for 
she is an artist for whom appropriation obviously functions as a metacita-
tional feminist strategy rather than a symptom of creative deficiency. In a 
blog post she describes the intentions behind her restaging of Schneemann’s 
iconic work: “A few weeks before my performance at the Spill Festival 2011, 
a 20- year- old idiot who knows absolutely nothing about the history of femi-
nist performance wrote that I was plagiarizing another artist, presumably 
the only other feminist performance artist she’d ever heard of. In reality, I’m 





From How 2 Become 
1, 2011. Source: Lauren 
Barri Holstein.
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plagiarizing all of them, and lots and lots of other people.”101 Holstein posted 
a clip of her adaptation to Vimeo with the title “I’m a Plagiarist. Sorry, Ms. 
Schneemann. It’s only because I love you.” Unlike Young- as- Sherry, who 
would dismiss the accusation in a single folksy gesture, Holstein herself (not 
The Famous) responds with seeming sincerity (and without the armor of her 
persona) to the charge of plagiarism. In contrast to the strategies of parasiti-
cal homage, parasitical disavowal, and manic autogenesis I have outlined in 
this chapter, Holstein’s performance embraces reenactment earnestly and 
openly (if without securing the official approval that Abramović would insist 
on — hence Holstein’s characterization of her work as “plagiaristic”). Hol-
stein pays in sincerity the debts she owes to the earlier generation of feminist 
artists, who continue to inspire and move her.
Still, the Bellyflop reviewer’s naïve indignation at Holstein’s plagiarism 
evidences a vestigial attachment to measuring the quality of an artwork by 
its originality. The reviewer, rather startlingly, refers to Holstein’s work as 
“vintage Ann Liv Young,” a stark if comic reminder of the ever- evolving 
nature of notions of old and new. This is yet another turn of the gener-
ational screw; Young, who herself parasitizes a more established genera-
tion of artists, including Finley and Abramović, is here positioned as the 
host to Holstein’s parasite — suggesting there is no way to immunize oneself 
from parasites. As the coda explores in the work of Roisin Byrne (who is 
the ne plus ultra of this political and aesthetic move within feminist perfor-
mance art), when parasites gain access to resources — even the smallest bit of 
recognition — even parasites can be parasitized in their turn. It is only a mat-
ter of time.
CODA IT’S NOT YOU, IT’S ME
Roisin Byr ne a nd t h e Pa r a sit e’s  
Shi f t ing  Ethi c s a nd Poli t ic s
The parasited one parasites the parasites. One of the first, he jumps to the last 
position. But the one in the last position wins this game. He has discovered the 
position of the philosopher. — MICHEL SERRES, THE PARASITE
In this book I have advanced parasitism as a tactical mode or loophole by which certain precarious subjects (those with enough social capital to get 
a foot in the door) can leverage the minor advantages of appearing familiar 
and nonthreatening to those who hold power over them. This modality is ap-
propriable and reversible; it can be used indiscriminately and can be turned 
on anyone. The parasite’s comparatively minor leverage can be harnessed as 
a tool of solidarity and redistribution, just as it can be used in bad faith for 
reactionary or self- serving proprietary ends. As a remedy, it comes with un-
wanted side effects. Like the parasite itself, its targets are complex and con-
tingent. With each chapter in this book, the ethical and political valences of 
parasitical resistance have grown murkier as the power differential between 
the parasite and the host has narrowed. Whereas the extreme dominance 
of multinational corporate leviathans or the exclusionary legacies of private 
property, nationality or racial belonging, and debt or inheritance represent 
largely unambiguous targets of critique, parasitism’s ethical and political di-
mensions grow increasingly difficult to parse as its encounter with the host 
becomes more intimate, personal, and — as the host and parasite increasingly 
resemble one other — subjective. In what follows I return to the conceptual 
artist Roisin Byrne, with whose practice I opened the book, to examine what 
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happens when the power differential between parasite and host is negligible — 
when it is not fully clear which is parasite and which is host.1 
In 2011 Byrne began to flatter, steal, and contest my reading of her work 
as parasitical. Our correspondence would set off a yearlong chain of events 
wherein the artist appropriated my criticism on her practice while I appro-
priated her practice for my criticism. This uncanny period of creative (if not 
always consensual) mutualism proved strange and exhilarating. This en-
counter also lifted into view the inherent ethical and political indeterminacy 
of parasitism, as well as parasitism’s tendency to conceal and displace the 
violence it enables (concealment that is the condition for its special form of 
access). I take Byrne to be a problematic exemplar of what I have explored in 
the second half of the book as parasitism’s compromised feminist potential — 
 a potential that is heavily reliant on a white heterosexist matrix in order to 
accommodate itself to hosts, which allows it to remain undetected. I argue 
that Byrne’s body of work tests the limits of parasitism as a paradigm of re-
sistance: Is it worth it to take advantage of the loopholes enabled by gendered 
mechanisms of exclusion when doing so means propping up other struc-
tures of oppression? Our exchange raises new questions about the critical 
and practical value of parasitical resistance, particularly its utility as a femi-
nist analytic and mode, and also the difficulty of critiquing something with 
which one is entangled. 
MISS APPROPRIATION
When our correspondence began, Byrne was fresh off of her appearance 
on the bbc 4 reality tv  series Goldsmiths: But Is It Art? (2010). The (rather 
unfortunately titled) documentary series showcased the young conceptual 
artist as one of three mfa  students struggling to jump- start their careers 
in the shadow of the global financial crisis.2 The show promoted itself as a 
glimpse into the inner workings of the university’s art program, which is 
a hotbed for conceptual art, having produced a generation of artists that 
includes Gillian Wearing, Steve McQueen, and, most famously, Damien 
Hirst. (Hirst became notorious for his project The Physical Impossibility 
of Death in the Mind of Someone Living [1991], a tiger shark preserved in 
a tank of formaldehyde.) The two- part series highlighted Byrne’s tactic of 
openly stealing the concepts of well- established male conceptual artists.3 A 
single mother of a young son, living in London, Byrne characterized her 
controversial methods as necessary to her survival. “Being an artist and a 
single mum, you [become] very creative [with] what’s available to you. It 
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can be very expensive spending money on materials, paying rent and fees. 
I just need to think on my feet. Stealing or robbing or appropriating — 
that’s what I do.”4 
In 2009 Byrne made Look What You Made Me Do (figure C.2), described 
in the introduction. She used her position within the university and her 
friendly rapport with the artist to divert Jochem Hendricks’s honorarium 
for a visiting stint at Goldsmiths, replacing his bank information with her 
own and using the funds to make a copy of his most famous work, Tax 
(2000) (figure C.1). For that piece, Hendricks had purchased gold bars in the 
exact amount that he owed the government and claimed them as “artist’s 
materials” on his tax return (a loophole in tax law since said to have been 
closed).5 
Hendricks’s work often explores loopholes in the law: for Luxus Avatar 
(2009) he made a life- size gold replica of himself and purchased luxury items 
(including a sports car and Hermès clothing) for this replica, writing them 
off on his taxes as artist’s materials and exhibiting them as part of his show 
Legal Crimes. Rather than exploring legal loopholes, Byrne’s work explores 
the unwritten laws of social mores. The implications of Hendricks’s actions 
are explicit and straightforward: it’s legal or it’s not. In contrast, Byrne ne-
gotiates the realm of the implicit, identifying in the extralegal gray area of 
conceptual art a loophole, a certain amount of play in the system, that allows 
her to investigate the double standard in the critical reception of their work. 
While Hendricks’s incursions are “clean” and masterful, hers are “dirty” 
and parasitical. 
Recall that Hendricks attempts to police the boundaries of art, to exclude 
Byrne’s work while offering an alibi for his own. (He suggests that her work 
is not “serious,” characterizing Look What You Made Me Do as a joke.) He 
concludes his email to her by asking Byrne to send further justification of 
the merit of the piece if she wants to be treated as a peer. While Hendricks is 
perfectly valid in questioning the quality of her conceptualization (and, as he 
rightly notes, her expropriation is not at a loss to him), in so doing he misses 
the real trap she has laid for him: his attachment to his own originality. 
Byrne calls Hendricks out for being proprietary over his cultural capital — 
which he earned by making antiproprietary art. She shows how, when faced 
with the threat of her parasitism, he retreats into the very discourses of ar-
tistic mastery and intellectual property that his practice ostensibly works to 
subvert. Ever the transgressor, Hendricks, as I argue of Dick in chapter 3, 
resists being transgressed, preferring the role of mentor and pedagogue to 
colleague.
FIGURE C.1 Jochem Hendricks, Tax, 2000 . Source: Jochem 
Hendricks.
FIGURE C.2 Roisin Byrne, Look What You Made Me Do, 2009. 
Source: Roisin Byrne.
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13 May 2009 11:05:01
Subject: Re: Hello
Roisin,
Of course I was laughing when I read your confession. But you are 
aware that you are dealing with my expenses, it is not even a profit. . . .  
If you are able to convince me with a profound concept and content, 
we can talk. Up to now, I can only see a game, which is related to my 
work. Meaning, content are the major points.
Looking forward to your explanations.
Best wishes,
J.M.
To this missive Byrne responds with an unfazed “I was wondering how you 
might take the news!” Upbeat and confessional, her email is also unapolo-
getic: Jochem, I don’t have to sell this work to you, because you’ve already paid 
for it. “I have fallen in love with your work and you,” she continues, echoing 
Kraus’s and Calle’s lovesick masquerades. “My explanation is one of simply 
pure unadulterated desire . . . the desire for something of yours, a piece of 
work, perhaps a piece of you.” Though it is formulated in the language of se-
duction, hers is less a desire to be with Hendricks than to signify like him, to 
possess the authorizing power of his signature. 
15 May 2009 20:24:55
Subject: Re: Hello
Dear JM,
Thanks so much for your reply. I was wondering how you might take 
the news! And I guess I was also secretly hoping for you to ask me to 
“sell” it to you so to speak as a profound concept. I’m not sure as I have 
to remind you that you have paid for it already. But joking aside, maybe 
I will give you an explanation at least and a concept at most.
My explanation is one of simply pure unadulterated desire. By this 
I mean that I have fallen in love with your work and you by associa-
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tion the artist Jochem Hendricks. The desire for something of yours, 
a piece of work, perhaps a piece of you. You and your bank details be-
came the raw materials that made my work possible, they and you be-
came the medium by which I produced a 24 Carat Gold Bar, the closest 
thing to owning an authentic Jochem Hendricks as I could ever hope 
to get to. The only thing missing now of course is your signature.
Roisin
The piece is typical of Byrne’s practice. It’s one of five different works for 
which she has engaged prominent male artists over email, using flattery to 
get what she wants from them. She has also stolen, copied, and forged the 
works of the conceptual artists Santiago Sierra, Roberto Cuoghi, Ryan Gan-
der, and Simon Starling. In one piece Byrne professes to have tracked down 
one of the four female prostitutes that Sierra paid with a shot of heroin to 
be tattooed, in a work titled 160 cm Line Tattooed on 4 People (2000). Byrne 
claims that she used laser removal to erase the prostitute’s tattoo and had it 
tattooed on her back instead. In another pilfered piece, Byrne claims that 
when she placed an order for a neon sign that she intended to exhibit, she 
was told that she was the second artist that week to place such an order — 
a “stroke of luck” that’s hardly believable.6 Supposedly the other order, 
which read “Massage,” had been placed by the British artist Ryan Gander 
(a story he disputes). Upon learning this, Byrne claims, she canceled her 
original order and instead ordered an exact replica of Gander’s sign, which 
she exhibited as Massage (2009). It should be noted that Byrne’s manner of 
exhibition provides little evidence that these actions actually took place. 
These conceptual artworks are “indexed” by digital photographs and aph-
oristic captions, presented as “documentary evidence” of otherwise un-
verified performances; it is this evidence that is exhibited in galleries and 
on the artist’s personal website (roisinbyrne.co.uk).7
In 2009 Byrne initiated an email correspondence with Starling. Widely 
praised for his ambitious environmental actions and installations, Starling 
received the Turner Prize, arguably the world’s most prestigious award for 
contemporary art, in 2005 for his meticulously researched and crafted Shed-
boatshed (Mobile Architecture No. 2). In this work he converted an old shed 
he found on the banks of the Rhine into a boat, which he paddled to Art Ba-
sel and painstakingly rebuilt into a shed, which he exhibited in the gallery. 
Byrne, claiming admiration for his work, posed as a fan wishing to admire 
IT’S NOT YOU, IT’S ME 197
one of his works in situ. “You are obviously a very busy man,” she cooed. She 
asked him where she could find the plants he had transplanted to the Parque 
Los Alcornocales in Spain for his earnestly titled 1999 installation Rescued 
Rhododendrons. She then used against him the information she gained when 
she posed as a horticulturist, stole one of the shrubs, and smuggled it back 
with her on a budget airline flight. For her final student show at Goldsmiths, 
she exhibited their correspondence in full, hanging printouts of the emails 
with black electrical tape alongside the withering plant in a piece she entitled 
You Don’t Bring Me Flowers Anymore (figure C.3). This is one of the least pal-
atable examples in the book, not least because the host is consciously work-
ing to redistribute. The parasitical act is much harder to stomach when the 
target is not someone taking advantage of their privilege but instead some-
one who is trying to use it for the betterment of others. It is Byrne, in this 
case, who takes what is being distributed and keeps it for herself.
“It’s like the residue of somebody else’s, like a Turner prizewinner’s, pro-
cess,” she said of the plant, observing on Goldsmiths: But Is It Art? that Star-
ling had won the Turner Prize “in 2004 or something like that,” perform-
ing to her colleague a kind of “willed ignorance” similar to what Young 
performs to her feminist art forebears. Byrne continued, “So what kind of 
value does that embody, and if I take it, what does that mean?”8 When Byrne 
FIGURE C.3 Roisin Byrne, You Don’t 
Bring Me Flowers Anymore, 2009. 
Source: Roisin Byrne.
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informed Starling of what she’d done, he was stunned. “I’m sad and disap-
pointed,” he wrote to her. “I understood you had a certain empathy for what 
I was doing as an artist.” Upon receiving this email, Byrne merely shrugged: 
“He’s a bit upset. But you can’t be taking these things too seriously.” Star-
ling (like so many of the other hosts that I have described in this book) later 
threatened legal action but never pursued it.
IT’S NOT YOU, IT’S ME
I became interested in Byrne’s work when I was in the early stages of writing 
about performance artists that I read as manifesting feminism’s more ambiva-
lent dimensions. I found her work to be symptomatic of the kind of interven-
tionist practice I was beginning to theorize as parasitical.9 The relatively scant 
curatorial and journalistic writing about her artistic practice had focused al-
most solely on questions about the ethics of stealing and forgery, but in my 
early writing I asked what possibilities were opened up by reading her prac-
tice as a performance that literalizes and hyperbolizes the stereotypical femi-
nized other — one of many such performances, as the previous two chapters 
have shown. What if, rather than moralize about the actions of one individual 
woman artist, we regarded her performance as structural, as playing a posi-
tion? I saw Byrne’s work as being in line with the high- femme interventions of 
Chris Kraus, Sophie Calle, and Jill Magid, all of whom engage in practices of 
“tactical flirting,” a phrase that Sarah Kanouse has used to describe the radi-
cal feminist dance troupe The Pink Bloque.10 I saw Byrne’s methods as hav-
ing clear precedents in the work of “theft artists” such as Dennis Oppenheim, 
Ann Messner, and most notably the Bulgarian artist Ivan Moudov, who steals 
fragments from artworks exhibited in galleries and museums, re- exhibiting 
them with extreme attentiveness (Fragments, 2002 – 7). I saw her methods as 
inheriting from an earlier generation of feminist appropriation artists, namely 
Elaine Sturtevant and Sherrie Levine, both of whom are known for making 
replicas of iconic works by famous male artists. Sturtevant and Levine were at 
the forefront of the conceptualist critique of male authorship, debunking the 
masculinist myth of originality by showing that they could be just as master-
ful as the original authors.11 Byrne steals and forges not to claim the works as 
her own but to use mimicry as her alibi; when they say “You can’t do that,” she 
answers, “Well, you did.” Similarly Sturtevant and Levine made no attempt 
to pass off their copies as the original works. Instead they actively promoted 
their projects as appropriations of the male artists’ works. 
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Byrne exhibits her works specifically as appropriations of work by more 
established hosts, and it is this that makes her work parasitical. Unlike Stur-
tevant and Levine, Byrne is conceptually invested not in the materiality of 
her re- presentation of the male artists’ works but in the social conditions that 
make possible her parasitical appropriations of their work in the first place. 
Levine and Sturtevant emphasize their structural exclusion from the aura 
of mastery and prestige that is conferred on male artists like Duchamp and 
Warhol, whose originality lay in their rejection of originality as an aesthetic 
principle — though they did not reject originality as the basis of the system 
of rewards by which male artists accrue power and influence. In contrast, 
Byrne emphasizes her access to that aura, however compromised and con-
tingent that access is.
Byrne weaponizes feminine stereotypes. She embodies the logic and 
tactics of parasitism: she plays herself, overidentifying with the role she 
is already given to play, like the younger performance artists in chapter 
4. She flatters the male artist who sees her only as a schoolgirl admirer, 
a minor character in his story, a hanger- on to the great egos of the male 
avant- garde. Blandishing the host, she leverages professional flattery and 
flirtation to lower her target’s defenses; after emailing Starling to tell him 
that she had taken his plant, she compares the anxiety she feels awaiting his 
response to “feel[ing] like the girl waiting for the fucking phone call.” She 
takes advantage of her appearance as nonthreatening, as “like but unlike” 
the host; she is a white woman with a British passport and the cultural 
capital represented by a Goldsmiths mfa , like enough to pass undetected 
but not like enough to challenge the host’s power or possessions. She gains 
the trust of prominent male artists through the lateral access enabled by 
her performance of heterosexual flirtation, her assumed socioeconomic 
connivance, and all the myriad ways that middle- class whiteness and fem-
ininity are invited into, regarded as loyal and resigned to, the fundamen-
tal structures of power. Her interventions assume the heterosexuality of 
the male artists she targets and the heteronormativity of their relations. 
Byrne’s imposition of a romantic script highlights their ability to benefit 
from masculine heteronormative privilege, indifferent to the artists’ ac-
tual sexualities or whether or not they identify with her imposed script. 
Her incursions play the obsequious young artist off the seasoned master, 
turning the intimate protocols of both chivalry and professionalism to her 
ends: luring the artist into unwittingly assisting in the theft or forgery of 
his own work. 
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“I’m not interested in placing it in some kind of art discourse,” Byrne 
has said of her work. “I’m interested in a relationship to information and to 
ownership. The separation between you and that thing you desire is chang-
ing.”12 What Byrne calls “that thing you desire,” that coveted object taken 
without permission, is the very cultural and commercial capital possessed by 
the male artists whom she targets. Reading Byrne’s practice as parasitical — 
 indeed as a self- conscious feminist performance of parasitism — opens up a 
number of questions: How does the actor’s minoritarian status affect how we 
read the ethics and politics of an action? What are the grounds (moral, taste- 
based, or otherwise normative valuative terms) for characterizing women’s 
drive to acquire cultural and commercial capital — awards, renown, financial 
success — as a parasitical imposition? What might be possible for a feminism 
that is unbounded by the ethical imperatives of autonomy, propriety, and 
sincerity in an eminently unethical system? How might parasitism free up a 
set of experimental feminist tactics of resistance in a moment when frontal 
or affirmative political actions are often rapidly suppressed? 
Byrne takes without giving — a reversal of the terms by which femi-
nized subjects are expected to give without taking. She does not attempt 
to redress women artists’ historical marginalization by changing the struc-
tures that exclude them; instead she short- circuits exclusion by simply tak-
ing symbols of the capital she covets. She exhibits the fruits of her labor 
as conceptual art, a frame within which otherwise illegal or immoral acts 
are imbued with critical potential. Her projects — indeed all the projects ex-
amined in this book — challenge and reflect on modernist investments in 
originality, prompting questions about authorial intention and legitimacy, 
private property and zones of illegality. Byrne exploits the relatively recent 
recognition of appropriation as a recognized aesthetic practice, latching on 
to the deregulatory zeitgeist of the neoliberal art market and securing it as 
her host. It guarantees her claim to that which is otherwise beyond her reach. 
As a part of a biweekly research group, I uploaded an early draft of my 
writing on Byrne onto a university- sponsored wiki — a collaborative on-
line space for sharing files — to be shared with my fellow graduate students 
for workshopping. A few weeks later, on April 17, 2011, I received a Face-
book friend request and then a message from Byrne. Our wiki had not been 
password- protected, and the artist had found my unpublished draft about 
her work through a Google Alert she had set for herself. In her message, 
Byrne praised my reading of her work; a few days later she emailed me to 
ask permission to “take some terms” of mine for her artist’s statement for an 
upcoming solo exhibition in Madrid.13 
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Subject: Hello
April 17 at 6:17 am EST
Hello Anna
I thought i would drop you a line to run something by you..i hope you 
don’t mind. I have a solo show coming up at the end of May at my gal-
lery in Madrid and i would really like for the works to be positioned 
properly ..it’s time!…
Anyhows, i was wondering if i could ask you whether it might be pos-
sible to take some terms you use… for my blurb for my upcoming show???
With no publication on Byrne to cite, I was faced with having my own 
ideas rendered unoriginal — an uneasy position. Despite her reputation as a 
theft artist, Byrne’s record gave little indication that she neither would pose 
a threat to me, for I was neither male, nor affluent, nor well established. Nev-
ertheless the request brought into conflict the difference between the acade-
my’s and the art world’s appropriative protocols. As Wilson Mizner famously 
said, “Copying one book is plagiarism, copying many is research.”14 While 
academic criticism, like conceptual art, is a hypercitational genre, the schol-
ar’s accepted parasitism turns on the quotation mark and the requisite works 
cited; the parasitism of the conceptual artist depends for its citation on the 
viewer’s art historical knowledge. Finding myself in the place of Hendricks 
and Starling, I was made aware of my own attachment to seeing my work as 
somehow original. After some deliberation, I responded:15
Subject: Re: Hello
April 19 at 5:29 pm EST
Hi Roisin,
I am honored that you are interested in my work. Would this be for 
a catalog essay? If so, I would be thrilled if you quoted me (I could 
provide you with a quote if so) and perhaps even better, I could write 
something about your work for it.
As a young female graduate student who is working to establish my-
self as a critic — just as you are as a young artist — it means a lot for my 
ideas to be acknowledged (and yes those are my phrasings). Perhaps 




April 20 at 2:53am EST
Hi Anna,
I am delighted I found your ideas! and i think it would be a good thing 
to do something together. You articulated things in my work in a way 
that no one else has which i am i have to say really happy about. A col-
laboration sounds like something i would be more than happy to do.
At this stage the gallery in Madrid won’t be doing a catalogue, it 
would just be a press blurb positioning the work, do you think you 
would be interested in being credited on something like this? It’s small 
fry but . . .
“Small fry or not,” I wrote back to Byrne, assuring her that I would indeed 
appreciate being acknowledged and providing her the information to do so. 
I did not hear back from her. 
On May 26 I received a group Facebook invitation to her exhibition It’s 
Not You, It’s Me at The Goma in Madrid. The artwork being exhibited was 
Byrne’s effort to assume the identity of the Italian artist Roberto Cuoghi, 
who himself was said to have assumed his ailing father’s identity, undergo-
ing a dramatic physical transformation in the process.17 Byrne could not find 
out much about the project, but she decided that if Cuoghi had become his 
father, then she would become him.18 She claimed to have legally changed 
her name to Roberto Cuoghi for that project, and under that name to have 
obtained a credit card, created an online persona, and exhibited work, in-
cluding two “self- portraits” at the Irish Museum of Contemporary Art 
(IMOCA). In the body of the Facebook invitation was Byrne’s artist’s state-
ment (figure C.4). Not only had she appropriated without attribution my 
reading of her work as parasitical; she had also lifted a passage from Na-
than M. Martin’s 2003 article for the Carbon Defense League, which she 
had most likely encountered when she came across it in my essay, where it 
served as the epigraph. (It is now the epigraph of this book’s introduction.) 
Six months later, when the exhibition moved to London’s Alma Enterprises, 
Byrne struck again, this time even more brazenly: the press release and web-
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site for the show reproduced an entire paragraph of my unpublished disser-
tation prospectus. 
By appropriating my reading of her work as feminist, Byrne short- 
circuited it, reclaiming from me the position of parasite. She fed on the 
structure of feminist reflexivity I articulated, seeking to capitalize on the at-
tention brought her by my overstatement of her feminist politics. It seemed 
that the hosts to whom Byrne would play parasite had changed between 
her earlier projects and 2011. Perhaps her professional and economic situ-
ation had become more precarious, necessitating a tactical slippage from 
powerful, well- established male artist hosts to female peers. Perhaps Byrne’s 
parasitism had never had a stable ethical dimension in the first place. In my 
reading of her work, carried out for my professional advancement (a form 
of scholarly parasitism), had I projected the feminism I found there? Had I 
attributed political intention where none existed?
Or perhaps the parasite’s value cannot be made legible by the orthodox-
ies of intentionality. It is not a stable liberal moral agent. Rather, the para-
site might be said to occupy a deictic structural position, as the linguistic 
shifters you and me of her exhibition title suggest. Michel Serres observes 
that to be a parasite is precisely to be a shifter: “To play the position or to 
play the location is to dominate the relation. . . . And that is the meaning 
of the prefix para- in the word parasite: it is on the side, next to, shifted; 
FIGURE C.4 Facebook invitation to Roisin Byrne’s It’s Not You, It’s Me 
exhibition, 2011. 
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it is not on the thing, but on its relation. It has relations, as they say, and 
makes a system of them.”19 Serres’s crucial insight here is that identities 
are contingent on their place within a network of social relations. We play a 
given role in relation to others’ given roles. Rather than ask who or what is 
behind the mask of the parasite (Is Byrne bad or good? Was she always bad, 
or did she become bad?), Serres proposes to ask what the mask can do. Byrne 
shifts; she plays the relation. And in so doing she shows that the parasite is 
not an ethical actor in the conventional sense. The parasite is not an identity 
but rather a mode of playing the system, a form of agency without a prede-
termined moral coherency. Since its agency unfolds in a dynamic system of 
play, parasitism is not an ethics of the individual but an ethics of relation. 
Its actions must be judged in relation to the actions of others, particularly 
those who set the rules of the game. The parasite’s ethics are not relevant, 
for ethics is predicated on internal coherence. Instead, the parasite shifts the 
question, moving it away from morality (which is predicated on identity) 
toward positionality. As a paradigm of resistance, it is not about who you are 
but where you are situated within a set of relations. Byrne is thus not feminist 
in a moral sense; she is feminist only to the extent that she reveals something 
about the structural makeup of a shifting field of power relations. 
Byrne’s work shifted the focus from identity to positionality, compelling 
me to reassess both my position as a critic and my own latent investment in 
originality, which comes with my relative precarity within academia. My 
positions here render me what we might call a contingent host (someone 
who occupies the position of host precariously or only under certain cir-
cumstances, who doesn’t have the kind of capital that a host typically does). 
By addressing me directly, Byrne made me consider my role within the con-
temporary art economy, my position in the relations between the art world 
and the scholarly world. These relations go both ways: scholarly validation 
is essential for building artists’ careers, and conversely, engaging original 
objects of study is vital to producing hireable and tenureable scholarship. 
A few months after this initial exchange, I published a short piece detail-
ing my entanglement with Byrne.20 As the online text was being formatted 
the editorial manager received an unexpected email. “The encounter you 
describe with Roisin in your text has . . . been slightly echoed,” she wrote 
to me. Byrne had learned of the essay’s publication before I had, again pre-
emptively discovering the piece through her Google Alert, and she had in-
quired of the editor how soon it would be advertised. My essay positioned 
Byrne’s work within the larger frame of a discussion of contemporary femi-
nist art (and situated me as a host); Byrne promoted it on her Facebook and 
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Twitter accounts as a “monumental review” of her work (situating me as a 
parasite). 
Is the critic a parasite or a host of its object of study? Is the critic- object 
relation truly parasitical, or is it symbiotic, mutually beneficial as it increases 
the cultural capital (potentially convertible to financial capital) for both par-
ties? In his essay “The Critic as Host,” J. Hillis Miller examines the critical 
practice of quotation and citation in these terms: “Is this [quotation] differ-
ent from a citation, echo, or allusion within a poem? Is a citation an alien 
parasite within the body of its host, the main text, or is it the other way 
around, the interpretative text the parasite, which surrounds and strangles 
the citation which is its host? . . . Or can host and parasite live happily 
together, in the domicile of the same text, feeding each other or sharing the 
food?”21 The parasite’s opportunistic timing (it comes after the host in or-
der to come first, to beat the host to the punch) had resurfaced — the same 
timing that Byrne displayed in asking to para- cite me before there was any-
thing yet to cite. As digital technologies have enabled unprecedented forms 
of intimate access, proximity, and familiarity, they have dissolved traditional 
boundaries; Byrne seized upon the window of opportunity created by email 
and social media to gain immediate access to her critic, unsettling the usual 
safe distance between critics and their objects created by geographical dis-
tance, temporality of publication, and so on. In other words, Byrne pre- cited 
my work before it could be stamped as my own, as original, by the legitima-
tion machine of academic publishing. My authority as a scholar came 
from observing this delay; Byrne’s reputation as an artist depended on 
getting there first. I, in turn, scrambled to establish ownership over the ideas 
before she could by slapping together a website about my research. 
The target of an act of parasitical appropriation is essential to the ges-
ture’s political signification. Is the target well- resourced or precarious? Does 
the parasite appropriate up or down? But equally essential is the question of 
whether the parasitical act reduces the original work’s vitality or enhances it. 
(For Byrne, taking Starling’s plant and getting his response “completed the 
piece,” enabling her work to thrive, whereas Starling said that her use of his 
plant had “completely destroy[ed] the work.”) For my part, Byrne’s appro-
priation, while initially vexing, helped refine my reading of her and brought 
increased scholarly and public attention to my work.
By the time the encounter was picked up by several news sites in late 2011, 
eventually becoming the basis of a 2013 performance art piece at Brooklyn’s 
Grace Space by the feminist performance and curatorial collective h ag , it 
had grown more difficult to disentangle who was the parasite and who the 
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host.22 In the weeks that followed the publication of my essay, I took a page 
from Byrne’s playbook and set up my own Google Alert. A few days later I 
received an alert that an Austrian online fashion magazine called Fashion-
Office had run a mobile feature about my article. Observed an art reviewer 
advertising Byrne’s show in Time Out London, “I’m not sure if there is such 
a thing as ‘parasitic art’ but it’s certainly a description applicable to the work 
of Roisin Byrne.” The news forum Big Think featured an article by the art 
blogger Bob Duggan with the title “Is Parasitism the Future of Feminist 
Art?” — a title that stood in marked tension with my own article’s stated de-
sire to move away from a developmental or solution- based model of femi-
nist futurity.23 Duggan offered his own reading of my encounter with Byrne, 
which he framed as a review of my article — albeit in terms I no longer rec-
ognized as my own. 
Byrne advertised the Big Think piece on her Facebook page, but her 
tone had changed from elation to ridicule, likely caused by the fact that 
Duggan focused on the critical reading over the artwork. Duggan observes 
that “Byrne herself may have felt [that she] more than . . . intellectually ar-
ticulated [the issues of her work], at least until Fisher came along to provide 
the words.” Byrne’s responses to my work grew increasingly hostile. As hosts 
do, she disavowed her own tactics when she found them aimed at her. “First 
a thief now a feminist!” she tweeted. In a Facebook comment responding to 
my article, she wrote, “i can’t say feminist tactics have ever much been a con-
cern of mine.” After the Big Think piece, she commented more aggressively: 
“i can’t say i give a shit that i am a woman. i can say i give a massive amount 
of thinking time about being part of a structure that keeps you dependant 
on it if you let it.” A Facebook friend of Byrne’s chimed in, neatly summing 
up this coda’s argument about the exchangeability of the host- parasite posi-
tions: “well for all Fisher’s whining that she was used as host, she has pretty 
successfully parasited her way out of obscurity on the back of your work!”
But this relatively narrow view obscures how the interests of the larger 
forces that hosted my encounter with Roisin Byrne also shaped the way it 
played out. The critic’s and artist’s repeated exchanges of who is host and 
who is parasite is a dynamic that is all too easily accommodated by — even 
supported by — corporate digital platforms, mediums that are designed 
around appropriation and recontextualization. Social media’s parasitical 
hold revealed itself as I attempted to detach myself from Byrne’s lure (and 
vice versa). It contrived to make it difficult for me not to respond to Byrne 
and for Byrne not to respond to me: my Facebook News Feed fed me new 
material about the artist, and her Google Alert repeatedly drew her back into 
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the fray. As the invisible substrates that made our dialogue possible, Face-
book, Twitter, and Google posed as mere platforms for our exchange, but in 
fact they were highly interested hosts whose interests lie in users generat-
ing ever more content. In our entanglement Byrne often appeared parasiti-
cal to me in her very proximity to and obliging use of these technologies; 
she channels the market’s appropriative force, her art both exposing and 
exploiting the conditions that make her practice possible. To question only 
the artist’s morals attends to the parasite but ignores the host system; it dis-
places the more difficult work of questioning the corporate and institutional 
infrastructures.
THE CHARM OFFENSIVE
After our exchange I went back through the material available about Byrne’s 
previous interventions with a finer comb. Where Hendricks had conde-
scended to Byrne, Starling had responded affably to her initial emails ask-
ing for information about where the plants were located. “I remember that 
they grow in amongst cork trees and are mainly between the main road that 
runs along the coast and the the [sic] top of the hill,” he had replied. “I would 
love to know if my plants are still alive but would be really surprised if you 
find them. I think I left a little ribbon on them.” When she told him what 
she’d done, he (like Hendricks) did not acknowledge her act as a work of 
art, reframing it instead as an act of vandalism and theft. Starling insists on 
the moral and legal consequences of Byrne’s actions and rejects their poten-
tial financial or artistic value.24 Byrne refuses to revere the aura of Starling’s 
original, thus reducing the plant to its value as a symbolic object of economic 
exchange: “I would like to keep it alive, yes. Because as an artwork, it has a 
value so I reckon it’s more valuable alive than dead.” But the plant ultimately 
withers and dies while on display.
Like the guest who knows that her host has to make her comfortable or 
risks appearing ungenerous, Byrne (like Kraus and Calle) personifies the 
feminine delicacy associated with her social demographic in order to play 
the threshold of care required by protocols of chivalry and professional eti-
quette. She exploits these protocols’ reliance on whiteness, middle- class- ness, 
and femininity as moral virtues. She taunted that she had read Starling’s lit-
tle ribbon marking the work as a romantic embellishment intended for her: 
“The moment I saw them there . . . beautifully healthy and full of flowers I 
felt that in some way you had left them there for me . . . and in so doing you 
were presenting me with a token of your affection so I took one.” Further 
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taunting him, she reassures Starling that she was not harmed in the process 
of stealing his work: “I had to chop it up into four pieces nervous i would 
be seen by park security. But I wasn’t, I am ok.” Byrne plays the thresh-
old of care only up to a point, taking only what she can get away with; she 
calibrates her risk to her situated privilege. And she does get away with 
it. Starling drops the charges, responding with emotion rather than legal 
action. Byrne is shielded from material or physical retaliation by a racial, 
sexual, and class logic (of white femininity as nonthreatening and nonequal) 
that is not mobilized innocently.25 
Byrne is able to risk her performances of criminality, to count on art as 
her alibi, because of her taken- for- granted ability to resist, an ability that 
is not granted to all. As a white, middle- class subject, working in the con-
text of a (comparatively) democratic society, her sense of security that she 
will not be arrested (to count on the police not being called, or if they are, 
the likelihood of her being perceived as an empathetic subject in the eyes 
of the state) is safeguarded by her white privilege. Similarly, her artistic 
performances of stealing and forgery are safeguarded by their institutional 
recognition as conceptual art, while these same actions are likely to be 
considered simply as stealing and forgery by an artist of color, a trans art-
ist, or an artist without a European passport. This distinction rests on who 
has the social capital to claim the position of the performance artist and 
be recognized as such (as opposed to vandal, terrorist, mentally unwell 
person) — a question of signification prominent in the work of the black 
performance artists William Pope.L, Tameka Norris, Zachary Fabri, and 
Dread Scott, who often perform in public spaces. Byrne’s assertation that 
she performs parasitism out of situational necessity conceals her complic-
ity with the same system of rewards that confers greater success on her 
male hosts than on Byrne herself. While Byrne is indeed a lower- income 
single mother, she is also an educated, white, cisgender British citizen with 
access to the cultural capital offered by an institution like Goldsmiths. 
Even as she casts Starling as an earnest, naïve Boy Scout type (as much 
of the art press has), Byrne proves indifferent to the political dimensions 
of Rescued Rhododendrons, which was made as a statement against British 
immigration policy. Starling undertook the project after learning that the 
rhododendrons, originally imported from the south of Spain to the north 
of Scotland in the eighteenth century, had come to be considered weeds (in 
other words, parasites) and would be uprooted and destroyed. Thwarting 
this plan, Starling returned the plants to their original homeland in Spain 
in the back of a Volvo (figures C.5 and C.6). He had originally intended 
FIGURES C.5 AND C.6 Simon Starling, photographs from Rescued Rhododendrons, 
2000. Source: Simon Starling.
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to transfer them to what he saw as a sanctuary, a new homeland, a float-
ing island of rhododendrons in the middle of the freshwater Scottish lake 
Loch Lomond. However, the floating sanctuary idea was scrapped when he 
realized that the national conservation agency Scottish National Heritage, 
an important funder for the “Island of Weeds” project, had themselves 
spent £5 million trying to eradicate the plants. Starling instead reintro-
duced the plants in the south of Spain, their original home, which is where 
Byrne found them. As a conceptual statement about the refugee crisis, this 
conclusion seems to posit, despairingly, a world in which there can be no 
sanctuary for refugees. This complication in the making of the work sug-
gests that although Byrne presents Starling as a foolish, earnest idealist, 
he is in fact quite aware of the political contingencies of his own practice. 
Byrne’s act of appropriation blithely disregards the larger implications 
of Starling’s work, which is a sustained engagement with issues of labor 
and migration, immigration policy and national security, ethnic cleans-
ing and genocide, all framed as social parasitism by existing structures of 
power.
Byrne demonstrates the danger of working against certain kinds of power 
and privilege while at the same time employing other kinds of power and 
privilege in order to do so. She channels the appropriative indifference of a 
free market that, in its singular focus on maximizing capital value, throws 
off the burden of contextual specificity. The secondary framing of the para-
sitical act of appropriation can divorce the original work from its context 
and meaning, for there is a structural displacement at work in parasitical 
appropriation. Capitalizing on this displacement, Byrne selects for some as-
pects of power in the work (e.g., gender inequity in the art world) and dese-
lects for others (the contingencies of racial and ethnic difference, capacity 
and ability, sexual orientation, unexpected political solidarities, and so on). 
This makes certain features of difference advance and others recede, as if she 
plays her parasitism in order to trump his. Her work levies the same implicit 
feminist critique of masculine privilege against every artist (whether a “bad 
boy” like Hendricks or a “good boy” like Starling), indifferent to other iden-
titarian markers beyond their status as male artists and the politics of their 
body of work. She turns them all into monolithic Dicks. 
As a number of the artworks from the second half of this book make 
evident, parasitism’s violence comes from its essentialization of the host as 
nothing but a host: it conflates very different people, turns individuals into 
a mere symbol of power. Byrne’s disregard for complexity is emblematic of 
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parasitism, for it treats all hosts as created equal (much as my early writing 
that Byrne appropriated threatened to treat all parasites as created equal, as a 
vector only for feminist rebellion). Byrne’s critique of Hendricks is the same 
as her critique of Starling, Gander, Sierra, and others — presumably a critique 
of their masculine privilege in the art world and beyond. Byrne’s flattening 
out of the complexities of their work proves especially violent in the case of 
Starling, an artist of whose work it has been said that “backstory is every-
thing.”26 Her actions, which may circumstantially or instrumentally signify 
as feminist, hold Starling’s work hostage to the problem of gender inequity; 
in other words, her conceptual reframing of Starling’s work through the lens 
of masculine privilege drowns out the important political critiques staged 
by his art. Unlike Hendricks, Starling does not overplay his position. He is a 
redistributive host, while she is a self- serving parasite. He shows that having 
some cultural capital is not itself necessarily the problem.
Byrne’s stereotypical portrait of Ryan Gander, whose neon sign concept 
she claims to have stolen, likewise proves incomplete. The fact that Gander 
works from a wheelchair is left out of Byrne’s conceptual narrative, as is his 
and Starling’s shared investment in appropriation as a mode of institutional 
critique. In this sense, Byrne, who enjoys different degrees of privilege com-
pared to Gander (as able- bodied) and to the immigrants and refugees ref-
erenced in Starling’s work (as someone with a European passport), fails to 
recognize her own relative status as a host. In other words, she ignores the 
intersectionality of identities.27 Whatever its conceptual intentions (or lack 
thereof), the feminist critical value of Byrne’s project, which subverts only 
the white female or white male paradigm, fails to model a viably intersec-
tional parasitical resistance. 
Here we might ask whether the parasite, in playing the threshold of care, 
can ever be fully feminist or resistant if its tactical possibility is conditioned 
by its performance of complacency with other forms of oppression. Femi-
nism remains a useful space for tackling the problem of resistance’s complic-
ity with structural inequity, so long as it relinquishes its investments in pu-
rity and does not disavow its own dependencies — in other words, so long as 
it recognizes its own parasitism, its own complicity. Byrne’s work raises the 
question of how we can become better, more redistributive parasites while 




Byrne charges Hendricks with not recirculating the capital he acquires — 
a practice in which her work also engages. She represents not a parasitical 
model of redistribution but one of unapologetic absorption and free- market 
individualism. One of her artworks in particular, Old Work (2010) (figure 
C.7), makes this remarkably explicit. Taking a page out of Hendricks’s play-
book, Byrne claims that she “illegally extracted” money from the British 
welfare system and used it to make a large neon sign of the word work, 
which she stipulated could only ever be exhibited turned off. What is the 
difference between Hendricks’s parasitism of the state and Byrne’s? Byrne 
too exploits the resistant potential of parasitism as a loophole by which the 
system of white supremacist heteropatriarchy might be made to accom-
modate its own undermining. Yet Hendricks’s exploitation of the mini-
mal generosity of the state with Tax may have contributed to the closure 
of the loophole in tax law that provided modest tax benefits for working 
artists; similarly, in February 2013 the Paris Court of Appeals announced 
the closing of Byrne’s exploited loophole that had allowed what the court 
called “artistic parasitism.” The judgment ruled that if a work of art was 
found to be too similar to an existing work, what was of most consequence 
was the fame of the first artist — a decision that effectively made it easier to 
steal from people who are not famous than from those who are.28 By tak-
ing parasitism’s name in vain, one might argue that Byrne overexposed it, 
potentially putting it on the radar of official systems and thereby closing 
it as a loophole for others who might employ it toward redistributive ends. 
And yet this decision to protect and consolidate the position of the host is 
hardly surprising, or the fault of the parasite. It only makes it that much 
harder for those who do not already have status or influence to get ahead 
and ultimately to survive in a system stacked against them.
What is the work of the parasite, the contribution of an actor that seems 
to take without giving back? The parasite, who must survive to disrupt, but 
who must be seen as nonthreatening in order to survive, is always under 
threat of being either eliminated from the system or put to work within the 
normative economy of the host. The parasite thus always operates between 
two or more frames; the prefix para- points to this duplicity, meaning at the 
same time both “with” (near or beside) and “against” (counter). It must walk 
a fine line between the resistant and the reactionary (and the reproductive, 
in the sense of potentially reproducing existing relations of power). It is this 
quasi- belonging, this insider- outsiderness, that allows it to leverage a certain 
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critical distance between itself and its host milieu, which makes it possible 
for it to play the position in which it finds itself. It rides this line, exploits 
this opening in the system, as long as it can. In its ideal, socially progressive 
form, the resistant parasite only simulates its complicity, working behind the 
host’s back, but in some cases (as in Byrne’s) the parasite plays its position 
opportunistically or in bad faith.
As my entanglement with Byrne illustrates, the parasite is both dangerous 
and generative precisely because there are no guarantees against its mecha-
nisms. Byrne’s performance of parasitism shows that it need not work to-
ward something (a focused goal, an ethical logic); it just works. The parasite 
thus threatens the integrity of boundaries (self/other, criticism/art, a private 
draft/public persona). The parasite is an unstable agent not simply because 
it refuses to abide by the rules but because it appropriates the mechanisms 
of its hosts, who make the rules of the game but do not always follow them. 
Throughout the book we have seen artists who, perceiving themselves to be 
out of options, resort to using the tools of the host against it: using Google 
to take down Google, using private property law to unthink private prop-
erty, using cultural studies to make a cultural study of Dick, using white 
feminist legacy reenacted to disidentify with white feminist legacy. Byrne 
is the ultimate version of this trend toward a politics of mirroring, reflec-
tion, mediation. If the labor of her art is showing her enmeshment in her 
FIGURE C.7 Roisin Byrne, Old Work, 2010. Source: Roisin Byrne.
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economic- artistic milieu, the scandal of her persona is that she refuses to be 
better than the moral and legal economies of value in which she operates. 
She both stages a critique of the system in which she acts and draws mate-
rial gain from her critique. Yet it is hardly adequate to respond to her with 
moral disgust, for her parasitism refuses the dictates of institutional moral-
ity. Her moral or ethical status cannot fully be disentangled from that of the 
systemic structures that host her. She models the way one can, as powerful 
entities often do, sit on and play the system in which one finds oneself. In 
such a moment, the critical safeguards we typically rely on to judge such an 
artist’s work are compromised by our own implication in it. 
My early thinking about Byrne was caught up in whether it would ever 
be possible to dissociate her critical potential from her opportunistic per-
formance of capitalist mimicry. Now I think that it is precisely the inability 
to separate these things that gives the parasite its resistant power. Without 
clear boundaries (ethical, spatial and temporal, or otherwise), what sepa-
rates a work from its context, and how do you know when it is over? Per-
haps it is over when there is no more resistance, no more interference on 
the line; when the parasite has been fully absorbed into the host or when it 
has been expelled from the system; or when even the ultimate opportunist 
doesn’t seem to be able to survive a transforming, brutally competitive art 
market. Byrne’s representing gallery The Goma no longer lists her as part of 
their stable of artists, and I can find no sign that she is still actively produc-
ing work. Her former artist website (roisinbyrne.co.uk) is now permanently 
down. “You don’t have permission to access,” reads an error message marked 
“Forbidden” when I first noticed it was no longer running. In a halting irony, 
her website has since been bought by someone who appears to be a different 
Roisin Byrne, a British business guru, and is now home to Roisin Byrne’s 
Business Boutique (“Home of the Ambitious Upstart”), though the possibil-
ity that the website might be yet another stunt by the artist, while unlikely, 
can’t fully be ruled out.29 “Are you an entrepreneur struggling to get started? 
Did you already start a business but can’t seem to get off the ground? Is your 
business hitting a plateau and you can’t seem to grow any further?” 
I tried instead to write to Byrne to see how she’s been. 
I didn’t hear back. 
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NOTES
INTRODUCTION. TOWARD A THEORY OF PARASITICAL RESISTANCE 
1. Scholars have mostly written about Ubermorgen in the context of discus-
sions about art hacktivism and tactical art and media. See the following repre-
sentative works: Arns, “Feeding the Serpent Its Own Tail”; Bernhard and Lizvlx, 
ube r mo rg e n.c o m; Raley, Tactical Media; Broeckmann, “Software Art Aesthet-
ics”; Dieter, “Amazon Noir”; Kampf and Cox, “Using Digital Art”; Mihai, “Art 
Hacktivism”; Thoburn, Anti- Book; Vavarella, “Art, Error.”
2. “All of our work is done out in the open,” the group noted in a press release 
about the project. Ubermorgen, “Press Release,” November/December 2006, 
www.amazon- noir.com/TEXT/PRESS_RELEASE_151106.pdf. 
3. “The Hacking Monopolism Trilogy,” Face to Facebook, accessed December 
27, 2017, www.face- to- facebook.net/hacking- monopolism- trilogy.php.
4. A press release announcing funding for Amazon Noir describes the piece 
as “question[ing] the inconsistencies in the enforcement of copyright law” and 
“point[ing] out the hypocrisy of the digital copyright lobby.” Amazon Noir col-
laborator Paolo Cirio explained in an interview, “When a common good has 
been given to people for free or for a cheap price, the whole of society grows.  
Every day we see the rampant privatization of commons [sic], as soon as people 
become more poor and ignorant. The latest movements of cc  [Creative Com-
mons], Wikipedia, p2p free networks, etc. are a much needed [sic] resistance in a 
world where the use of cultural content is ever less a right and ever more a busi-
ness.” Edith Ross Haus for Medienkunst, “Stipends 2006,” entry “ubermorgen 
.com, ‘Amazon Noir — The Big Book Crime,’ ” accessed May 16, 2018, www.edith 
- russ- haus.de/en/grants/grants/archive/stipends- 2006.html; Cirio, Ludovico, 
Bernhard, and Lizvlx, “The Big Book (C)rime.”
5. Thoburn, Anti- Book, x.
6. Pasquale, The Black Box Society, 89.
7. See Philip, “What Is a Technological Author?,” on “good versus bad” open 
source as a function of a Western versus a non- Western paradigm. In his “Guer-
rilla Open Access Manifesto,” the digital prodigy and activist Aaron Swartz 
challenged as hypocritical big corporations’ moralistic stance against open ac-
cess: “It’s called stealing or piracy, as if sharing a wealth of knowledge were the 
moral equivalent of plundering a ship or murdering its crew. But sharing isn’t 
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immoral — it’s a moral imperative. Only those blinded by greed would refuse to 
let a friend make a copy.”
8. In a 2004 online article for the Independent Book Publishers Association, 
Jonathan Kirsch, an attorney specializing in copyright and publishing law, wrote, 
“Amazon, of course, is such a dominant player in the book industry that many 
publishers, and especially independent publishers, feel compelled to participate 
even though they fear that it might not be in their best interest to do so. . . .  
Although there has been much grumbling among both authors and publishers  
about the Amazon programs . . . no one has gone so far as to test the legality of  
the programs in court.” Kirsch, “Danger! Amazon’s Inside the Book Programs  
Pose Legal Risks for Publishers,” Independent Book Publishers Association, June  
2004, articles.ibpa- online.org/article/danger- amazons- inside- the- book- programs 
- pose- legal- risks- for- publishers/. 
9. The rise of an explicitly authoritarian figure like Donald Trump, however, 
has attested to an ascendant form of naked sovereign power in U.S. mainstream 
politics that does not feel the need to dissimulate its bigotry, misogyny, nepo-
tism, and jingoism under the guise of hospitality. 
10. Frank Pasquale defines a black box as “a useful metaphor . . . [that] can re-
fer to a recording device, like the data- monitoring systems in planes, trains, and 
cars. Or it can mean a system whose workings are mysterious; we can observe its 
inputs and outputs, but we cannot tell how one becomes the other. We face these 
two meanings daily: tracked ever more closely by firms and government, we have 
no clear idea of just how far much of this information can travel, how it is used, 
or its consequences” (The Black Box Society, 3).
11. For helpful discussions of digital technologies and neoliberalism, see, among 
others, Chun, Control and Freedom; Dean, Democracy; Shaviro, Post- Cinematic  
Affect; Taylor, The People’s Platform; Chun, Updating; G. Hall, The Uberfication;  
Srnicek, Platform Capitalism; Cohen, Never Alone.
12. The perceived inefficiencies of an earnest form of revelatory criticism find 
support in the resignation that has generally characterized mainstream pub-
lic response to the seismic bursts of transparency that followed the Wall Street 
bailouts; Wikileaks, Snowden, and the Panama Papers; and a revolving door of 
Trump whistleblowers — suggesting ours to be a moment when the exposure of 
corruption or extralegality cannot be said to produce revolution or even regula-
tion. As dismissals of the politics of revolution seem perpetually proven wrong, 
it is not that on- the- ground protest or the epistemology of exposure are not use-
ful or even crucial gestures but rather that we cannot expect them alone to fix 
what they make manifest. Nico Baumbach, Damon R. Young, and Genevieve 
Yue write, “[Since 2009] we have witnessed what looked briefly like the implo-
sion of the global financial system followed by a wave of protest movements chal-
lenging the neoliberal consensus, but business as usual has returned, indeed with 
a renewed sense of inexorability. Capitalism is both broken and all- pervasive. . . 
. The global financial system to which we are all beholden has never been more 
opaque in its operations, or more transparent in its effects” (“Introduction,” 1). 
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13. As Steven Shaviro argues, “transgression no longer works as a subversive 
aesthetic strategy . . . Transgression is now fully incorporated into the logic of 
political economy. It testifies to the way that, under the regime of real subsump-
tion, ‘there is nothing, no ‘naked life,’ no external standpoint . . . there is no lon-
ger an ‘outside’ to power’ ” (“Accelerationist Aesthetics”).
14. Since the 1990s, the practice of hiring “white- hat hackers” (many of whom 
are “black- hat hackers” who turned coat) to locate vulnerabilities in corporate 
or government software and cybersecurity systems has become more and more 
prevalent. Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Samsung, Uber, Tesla, Apple, and even 
the U.S. government all have cash- for- bugs schemes, enlisting end users as bug-
hunters. “A Bug- Hunting Hacker Says He Makes $250,000 a Year in Bounty,”  
mit  Technology Review, August 22, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com 
/s/602224/a- bug- hunting- hacker- says- he- makes- 250000 - a- year- in- bounty/. See 
also “A Framework for a Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Online Systems 
(Version 1.0),” U.S. Department of Justice Cybersecurity Unit, July 2017, https://
www.justice.gov/criminal- ccips/page/file/983996/download/. Accepting pay-
ments in exchange for helping fortify state and corporate power appears to stand 
in clear opposition to the hacktivist ethos, which Gabriella Coleman associates 
with “an enthusiastic commitment to antiauthoritarianism and a variety of civil 
liberties” that is generally concerned with checking mechanisms of state control 
and supporting internet freedoms (“Hacker,” 160).
15. “[Artists] can easily become extensions of the museum’s own self- 
promotional apparatus, while the artist becomes a commodity with a special 
purchase on ‘criticality,’ ” writes Miwon Kwon in One Place after Another (47). 
16. Stevphen Shukaitis observes that “in the current functioning of capital-
ism, the critical function of governance is to be more critical than the critics of 
governance itself. Functionaries in a system of power, by presenting themselves 
as their worst critic, thus deprive critique of its ammunition and substance, 
thereby turning the tables on it. This is to go beyond both the arguments put for-
ward by Boltanski and Chiapello; that critique has been subsumed within capi-
talism and that, within autonomist politics, reactive forms of social resistance 
and insurgency still remain a driving motor of capitalist development. This hints 
at the possibility that strategies for the neutralisation of the energies of social in-
surgency are anticipated even before they emerge” (“Overidentification,” 28). See 
also Boltanski and Chiapello, The New Spirit.
17. Deleuze, “Postscript.” Since Deleuze, media theorists have called upon the 
concept of control to advance an analysis of the postdisciplinary logics of domi-
nation as the everyday experiences of exploitation have only become more dis-
creet, internalized, and automatic — in a word, participatory. For discussions 
of the diagrams of power advanced by digital networks, see Galloway, Protocol; 
Chun, Control and Freedom; Raley, Tactical Media; Franklin, Control; Hu, A Pre-
history; Jagoda, Network Aesthetics.
18. This is a quote from Byrne’s description of Look What You Made Me Do 
on the artist’s website, formerly roisinbyrne.co.uk.
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19. When asked by an interviewer about the choice to count the grains by 
hand (punishing work in which the artist himself claims also to have actively 
participated), Hendricks responded, apparently unironically, “You have to con-
sider that my 12 assistants received money for something which other people pay 
a lot of money. Anyone, for instance, who attends meditation courses, and at-
tempts to achieve a sense of nothingness has to dig deep into their pockets for 
the privilege. I give them money for it!” “Interview: Conversation between Eva 
Linhart and Jochem Hendricks,” in Hendricks, Legal Crimes, 29.
20. Sally Churchward, “Fighting Dogs, Theft and Avoiding Tax — Artist  
Jochem Hendricks Brings His Controversial Work to Southampton,” Daily Echo, 
November 5, 2012, https://www.dailyecho.co.uk/leisure/news/10026459.fighting 
- dogs- theft- and- avoiding- tax- artist- jochem- hendricks- brings- his- controversial 
- work- to- southampton/.
21. This method is captured by the title of Hendricks’s 2002 artist’s mono-
graph, Legal Crimes.
22. What is so threatening about the feminized copy, Rebecca Schneider ar-
gues, is its potential to destabilize a patriarchal order that masquerades as origi-
nal and foundational. “Perhaps one result of a mimesis not properly vilified 
would be that the seeming first would have to acknowledge its indebtedness to 
the second” (“Hello Dolly,” 96).
23. Ahmed, Living a Feminist Life, 253.
24. “The piece is a performative media- installation and thus continues the 
historical tradition of happenings and performance art. Provoking reactions 
from conventional media and business is an integral part of the project,” reads 
the work’s entry on the website announcing the funding it received from the 
Edith Ross Haus for media art. Edith Ross Haus for Medienkunst, “Stipends 
2006.”
25. Like Amazon Noir, Look What You Made Me Do translates as installation 
art when it is represented in a gallery space (an effect of exhibiting the piece’s 
component parts), while it presents as conceptual art in its exhibition on the art-
ist’s website, which takes the form of a brief description and digital images that 
metonymically stand in for the larger work.
26. In Living a Feminist Life, Sara Ahmed observes that this is how white men 
come to embody “an institution”: “White men refers also to conduct; it is not 
simply who is there, who is here, who is given a place at the table, but how bodies 
are occupied once they have arrived” (153).
27. Insofar as the artists in this book achieve a kind of solidarity with more 
marginalized and exploited communities in their attempts to undermine the 
host, it is at a remove, from a position that does not take on the challenges and 
risks faced by these communities and that lacks affective ties to them.
28. My use of the designation women refers not to a biological category but a 
political and historical one. I follow Silvia Federici, who has argued for the ne-
cessity of maintaining the category woman to confront the economic and insti-
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tutional forces that produce it, its problematic positing of a universal political 
subject notwithstanding (“Sipping Tea”).
29. Serres’s The Parasite is credited with parasitism’s arrival on the scene of 
contemporary art, design, and architecture in the 1980s. For discussions of para-
sitism as an artistic, design, and curatorial practice, see Sara Marini, “Parasitical 
Architecture,” Domus, May 10, 2010, www.domusweb.it/en/architecture/2010/05 
/10/parasitical- architecture.html; Fitzpatrick and Brothers, “A Productive Irri-
tant”; Jahn, Byproduct; Pilcher, “Parasitic Art”; Anagnost, “Parasitism.” The very 
language of parasitism is used to signify cutting- edge art and curatorial experi-
mentation, as the term’s appearance in the names of exhibition spaces such as 
Ljubljana’s P.A.R.A.S.I.T.E. Museum of Contemporary Art, Hong Kong’s Para/
Site Art Space, and the German online art magazine Berlin- ArtParasites attests. 
For figurations of the parasite in digital interventionist practice, see Martin, 
“Parasitic Media”; Lovink, Dark Fiber; Critical Art Ensemble, Digital Resistance; 
David Garcia and Geert Lovink, “The a bc  of Tactical Media,” January 10, 2008, 
Tactical Media Files, www.tacticalmediafiles.net/articles/3160; Raley, Tactical 
Media. See also the parasite, a massive Alternate Reality Game (a r g) experi-
ment led by Patrick Jagoda at the University of Chicago: H. Coleman, “the para-
site.” Invocations of parasitism in the work of Michel de Certeau, such as the 
passive tactics of free riding (working slowly, pursuing nonwork efforts while on 
the clock, squatting), will be familiar to many. “The space of a tactic is the space 
of the other,” writes de Certeau. “Thus it must play on and with a terrain im-
posed on it and organized by the law of a foreign power. . . . It does not have the 
means to keep to itself, at a distance, in a position of withdrawal, foresight, and 
self- collection” (The Practice, 37). Such “weapons of the weak” (to use James C. 
Scott’s phrase) follow a parasitical logic in that they are improvisational, short 
term, and fragmentary practices of resistance available to those constrained 
within spaces of domination. See also Scott, Weapons and Domination.
30. Combes, The Art of Being a Parasite, 8 – 12.
31. Nixon, Slow Violence; Berlant, Cruel Optimism. I am indebted to Ingrid 
Diran for this insight and phrasing.
32. Muñoz, “Feeling Brown,” 70.
33. Muñoz, Disidentifications, 11 – 12.
34. In Bodies That Matter Butler asks, “What are the possibilities of politi-
cizing disidentification, this experience of misrecognition, this uneasy sense 
of standing under a sign to which one does and does not belong? . . . it may be 
that the affirmation of that slippage, that the failure of identification, is itself the 
point of departure for a more democratizing affirmation of internal difference” 
(219). See also Butler, Bodies That Matter, 121 – 40.
35. Harney and Moten, The Undercommons, 31, 26.
36. Stevphen Shukaitis, Jean Baudrillard, and others have described “over-
identification” and “overacceptance” as manic maneuvers by which one pretends 
to take the system at its word, performs sincerity at a fevered pitch, or plays so 
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close to its script that the system shudders at the intensity of one’s participation. 
For a compelling analysis of overidentification, see Shukaitis, “Overidentifica-
tion.” For a discussion of overacceptance, see Jean Baudrillard, “The Masses: The 
Implosion of the Social in the Media,” trans. Marie Maclean, in New Media, Old 
Media: A History and Theory Reader, ed. Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and Anna Wat-
kins Fisher with Thomas Keenan, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2015), 515 – 22.
37. Butler, “The Body,” 84.
38. Lauren Berlant’s influential diagnosis of aspirational political attachment 
as a form of “cruel optimism” powerfully conveys the high cost of political ideal-
ism in this moment.
39. Peter Gilliver, “Precarious,” oe d  Online, Word Stories (blog), accessed  
February 10, 2017, http://public.oed.com/aspects- of- english/word- stories 
/precarious/.
40. Wang, Carceral Capitalism, 53.
41. See Harvey, A Brief History; Boltanski and Chiapello, The New Spirit of 
Capitalism; Berlant, Cruel Optimism; Giroux, Neoliberalism’s War on Higher 
Education; W. Brown, Undoing the Demos; Feher, Rated Agency.
42. Regarding the challenge to survival, we might think, for example, of Les-
ter A. Spence’s discussion of the neoliberal transformation of the term hustler 
over the past thirty years, from a “person who tried to do as little work as pos-
sible in order to make ends meet” to “someone who consistently works” (Knock-
ing the Hustle, 2). As higher numbers of black men in the United States have 
been expelled from the formal labor economy, their choices limited by lack of 
education and jobs, criminal records, and discrimination, some have turned to 
informal economies or shadow markets for income. In this context they are vul-
nerable to arrest and police brutality (as was the case for Eric Garner, who sold 
loose cigarettes, and Alton Sterling, who peddled cd s, both killed by police who 
approached them for petty street hustles). 
43. Emily Badger, “It’s Unconstitutional to Ban the Homeless from Sleeping 
Outside, the Federal Government Says,” Washington Post, August 13, 2015,  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/08/13/its- unconstitutional 
- to- ban- the- homeless- from- sleeping- outside- the- federal- government- says/.
44. Davis, “Fortress L.A.,” 104; Edward Delman, “Should It Be Illegal for Su-
permarkets to Waste Food?,” Atlantic, May 29, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com 
/international/archive/2015/05/law- france- supermarkets- food- waste/394481/.
45. Caroline Mortimer, “Space, Not Spikes Protest Artist Says ‘Hostile Archi-
tecture’ Is ‘Anti- Human,’ ” Independent, July 23, 2015, http://www.independent 
.co.uk/arts- entertainment/art/features/space- not- spikes- protest- artist- says 
- hostile- architecture- is- anti- human- 10409673.html. Even bourgeois customers 
are subject to disciplinary strictures. A sign outside of one Whole Foods Market, 
a grocery chain that serves an upper- middle- class customer base, informs shop-
pers of the expiration date on their welcome: “Warning: 3 Hour Customer Park-
ing Only.” The capitalist mandate to keep circulating reframes paying customers 
as trespassers.
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46. John Kennedy, “How Digital Disruption Changed 8 Industries Forever,” 
Silicon Republic, November 25, 2015, https://www.siliconrepublic.com/companies 
/digital- disruption- changed- 8- industries- forever.
47. See Terranova, Network Culture. For discussions of how women of color 
built the internet and what they have done to fix it, see Nakamura, “Indigenous 
Circuits” and “The Unwanted Labour.” For a discussion of the shift from a 
model of permanent to temporary ownership, from buying a product outright to 
temporarily licensing it, see Perzanowski and Schultz, The End of Ownership.
48. Gillespie, “The Politics of ‘Platforms.’ ”
49. Drawing on feminist accounts of hospitality by Tracy McNulty and Irina 
Aristarkhova that extend the philosophies of Kant, Levinas, and Derrida, I un-
derstand the concept of hospitality as necessarily implying a coercive dynamic, 
for ownership (the privilege of having an official right of permission or posses-
sion in the face of another who does not) makes the act, in its unconditional 
form, structurally impossible. Given the power differential that subtends it, 
the hospitality relation can never be fully consensual. See McNulty, The Host-
ess; Aristarkhova, Hospitality of the Matrix; Derrida and Dufourmantelle, Of 
Hospitality. 
50. Writes Tracy McNulty, “Hence potis identifies not only the master, but the 
master who is ‘eminently himself ’ ” (The Hostess, ix).
51. “Some bodies are deemed as having the right to belong,” writes Nirmal 
Puwar, “while others are marked out as trespassers, who are, in accordance with 
how both spaces and bodies are imagined (politically, historically, and conceptu-
ally), circumscribed as being ‘out of place’ ” (Space Invaders, 8).
52. Serres, The Parasite.
53. Anders M. Gullestad writes, “Again according to the oe d , as a noun, ‘par-
asite’ was first used in the current scientific sense in Ephraim Chambers’ Cy-
clopædia (1728), when he — under the heading ‘pa r as ite s , or pa r a sit a ic a l  
[sic] Plants’ — defined the subject as ‘in Botany, a Kind of diminutive Plants, 
growing on Trees, and so called from their Manner of living and feeding, which 
is altogether on others’ ” (“Parasite”).
54. Arnott, “Studies,” 162 – 63. See also Gullestad, “Parasite”; Hassl, “Der klas-
sische Parasit” and “The Parasitic.”
55. “Gift exchange forms part of what is called an ‘embedded economy,’ ” 
writes Anne Carson, “that is, a sociocultural system in which the elements of 
economic life are embedded in noneconomic institutions like kinship, marriage, 
hospitality, artistic patronage and ritual friendship” (Economy, 11 – 12). Carson is 
particularly interested in the complicit role of court singers and poets who come 
to be stitched into the embedded economy by trading their art for food and shel-
ter in Homer’s Odyssey. “At the moment when Odysseus, in the banquet hall of 
Alkinoos, carves out a hot chunk of pig meat from his own portion and proffers 
it in gratitude to the singer Demodokos ‘so that he may eat and so that I may fold 
him close to me,’ we see the embedded economy in its ideal version,” she writes 
(14). 
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56. Gullestad, “Parasite.” Drawing on the work of W. Geoffrey Arnott, Gulle-
stad notes that “over time the parasite ended up as a more or less interchangeable 
rival to the earlier comedic stock character of the kolax (the flatterer) as a name 
for those characters in Greek and Latin comedy looking for a free lunch, be it in 
a literal or metaphorical sense.” See also Damon, The Mask of the Parasite.
57. In How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend, Plutarch “acknowledges that the 
comic parasite, on stage, is impossible to miss, given his stereotypical traits and 
blatant self- abasement. But he goes on to warn of the dangers we face when para-
sitism and flattery become hard to detect, when the flattered takes on the stan-
dard features of civilised elite behaviour, hiding his nefarious purposes behind 
him: ‘Whom, then, do we need to guard against? . . . He is usually sober, he is 
busy, and he thinks it necessary to get involved in everything, and wants to be 
in on all the secrets, and plays the part of friendship seriously, like a tragic actor, 
not a satyric or comic one’ ” (Jason König, “Philosophers and Parasites,” in Saints 
and Symposiasts, 243 – 44).
58. Jonas A. Barish quotes Plato: “The painter’s craft thus reduces itself to an 
effort of slavish mimicry. And the same holds, says Socrates, for the tragic poet, 
who, like the painter, is an imitator, and hence ‘thrice removed from the king 
and from the truth’ ” (The Antitheatrical Prejudice, 6). 
59. See Gullestad, “Parasite.” For a brief essay on the evolving political cur-
rency of parasitism, see Samyn, “Toward an Anti- Anti- Parasitism.” 
60. Serres’s extraordinary 1982 book, The Parasite (which first appeared in 
French in 1980), offers a framework for thinking through complex systems of 
power. Serres’s treatise is as virtuosic as it is elliptical, and it may be for this 
reason that its contributions have still not fully been contended with. His elu-
sive philosophy is concerned less with parsing the politics of the parasite, which 
remains largely opaque in his account, than with unearthing a lively and am-
bitiously intertextual theory of the parasite. Serres tracks the term’s tripartite 
semantic resonance in the domains of anthropology, biology, and information 
theory, noting that the French sense of parasite means “noise” or “static” (a se-
mantic dimension lost in English). But what the figure yields is ultimately a 
study of systems.
61. Serres, The Parasite, 191, 202.
62. Serres, The Parasite, 202.
63. Writes Muñoz: “At times, resistance needs to be pronounced and direct; on 
other occasions, queers of color and other minority subjects need to follow a con-
formist path if they hope to survive a hostile public sphere” (Disidentifications, 5).
64. Serres, The Parasite, 217.
65. Stanford Open Policing Project, “Findings,” 2019, https://openpolicing 
.stanford.edu/findings/. See also: NYCLU, “Stop-and-Frisk Data,” 2019, https://
www.nyclu.org/en/Stop-and-Frisk-data.
66. It is helpful to bring a sense of the scale of the host system into this dis-
cussion, as Nathan M. Martin does in “Parasitic Media.” Martin contends that in 
larger systems, larger tolerances are given for error; in smaller systems, the stan-
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 231
dard deviation is already so small (and the monitoring so direct) that it is dif-
ficult for a parasite to remain invisible and still be able to function properly. He 
writes, “An example would be the amount of theft by employees that occur[s] at 
a small business where the owner is a visible source of monitoring being much 
lower in most cases than a large corporation where the owner is not present and 
possibly not known. Retail thefts, like employee thefts, increase with the size of 
a business. Corporations such as Wal- Mart factor the losses they will see due 
to theft into their financial planning and cost analysis. Usually if the amount of 
theft grows relative to the size of the corporation, the level of standard deviation 
will not increase and no alarm will go off that will force the host to change its be-
havior.” Martin (for the Carbon Defense League), “Parasitic Media.”
67. See Hartman, Scenes of Subjection; Bhabha, The Location of Culture; Scott, 
Weapons of the Weak and Domination and the Arts of Resistance.
68. For Riviere, the masquerade of womanliness is “worn as a mask, both to 
hide the possession of masculinity and to avert the reprisals expected if she was 
found to possess it” (“Womanliness,” 306).
69. Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 8.
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scene in a photograph from her series Ain’t Jokin’ (1987 – 88). The scene highlights 
the psychic violence of the fairy tale’s idealization of white femininity to black 
girls. Rather than Newton’s drag queen, in Weems’s photograph a young black 
woman stands before a mirror with the caption “Looking into the mirror, the 
black woman asked, ‘Mirror, mirror on the wall, who’s the finest of them all?’ 
The mirror says, ‘Snow White, you black bitch, and don’t you forget it!!!’ ”
76. This scene cites the opening credits of Stanley Kubrick’s film adaptation 
of Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita, where the viewer first sees Lolita (played by Sue 
Lyon), lying down while Humbert Humbert (played by James Mason) paints her 
toenails.
77. Amber Hawk Swanson, “Not a Feminist Way of Thinking, Daddy’s Little 
Girl,” Feminism? Project, 2005 – 6, artist’s video.
78. Kelly McClure, “When Amber Met Amber,” Chicago 
Reader, August 2, 2007, http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/
artist- amber- hawk- swanson- look- alike- sex- doll- realdoll/Content?oid=4258953.
79. Claudia La Rocco, “Dance Review: Oh, Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall,  
Who’s the Naughtiest of Them All,” New York Times, March 17, 2007, http://www 
.nytimes.com/2007/03/17/arts/dance/17youn.html.
80. Kilston, “Introducing,” 32.
81. Gia Kourlas, “Dance Review: Pure as the Driven Snow?,” Time Out New 
York, March 8 – 14, 2007, archived at http://guiadosteatros.blogspot.com/2008/04 
/snow- white- na- zdb.html.
82. Interview with author.
83. Tzara, “Dada Manifesto,” 7.
84. Young explained her response when asked what her profession is: “I’m 
always like, ‘I’m sorry I don’t really know what I do.’ . . . If it is somebody who 
I don’t want to understand what I do and for instance, if it is somebody who 
doesn’t know what a choreographer is, I usually use the word choreographer. . . . 
And if it is someone who would know what a choreographer is, I usually say per-
formance artist. It’s evasion. I am an escape artist.” Interview with author, March 
6, 2010, Brooklyn, New York.
85. Interview with author, March 6, 2010.
86. DiGiacomo, “Hipster Warfare”; Horwitz quoted in La Rocco, “Provocative 
Artist Fights for Return.”
87. Claudia La Rocco and Gia Kourlas, “Dance Review: The Bagwell in Me,” 
New York Times, October 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/04/arts 
/dance/04roun.html.
88. Interview with author, March 6, 2010.
89. Gilbert and Gubar, Madwoman in the Attic, 47.
260 NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR
90. Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, 161.
91. See Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “autogenesis,” June 2011, ac-
cessed February 25, 2017.
92. Comment on Facebook page, February 19, 2011, accessed February 25, 
2017.
93. Muñoz, Disidentifications, x.
94. Muñoz, “The White to Be Angry,” in Disidentifications, 93 – 103.
95. Apri Cot, “How 1 Become 2,” Bellyflop Magazine, March 13, 2011, accessed 
on Wayback Machine Internet Archive.
96. Holstein, “The Cyclical Pleasures,” in Kartsaki, On Repetition, 120; see 
also Fisher and Holstein, “Part- time Feminist.”
97. Ann Liv Young, interview with author, September 9, 2013, New York City.
98. Lauren Barri Holstein’s thesis, “How (Not) to Be a Woman: The Perfor-
mative Politics of Ambiguity in Gender and Signification,” was submitted to-
ward the fulfillment of the artist’s master’s in dance theater (The Body in Perfor-
mance) at Laban in October 2010.
99. The essay, attributed both to Holstein and her alter ego, is exemplary of 
the ambiguity between the two that the artist maintains. See Holstein, “Splat!”
100. In “The Complete History of Feminism,” a performative manifesto pub-
lished in Feminist Times, Holstein (writing as The Famous) mocks public and 
popular media sentiment that would suggest that feminism is irrelevant or un-
necessary today: “In the ‘new millennium,’ everyone decided feminism wasn’t 
really necessary anymore, seeing that women weren’t being raped anymore; they 
were being paid something . . . and were being represented in the media, not as 
boobilicious incentives to buy things, but as well- rounded sex objects who’ve 
chosen sex object as career. Go women!” Lauren Barri Holstein, “The Complete 
History of Feminism, According to the Famous Lauren Barri Holstein,” Feminist 
Times, October 13, 2013, accessed on Wayback Machine Internet Archive.
101. Lauren Barri Holstein, “Interior Scroll,” The Famous, May 3, 2012, http://
laurenbarri.blogspot.com/2012/03/interior- scroll.html.
CODA. IT’S NOT YOU, IT’S ME
1. Roisin Byrne has received modest scholarly attention in the fields of con-
temporary art criticism and curatorial studies: Benson, “Acts”; Fisher, “We Are 
Parasites”; Kushnir, “When Curating.”
2. Goldsmiths: But Is It Art?, episodes 1 and 2, directed by Victoria Silver, aired 
April 12 and 19, 2010, on bbc . Thanks to Andrew Lison for bringing the show to 
my attention.
3. Jonathan Jones, “The Artist Who Steals for a Living,” Guardian, April 14, 
2010, https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2010/apr/14/roisin- byrne.
4. Louise Jury, “Goldsmiths Star’s Shoplifting in the Name of Art,” London 
Evening Standard, April 13, 2010, http://www.standard.co.uk/news/goldsmiths 
- stars- shoplifting- in- the- name- of- art- 6458439.html.
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5. Nathalie Levi, “ ‘Bad Artists Copy, Good Artists Steal.’ [1], What’s Yours 
Is Mine, Roisin Byrne and Duncan Wooldridge at Tenderpixel,” Nathalie Levi’s 
Blog, October 15, 2010, https://nathalielevi.wordpress.com/2010/10/15/bad- artists 
- copy- good- artists- steal- 1- what’s- yours- is- mine- roisin- byrne- duncan 
- wooldridge- at- tenderpixel/.
6. The neon sign that she claims to have originally ordered before pursuing 
Gander’s “Massage” concept instead was to read “Work will set you free.” The 
reference to the dictum Arbeit macht frei hung over the entrances of many Nazi 
concentration camps, most famously Auschwitz, is an obvious provocation. If 
this is true, her reproduction of the phrase out of context performs, under the 
banner of irony, a self- serving display of historical indifference.
7. Evidence of the work remains largely virtual, circulating via coverage in the 
mainstream art press and contemporary art blogosphere in addition to the odd 
gallery exhibition.
8. Goldsmiths: But Is It Art?, episode 1.
9. Beauvoir, The Second Sex (2011), 653.
10. Kanouse, “Cooing.”
11. Sturtevant accomplished this by painstakingly mastering each work’s re-
spective medium, whereas Levine utilized various media to reproduce the works, 
most famously rephotographing Walker Evans’s iconic photographs. (Sturtevant, 
who hated the word copy, added subtle changes to her versions and called them 
“replications”; Levine called her exhibition After Walker Evans.) By marking 
both the virtual equivalence of the quality and manifest content of the original 
and copied works and yet the nonequivalence of their reception, Sturtevant and 
Levine highlighted (and found a way to profit from, as conceptual artists) the 
secondary treatment of women’s work within the art market. 
12. Jones, “The Artist.”
13. The emails reproduced here are excerpted.
14. Quoted in Randall, Pragmatic Plagiarism, viii.
15. Anna Watkins Fisher, Facebook message to Roisin Byrne, April 19, 2011.
16. Roisin Byrne, Facebook message to author, April 20, 2011.
17. Cerizza, “Roberto Cuoghi.”
18. MacGlip, “Interview.”
19. Serres, The Parasite, 38.
20. See Fisher, “We Are Parasites.”
21. Miller, “The Critic,” 439.
22. On April 30, 2013, the self- described “post post feminist” performance and 
curatorial collective h ag , comprising Clara Lipfert and Jasmin Risk, performed 
a show at Grace Space in Bushwick called par as it e . Their performance trolled 
J. P. Marin, who was in the audience, about what they perceived to be a patroniz-
ing review he had written about my article about my encounter with Byrne, “We 
Are Parasites: On the Politics of Imposition.” The performance mocks Marin’s 
“mansplaining” of feminist art by playing a recording of his review while na-
ked and surrounded by makeup and sex toys, so as to represent “feminist art” in 
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its most cliché form. The duo said that they played a recording of his review to 
highlight the way the review represented a male critic’s appropriation of femi-
nist art, their denial of a voice about their own relationship to feminist theory 
and practice by a male- centric discourse. “Having no words of our own, that 
is, speaking his review out loud, we wished to render literal the feeling of be-
ing talked at, talked over.” Clara Lipfert, emails to author, October 28, 2013, and 
January 6, 2014. For more about the performance see h ag , “Parasite.” For more 
about h ag , see their Tumblr page, hagcollective.tumblr.com. For Marin’s review 
of the performance about his review (and the full text of his original review),  
ee J. P. Marin, “Self- Described Feminist Appropriative Performance,” childproof 
tv, May 17, 2013, http://www.childproof.tv/popular- dialectics/2013/05/17/self 
- described- feminist- appropriative- performance/.
23. Bob Duggan, “Is Parasitism the Future of Feminist Art?,” Big Think,  
July 18, 2011, http://bigthink.com/Picture- This/is- parasitism- the- future- of 
- feminist- art.
24. His assistant responded by telling Byrne that the plant now had no value, 
since she was prohibited from selling it as a work of Starling’s. Starling himself 
added, “Even if this is the right rhododendron . . . the plant in itself has no real 
value — it perhaps had some value were [sic] it was but certainly not now.”
25. In The Bluest Eye, observes Robin Bernstein, Toni Morrison depicts the 
dichotomizing of racial innocence along the axis of femininity: “an imagining 
of white girls as tender, innocently doll- like, and deserving protection, and black 
girls as disqualified from all those qualities” (Racial Innocence, 29).
26. The Guardian art critic Adrian Searle has contended, “Back- story is ev-
erything in Simon Starling’s work.” Quoted in Stuart Jeffries, “ ‘I Got a Lovely 
Poem from a Lady in St. Albans about Sheds,’ ” Guardian, December 7, 2005, 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2005/dec/07/art.turnerprize2005.
27. Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge write, “Intersectionality is a way of 
understanding and analyzing the complexity of the world, in people, and in 
human experiences. The events and conditions of social and political life and 
the self can seldom be understood as shaped by one factor. They are gener-
ally shaped by many factors in diverse and mutually influencing ways. When it 
comes to social inequality, people’s lives and the organization of power in a given 
society are better understood as being shaped not by a single axis of social divi-
sion, be it race or gender or class, but by many axes that work together and influ-
ence each other” (Intersectionality, 2).
28. François Herpe, “La notion de ‘parasitisme artistique’: Une arme contre  
les contrefacteurs astucieux,” Eurojuris France, June 21, 2013, https://www 
.eurojuris.fr/articles/la- notion- de- parasitisme- artistique- une- arme- contre- les 
- contrefacteurs- astucieux- 1208.htm.
29. This Roisin Byrne’s entrepreneurial enthusiasm and story of personal re-
birth is so cliché and overstated that the website has the air of a fake. 
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